

THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY.

JANUARY, 1905.

ARTICLE I.

THE THEOLOGICAL TRAINING OF OUR PREACHERS.*

By W. H. DUNBAR, D.D.

My part in the service of this evening is in some sense perfunctory, almost, I should say, superfluous. It can only be introductory, and must of necessity be very limited. In the few moments I can take I shall speak of *The Theological Training of our Preachers*.

We are here to receive the public utterances of two of our brethren upon whom has been laid the high and holy responsibility of giving shape to the doctrinal thought of the men who are to stand in our pulpits. This is in accord with a wise provision of the Constitution of our Seminary. The founders assumed that the Church had no right to take for granted the doctrinal position and the theological equipment of even its most faithful and trusted servants, to whom was committed the training of its preachers.

The service of this evening is given a preëminent significance by its double character. And it is made especially important by the places which these two men are to occupy in our Theological Faculty.

* A charge delivered by Dr. Dunbar, as President of the Board of Directors, at the Inauguration of the Rev. J. A. Singmaster, D.D., and the Rev. Luther Kuhlman, D.D., as Professors in the Theological Seminary of the General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the United States, Gettysburg, Pa., October 13th, 1904.

The one is to be instructor in *Systematic Theology*. In some sense this must be regarded as the foundation of the preacher's training. For if the preacher goes wrong in doctrine; if there is a lack of clear apprehension of foundation truths; if there be uncertainty in the statement of religious principles, all technical knowledge goes for naught, or, worse still, is but equipment for the promulgation of error. A false note in the system of theology will vitiate all the rest. *Dogmatic Theology* is the rock of doctrinal stability.

The other of these men is to be the instructor of our preachers in *Biblical Theology*. It is, to say the least, a striking coincidence that these two should come together—the utterances of the teachers in *Systematic Theology* and in *Biblical Theology*. And it is as suggestive as it is striking. The two are the necessary adjuncts, the one to the other. Doctrinal Theology is the fruit stored away. Biblical Theology is plucking the fruit from the Tree of Life. Doctrinal Theology is the digging of the treasure from the inexhaustible mine. The key-question of sound doctrine is the question, not simply "What is the Bible?" but also, "What is in the Bible?" Upon the correct instruction on these questions must depend the soundness and vitality of our doctrinal system. More and more must the preacher of the day be led to apprehend what the Bible is and what is in the Bible. That it is not simply a "text-book of history, a manual of sacred geography, a compendium of religious precepts and customs, a dictionary of theological terms, a directory of good morals." More and more must the preacher of the day be led to lay hold on the vitality of truth in the Bible—the truth as it is in Christ—which alone is to elevate and regenerate and save the race—"the power of God unto salvation."

It is recognized everywhere that we are living in unsettled and unsettling times. The thought of the world is reshaping itself—settling itself to new forms and expressing itself in new statements in science, in literature, in art, in political economy. And our religious thinking is not escaping the trend of these readjusting movements.

Two perils face us in the presence of these movements:—

The one, the peril of being carried away from our doctrinal foundations. The Church is full of sad wrecks—souls that have drifted away from the sure foundations of faith. And the tide is rolling to the very pulpit steps. The preacher stands on sandy ground where doctrinal training has not been given with the soundness and holy enthusiasm of unerring faith—where apprehension and statement of doctrine is not clear.

The other is the peril of a false and fatal conservatism which blindly rejects all the results of progress in the discernment of truth. The statement is a truism that nothing is much deader than dead orthodoxy. We glory in our conservatism, but mere ignorant or thoughtless or narrow conservatism in a restless age gathers about it much of the drift-wood of the streams of thought which eddy about it. By and by it may be nothing but a moss-covered rock. Dr. Stork in his Inaugural Address called attention to the fact that Theology was no longer the queen of the Sciences she once was. That she was come to be regarded as "only a hanger-on at the door of the palace of knowledge." After some telling blows at the presumption of the thought which would thus dethrone Theology, he is yet forced to admit: "I am far from thinking that in this matter of loss of dignity, Theology is altogether blameless." * * * "Perhaps," he says, "the simplest form of indictment which would express the age's complaint against Theology, is that it has fallen out of relation with life." * * * "Now if we analyze this simple complaint into its causes, it means that Theology has lost its hold on the respect and interest of the age, because it has been too speculative, too notional, too much a matter of dialectics." Doctrine is not to be found in dead forms—least of all is "Lutheran Theology a dead, lifeless thing which cannot change." Pure and sincere criticism has its legitimate place. Its results are to be assimilated. After all the drift of religious thought is toward Christ. We would not be willing to admit that Christ has lost his claimed power to "draw all men to himself." A few days ago, in the lecture-hall of one of our great universities, it was my privilege to listen to a great English scholar, a Cambridge man, on *The Present Trend of Philosophical Speculation*. Some of his con-

clusions were astounding. The brief statement of it all was that "the religious pessimism of the old creeds was giving way to a healthy worldliness"—that "it was uncertain whether the outcome would be a new form of Christianity or a new religion." As the audience passed out of the door, from the grave student to the keen reporter, came a common protest against such conclusions—an expressed sense of the need of Christ and his gospel. Human thought in all its struggles is tending to Christ—not so much to the historical Christ—not so much to the Christ who was the Great Teacher of Galilee—but to the Divine Christ, who was "God manifest in the flesh," who lived among men, who died for men, who is men's ever-living helper. Our Theology must bring itself into relation with life by making itself the one satisfactory answer to the seeking of human thought. It needs to be vitalized by appreciating all that Christ is to the world—the Saviour of man—the Redeemer of the Race.

Now out of these conditions, and in the face of these perils, comes the need of keen and discriminating logic on the part of theological teachers. It is this gift in a preëminent degree, that made our beloved Professor of Theology, who now rests among us in well earned retirement, such a tower of strength to the Church. With an intense love for the truth, he combined a logic acutely keen and sharply discriminating—a philosophy which at once detected the false note in the most plausible argument. It is striking how uncertain logic is in its investigation of truth. Recently two important books have been given to the student world. They are on the same subject—the much-mooted Johannine Problem. Both books are by men of ripe scholarship—masters of the voluminous literature on the subject—broad-minded and judicial in tone—each following apparently an unerring logic to his conclusions—the one a Unitarian, the other a Roman Catholic. Strangely enough they reached conclusions directly antagonistic. And yet more strange, it is the Unitarian who came to the conclusion that the traditional view of the authorship should be upheld, and the Roman Catholic, who found that the traditional view of the authorship was irrevocably disproved. It is an evidence of

intellectual integrity, but at the same time of the uncertainty of logic.

So the Church has the right to ask of those who are to be the teachers of its preachers, that they make a statement of the foundations upon which they stand—that they give proof of their equipment for the work and that they make manifest their heart-enthusiasm and devoted love of the truth.

For this purpose we are here this evening. These men are to speak, not only to this limited audience, but to the Church, which centers in this Institution as in no other.

My brother, you are called to the Chair of Systematic Theology in the Theological Seminary of the General Synod. The Constitution makes it incumbent on me to deliver to you a charge. I have not felt like assuming that duty in a direct way. And I can do no more than in this general way remind you of the high and holy responsibility which rests upon you in the trust committed to your hands. And your sense of responsibility can not but be accentuated by the fact that you are called to stand in a place which, through all the history of the institution, has been occupied by men who have towered as giants, and who were towers of strength in the Church. Schmucker, the founder, whose unfaltering devotion and intellectual power made this Institution a possibility; Brown, beloved and honored by the generation of preachers whom he moulded, with thoughts clear as the light, with logic unerring as the needle; Stork, versatile, brilliant, beloved, the charm of whose life remains with all who ever came in touch with him; Valentine, keen and discriminating, devoted and loving—these are the men who have gone before you. Standing in this place, and in probably more eventful times, yours is a position which must command all your best energies, and must call into action all your mental and spiritual powers.

And to you, my brother, called to the Chair of Biblical Theology, I have only to say that your work is one which may well inspire the best faculties of mind and soul. To bring forth the rich treasures from the mine, to lead our preachers to the source of all truth, to open the great Book of inspired Revelation with all its beneficent blessings to the world. It is a com-

paratively new field in the sphere of our work, but a field without let or bound. It is a work high as heaven, far-reaching as eternity.

And so, my brethren, I join your hands to coöperate in the appointed work to which you have been called, praying that the Spirit of Divine Wisdom may be your guide.

ARTICLE II.

THE PROVINCE OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.*

By PROFESSOR J. A. SINGMASTER, D.D.

I desire first of all to express my appreciation of the confidence which the Board of Directors of the Theological Seminary has shown in elevating me to the Professorship of Systematic Theology and the Chairmanship of the Faculty. I do not underestimate the greatness of the task which has been laid upon me, a task which concerns the convictions of the future ministry of our Church, and which pertains to the weightiest problems that can engage human thought. Moreover, I am both depressed and inspired by the memory of the lofty standard which has been set by my predecessors in this high office. In the nearly fourscore years of the history of this Seminary, the Chair of Systematic Theology has had only five incumbents. My personal acquaintance with my four predecessors, and my intimacy with the two who were my instructors, have only heightened my admiration for their intellectual superiority and their nobility of character.

For the first thirty eight years of the existence of the Seminary the distinguished Schmucker, the profound scholar and prolific author, stamped the impress of his personality upon the Lutheran Church, which was best known to other denominations because of him. Then came Brown with his masterly logic, and power of debate, and great heart which endeared him to all of us who knew him. The brief and brilliant career of Stork, the prose-poet and philosopher followed. Ah, that

* Inaugural address of Dr. Singmaster at his installation as Professor of Systematic Theology in the Theological Seminary at Gettysburg, Pa.

he might have lived to verify our high expectations concerning him! Need I mention the saintly Valentine, whose benign presence we still enjoy, whose kindly ways have won the hearts of the students of the College and Seminary for a whole generation, and whose incisive pen has been a keen sword drawn in defence of the truth?

The vastness of the domain of truth suggested by the term Theology, which treats of God and his relation to the universe, offers for consideration themes which might be profitably discussed by my predecessor, whose ripe scholarship fits him for a task, which is more or less appalling to a younger man. There are, indeed, many questions of an immediately practical character, pertaining to the enlargement of the Seminary which I would prefer to take up. I am enthusiastic in my convictions that our Seminary should, and, by the providence of God will, take rank with other great Seminaries of the land. Yet it is proper that at this time I should say something which more directly concerns the chair which I occupy.

The Board of Directors and the Church have a right to know the attitude of their teachers on the vital and widely discussed questions which involve the very foundations of our faith. While this occasion would not justify the attempt at a profound technical discussion of some phase of theological thought, I may nevertheless endeavor to set forth the leading purposes of the Chair of Theology which I occupy. The theme which I have chosen is,

THE PROVINCE OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

The few words which I shall have time to utter bear particularly upon the character and needs of our own school, as I have learned to know it during the several years of my connection with it as a teacher. While our Church has not been entirely unaffected by adverse theological currents, we may be grateful that our institutions have never been disturbed by serious doubts concerning the fundamentals of the faith. We have had less to fear from the incursions of insidious unbelief than any other historic Church in the land. Whether this be owing to the simplicity of the faith and the close adherence to the word of God, which characterize the Lutheran Church, or

to other reasons, I am not prepared to say. At all events, the type of our teaching has always been constructive rather than defensive.

It has been the function of this school to make preachers rather than theologians, if we may differentiate the two. The demand for the former has always been so urgent among us that the temptation has been to send men to preach even before they were prepared. But now, we are convinced that the time is at hand when our course of study might be profitably broadened for the few whose tastes and natural ability dispose them toward further and deeper inquiries into great questions. The endowment of additional professorships, and the establishment of fellowships and lectureships underlie such a wider movement, which I now commend anew to the Board of Directors and to the wealthy stewards of our Church.

In addressing myself to my theme, I shall consider:

I. THE CLAIM OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY TO RECOGNITION.

Theology is not a very popular study. It does not rank in public esteem with natural science. It is the object of more or less misunderstanding and even obloquy. Christian people, who have given the matter no thought, sometimes speak slightly of it. The possibility of theology as a science has been disputed by the various adherents of agnosticism. An age of doubt, which denies any rational content to theology, despises it. Yet in spite of all opposition, theology survives, and from its very nature must always be considered in the discussions that pertain to God and man. As long as man's nature remains as it is, with a longing for the infinite, a panting after God, a reaching out for the mysterious and unfathomable, so long will there be a place for theology. In fact, every man is more or less of a theologian. It may be confessed that theology has at times put itself so out of touch with life through a false conservatism or an impractical scholasticism as to merit the neglect with which it has been treated. Yet, in all its aberrations, we submit, whether it has ever sought to palm off upon the credulity of its adherents speculation for fact in the same degree as has been done in the name of science and philosophy.

Theology claims to be a science because of its orderly arrangement of the facts which are the content of the Christian faith. The Bible is not a theology. It sets forth truth by way of law, commandment, history, poetry and parable. Its appeal comes to every age and every walk in life. It is a progressive revelation in contents and in method, through centuries and covenants. Yet through it all there runs a clear purpose and a unity of truth, which it is the province of theology to discover and set forth. We might as well expect a scientific botany in nature as an articulated theology in the Bible. Flowers are more than botany, and man is more than anatomy, and religion is more than theology. But it is for the welfare of man that from facts, principles should be deduced and new truths discovered. Theology is a science which deals with actual phenomena, and employs methods as accurate as any known in the realm of science. Moreover, it treats of matters which, in their intrinsic importance, transcend all others.

Systematic Theology deals with religious truth beyond that directly revealed in the Bible. While it bases all its deductions upon the Scriptures, and always makes them the norm, it takes into consideration the unfolding and developing of doctrine through the centuries. The influence of the Holy Spirit in the Church has led it into a clearer conception of truth. Through long struggles, as is evident from Church history, the true doctrine has become more and more emancipated from error. It is the province of Systematic Theology to summarize, to group, and to formulate the various results derived from Scripture, reason and experience. Thus is held the ground that is gained in the ceaseless conflict with error, and thus is conserved the fruit of the best thought of the Church.

The need of a theology grows also out of the very nature of the Church, which is the community of believers. It is vain to decry confessions, or creeds, or theology. They are as unavoidable as the constitutions, written or unwritten, which bind men in the same society. The Church is not organized on mere sentiment, sympathy or fellowship. It is founded on truth. It is a community of faith. There can be no real fellowship or coherence where there is no common standard as to

the meaning of language or the content of faith. There can be no edifying worship, no consistent teaching in school or pulpit without some kind of a theology.

The idea of proportion also demands a proper formulation of belief. No doctrine or phase of doctrine must be maintained at the expense of another. No unessential feature must be magnified; no abnormal development can be tolerated, for undue emphasis placed upon one idea must obscure others equally important. Theology aims at symmetry. It opposes barriers to "fads" and fanaticism. It strives to present the whole truth in right relations.

It need not be urged that theology is demanded as a means of defence against aggression. The first age of the Church was that of Apologetics in which the Fathers maintained the divine origin and character of our holy religion. Then came the age of Polemics in which the great questions of Christ's divine Sonship were finally settled. Whether the danger comes from heresy within or from assault without, Systematic Theology seeks to defend the faith. The creeds which it has formulated have been the bulwarks of the Church.

* 2. THE RELATION OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY TO OTHER DISCIPLINES.

Theology has been classified as Exegetical, Historical, Systematic and Practical. The first has to do with the text and its meaning. The second treats of the history of the Church, including History of Doctrine, and also Biblical Theology as a historical discipline. Practical Theology considers the application of doctrine to preaching, organization, and the like.

And now what place does Systematic Theology hold among these great and useful studies? Let me quote from the Inaugural of Dr. Patton, President of Princeton Seminary.

"The cathedral is the synthesis of all forms of art. Its beauty and the impressiveness of its services are largely in the fact that it is the blending of architecture, sculpture, painting and music. What the cathedral is to the arts, Systematic Theology is to the several Disciplines that enter into theological study. The systematic theologian is an architect. Less ac-

complished, perhaps, than others in the knowledge of any one specialty, he must be more accomplished than any in the knowledge of all specialties. Like the professed biblical theologian he gets his doctrines out of the Bible, but his work does not stop with Exegesis. He sees doctrines not only as separately deducible from Scripture, but as progressively unfolded in Scripture. He sees them as the subjects of varying fortunes in the course of history, as defended here and antagonized there. He sees them as the subjects of controversy and as the constituent elements in ecclesiastical symbols. He knows, moreover, that while some truths regarding God are found in the Bible and nowhere else, other truths may be seen in the light of nature. But these truths of natural religion stand polemically related to those forms of philosophic thought which deny them. And the truths of Revealed Religion have felt the warping, blighting, compromising influence of a false philosophy. The systematic theologian in the very act of being a systematic theologian must be an apologetic theologian, must be a polemic theologian, must be a student of philosophy, must be a biblical theologian, must be familiar with ecclesiastical history, must know the ins and outs of ecclesiastical life."

In short, Systematic Theology is the sum of all special departments of theological study. It crystalizes and arranges results. The greatness of the task involved appeals to the humility rather than the arrogance of the one on whom the burden falls. He cries out, Who is sufficient for these things?

3. THE BASIS OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

God has not left himself without witness even in the natural world. His impress is stamped on his works. By observation of nature, and also from intuition and metaphysical study men have arrived at some idea of a Supreme Being. But this idea is mixed with error. Systematic Theology has a more substantial basis than that obtained by man's unaided reason. It rests upon Revelation. It believes that the Old and New Testaments are God's message to men.

The ever recurring question is as to the truth of the Sacred Scriptures. Does God speak to us in them? Does our The-

ology accept them or explain them away? The Church is deeply concerned as to the position of its teachers on this point. It has heard something of the claims of destructive criticism. It fears lest her children be deceived by the confident boasts of infidels. The Church itself, as represented by the great mass of believers, is not disturbed as to its own faith, for God's people have the witness in themselves. Yet the Church desires that its teachers be sound in the faith, and that they correct the false impressions which have been circulated about the Book.

But has not the Bible actually suffered at the hands of the critics? We are sincerely of the conviction that the integrity of the Bible is unimpaired. It may be granted that with increasing investigation, false opinions about the Scriptures and faulty interpretations have been given up, and the end is not yet. Let genuine criticism have full sway. It can do nothing but good. Let us not forget that the essential character of the word of God is something beyond questions of grammar, or chronology, or cosmogony. The Bible does not stand or fall with a certain theory of the universe. Its reliability is bound up with the higher and supreme question of human redemption. Does it bring us relief and show us the way out of our sin cursed state? Is it a revelation of God through Jesus Christ, the professed Saviour? As long as the light of God shines on us through it, and leads us through his Son into life and fellowship it will remain true.

Much has been said of late of the Bible as literature. No doubt it is literature, but it is much more. Its form is literature, but its content is life. The critics who look upon the Bible as finished will naturally dissect it. But the Bible is not finished. The Word of God is a living force. The Holy Spirit still accompanies it and reveals its meaning. "Were the Spirit that gave the Word to cease to live or to act, the Word would cease to reveal. The essential idea is that in revelation the living God *speaks* not simply has spoken, to living man."

It has been said that the Lutheran Church has no theory of inspiration. It is just as well that our Confession makes no formal definition. Everybody knows where Luther stood at

Worms. His test of cononicity was always the testimony to Christ. And has not our Church expressed itself unequivocally about the Bible in making it the only rule of faith and practice? Our Theological Seminaries in this country have always maintained that the Bible is the Word of God, and are still in line with the Reformers who made it the "formal principle" of the Reformation. The belief in revelation is fundamental to the Christian faith and life. To abandon it is to give up Christ, whose place in history is assured. Hence, it is absurd to deny revelation. For the individual nothing could be more disastrous than to question the possibility of divine communication. "The man who does not believe that God can speak to him will not speak to God."

4. THE RELATION OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY TO SCIENCE.

The attitude of theology toward natural science may be that of hostility, of indifference, of fear, or of coöperation. The first of these is illustrated by the treatment accorded to Galileo and Newton for advocating discoveries now universally accepted. It can not be denied that as a rule the Roman Church has contested every forward step in science. The attitude of indifference is illustrated by the case of those who deny that the two have anything in common, or by the ultra-conservatives, who imagine that what the fathers did not know is not worth knowing.

The fears of good people lest science should overthrow the Bible are not only groundless but utterly unworthy of an honest man. According to the teachings which we hold, truth is above everything and will prevail. A nervous, over-anxious concern about the Bible betokens a lack of faith. If we have built upon the foundation of the Word of God the wood, hay and stubble of a mistaken interpretation let us welcome a conflagration that we may start afresh. And let us not forget that while theology is a science, its realm is vastly broader than that of physical science.

The attitude of the Protestant Church has always been that of friendliness toward scientific inquiry. It is in a measure under obligations for its existence to the revival of learning

previous to the Reformation. Since then the Church has been the chief patron of learning, and has founded the great schools of the world. As truth is an absolute unit, it is preposterous to speak about a conflict in the realm of truth. Believing that the God of nature is also the God of revelation, we may feel assured that no well authenticated discovery of science can be at variance with any correct interpretation of Scripture. When theology had no scientific method, and so-called science knew only hasty generalizations there was necessarily no harmony. But now that both acknowledge and practice the same method of inquiry the final outcome must be unity. They approach their respective tasks with certain fundamental assumptions, such as, (a) the reality of sense-perceptions, (b) the trustworthiness of mental operations, and (c) the existence of intuitive truths, for instance, that every effect must have a cause. Starting with these postulates they both proceed to perceive, gather, and arrange facts. And, finally, from these facts thus ascertained and classified, they deduce the laws which underlie and control them.

Now in proportion as they are true to their fundamental principles, and accurate in their investigations, and unbiased in their judgments, will their conclusions be reliable. It is here where flaws and differences are found. Fallible in reason and prejudiced in temper both sides have often erred.

It is to be remembered, however, that the theologian has a very decided advantage in his realm over the scientist in his, inasmuch as the former has a direct revelation and a special promise of illumination. This does not put him out of the category of science, for his reason must decide always as to the character of the evidence.

We need also to observe the caution that rarely can the students of the one be accurate judges of all the steps and processes of the other. The possibilities of the specialist in his department are impossibilities to the general scholar. Hence, there must often be a suspension of judgment until there be a well-founded consensus. Yet, every man of intelligence has the right to reject any apparent conclusion which contradicts well authenticated fundamental principles.

Scientists are dreamers quite as much as theologians. Literature is covered with the wreck of hypotheses. Stern facts have often disconcerted theories, for which any confident claims had been asserted. Only a few years ago Huxley proclaimed the unscientific, unchristian, unbiblical, and untrue theory of spontaneous generation of life, which has been utterly abandoned as being without proof. When science claims any discoveries that contradict essential accepted beliefs it is bound to make out a clear case or go by default. We are not aware that geology, astronomy, biology or historical investigation has destroyed any part of the Bible, or displaced the omnipotent, life-giving Creator, or robbed Christ of his divinity. A host of leading scientists are devout followers of the Lord Jesus, and hold to the Scriptures with unshaken confidence.

5. THE RELATION OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY TO PHILOSOPHY.

What has been said about theology and science is in large measure applicable also to theology and philosophy. As every man is somewhat of a theologian, so is he also somewhat of a philosopher. Theology and philosophy occupy in part the same ground. They both assume to investigate and to teach what is true concerning God and the world. "There is no province of human experience, there is nothing in the whole realm of reality which lies beyond the domain of philosophy or to which philosophical investigation does not extend. Religion, so far from forming an exception to the all-embracing sphere of philosophy, is rather just that province which lies nearest to it; for, in one point of view, religion and philosophy have common objects and a common content, and in the explanation of religion philosophy may be said to be at the same time explaining itself."—*Caird*.

While the domain and purpose of theology and philosophy are similar, their methods are radically different. Theology relies for its data chiefly upon the sacred Scriptures, receiving them as the true and, therefore, adequate explanation of the universe as the creation of Almighty God. Philosophy seeks to attain knowledge through speculation and induction from data entirely outside of revelation. Rejecting or ignoring the

latter and relying upon unaided reason, philosophy must fight its way through the deep obscurity surrounding our being and destiny. Moreover, philosophy is largely abstract and impersonal, while theology on the other hand revolves around a living, concrete Personality, Jesus Christ.

Christianity at its birth was greeted with scorn by philosophy. To the Greek the gospel was foolishness. Yet efforts were not wanting to amalgamate philosophy and theology. Philo, the learned Alexandrian Jew, endeavored to reconcile Plato and the Old Testament. Gnosticism tried to do the same with the New. The early Fathers seem to have profited in some ways by their study of philosophy. Nevertheless, it became a blight to the Church in various ways. Whether on the whole Christianity has gained or lost by contact with philosophy is an unsettled question. The Reformers, revolting against the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, held philosophy in small esteem. Luther, with characteristic vehemence, pronounced Aristotle a near neighbor of the devil and a spoiler of pious doctrine. This condemnation is too sweeping. The world holds the memory of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in high reverence. They were true seekers after light. Plato was a theist. Had he known Christ he would have rejoiced and received him.

There is a true philosophy which is the handmaid of theology, but much that is called philosophy would be rejected even by a heathen Plato were he here today. Toward this the attitude of theology must be antagonistic, because it is practically atheistic. The student of theology must know it chiefly that he may combat and overthrow it.

Under the general term "monism" recent philosophy has reproduced some of the pre-Christian and anti-Christian teachings of the ancient philosophers. This monism, as defined by Haeckel, "recognizes one sole-substance in the universe, which is at once God and nature, body and spirit (or matter and energy), and holds it to be inseparable." This is the materialistic monism of John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. Matter is everything. "Mind is only a product of organization and a mode of motion. Human thought is, therefore, only a

model function of the brain." There is no personal God. There is no God at all except matter.

Revolting from this form of monism another, larger and more dangerous class of teachers, said to be found in our leading universities, maintain an "idealistic monism," which recognizes mind as the only real substance, and denies the reality of the eternal word apart from the thinking mind.

A third monism is pantheistic in still larger measure. According to this pantheistic monism, mind and matter are only different aspects or attributes of one infinite substance.

Such, in a word, are some of the phases of philosophy which meet the student, and which he will have to understand if he would withstand them and their blighting influence upon the faith of many.

6. THE RELATION OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY TO PREACHING.

Dr. McKenzie, in his recent inaugural address, sums up the task of the systematic theologian to be "to discover and set forth absolute truth, to produce immutable convictions in the mind of those who have consecrated their whole lives to the work of conveying these convictions to the minds of the people at large."

The Seminary is a place where a young man finds himself anew, where he readjusts himself to his larger horizon, where he reaches convictions concerning the truth and his business to preach it. For, the central theme of all theological teaching must after all be the same theme which furnishes the preacher his message every Sunday. The teacher, therefore, must teach Christ, if the preacher is to preach Christ. I agree with Delitzsch when he says: "So firmly am I convinced of the practical aim of all scientific labors that I regard the sermon as the culmination of all theological attainments." I believe that Systematic Theology is, therefore, properly taught when it fits men for the plain persuasive preaching of the word.

Theology for the sermon, for the teaching of the people is, therefore, our end. Theology must be to every sermon what the bony structure is to the body. No man can become a strong, confident preacher who is not a theologian. A correct

theological conception will suggest in clear logical order the saving truths that cluster about every text. It will give him clear-cut and consistent ideas. It will keep him from blundering. He will not misrepresent his Lord, nor mislead the poor sinner. He will have a wider range of truth, and not be forever harping on a single idea. His preaching will be full-orbed and edifying. No oratory or acquaintance with science, art or literature can atone for the lack of a well grounded and symmetrical knowledge of Christian doctrine.

7. THE METHOD OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

By the method of theology is meant the point of view from which it is approached. With what does it start? What is its central doctrine? Around what does it revolve? The central truth is determinative of all the rest. The relations and comparative importance of the various parts of a system are affected by the dominating idea. Its logical coherence and its practical application are involved in the settlement of the method or point of view. The motions of the planets was never understood until astronomy found the true centre of the solar system in the sun and not in the earth.

The method of theology differentiates the two great Reformation theologies, the Lutheran and the Calvinistic. The latter finds its centre in God as a sovereign; the former in God manifest in the flesh. There is truth in both. Nevertheless, it seems most in accordance with the nature of the case that we should approach God as he approaches us, that is, through Christ.

The Christo-centric method of schematizing the doctrines has recently been disparaged by a great Calvinistic divine (Dr. Patton), who likens dogmas to blocks which may be built into any shape without affecting the significance of each. "You may build castles or cathedrals," says he, "but however much you change the relations of these blocks to each other, you do not on that account change the individuality of each." It is true that the individuality is not changed by a mere transfer, but the importance of the block may be thus immensely altered. A block may be removed from a solid wall without

materially affecting it; but the keystone of an arch can not be taken away without causing a collapse.

It seems to us that the whole question of theology is simplified by starting with Christ, for here is a concrete fact, a great Personality. "The doctrine of Christ," says Schaff, "is the soul and centre of all sound Christian theology." Moreover, as in the first centuries the theological conflict waged around the Person of Christ, so in these later years this same question is again uppermost. For, even from a philosophical standpoint, Christ must be the determining element. The historical spirit can not ignore "the Supreme Person of history. He has left the mark of his hand on every generation of civilized men that has lived since he lived, and it would not be science to find him everywhere, and never to ask what he was, and what he did."

The problem of Christ's person involves the settlement of all the related questions of Creation, Mediation, Atonement, Resurrection and the future life. Given the divine-human Personality, all difficulties dwindle, and all doubts vanish.

Fairbairn, the leading Christian philosopher of our day, says: "The Lutheran Theology is essentially a soteriology, a science of the Redeemer's person and work, profoundly conscious of man's sin and the grace by which he is saved. * * * To it two things were necessary—the Scriptures, the source of all of our knowledge of the justifying Person; and the Sacraments, means by which his people communicated with him, especially in the act of his passion and death. The philosophers who have most strenuously handled and most nearly solved the problem [of the Incarnation] have been the sons of the land and of the church of Luther; and the theologians of other lands and churches that have to-day attempted through the Incarnation to vivify theology and relate it to modern knowledge are only paying unconscious but deserved homage to the faith and insight of the reformer and his sons."

As the Scriptures are the "formal principle" of the Reformation so is the doctrine of justification by faith its "material principle." This is Luther's doctrine of "a standing or a falling Church." The question is still discussed, What is the distinguishing doctrine of our Church? Sometimes it is said to

be justification, and again the sacraments. A truer answer is, It is the emphasis which it places on the doctrine of the Person of Christ. For the object of faith in justification is nothing less than Christ, and the union and communion which are set forth in the sacraments are union and communion with Christ, the living Head.

"This is the most important article of the Christian faith," says Luther, "that the Son is true God and also true man, and that he was sent into the world to save it." Concerning this Köstlin says: "Everything is thus made to depend upon the article concerning Christ, the Son of God sent into the world, who has secured forgiveness of sins and eternal life. Whosoever has this Christ has all things. This article and that upon justification are one."

But do we not magnify the Person of Christ unduly in comparison with His Work? Is not the death of Christ the chief thing? And is not the Atonement the central doctrine? The answer is plain, that what he is, is more than what he does. Even his dying was only to the end that we might have life in and through him. His inexpressible work is the exhibition of his unutterable love.

The theology of our Church, we believe, to have the right method; but we can not justify the vain disputations of her dogmaticians who have sometimes endeavored to explain what they confessed to be mysteries. The doctrine of the presence of Christ in the Holy Supper, for instance, has been the occasion of frequent offense, because it has been so bunglingly presented. The precious truth involved is simply that the whole Christ gives himself to satisfy the hungering soul.

The theology, then, which we hold and which we teach is that which revolves about Christ. It is religious rather than philosophical, and didactic rather than polemic. We believe that the world needs now and always the truth as it is in Jesus. As the sum of joy and hope is in finding Christ—the Christ whom the Baptist heralded, whom Philip found, whom Peter confessed, whom John declared, whom Paul proclaimed, so the chief duty of the theologian is to set forth Christ to the end that the young men may go and preach him as the only hope of a dying world.

ARTICLE III.

BIBLICAL THEOLOGY: ITS RELATION TO MINISTERIAL TRAINING.*

By LUTHER KUHLMAN, D.D.

Article I of the Constitution thus defines the object which the fathers had in view when they undertook the founding and equipment of a Seminary: "To provide our churches with pastors who sincerely believe the Word of God as contained in the canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments to be the only infallible rule of faith and practice, and who hold the Augsburg Confession to be a correct exhibition of the fundamental doctrines of the Divine Word, and who will teach them." It is designed that the ministry here trained shall be marked by ability and sound learning; shall exhibit unanimity of views and harmony of feelings, unselfish devotion, and deep, fervent piety; all in order that the Kingdom of the Redeemer may be effectually promoted. It is further enjoined upon directors, professors and pupils, that this design of the Institution shall always be sacredly kept in view.

The Seminary has, then, a high function. In the work and life of the Church it occupies a place of first importance. In view of the many and great differences between the time present and the times former, preaching does not hold the commanding place it once did. Yet it cannot pass away. God will not displace his own chosen instrumentality, and the quality of the ministry will measure the efficiency and progress of the Church in the whole wide field of beneficent activity; will shape and color the religious views, feelings, temper and character of the people, and will largely determine the place of our Lutheran Communion in the household of Christian faith. There is no interest of the Church, no phase of her work which is not directly related to, and affected by, her ministry.

*Inaugural of Dr. Kuhlman at his installation as Professor of Biblical Theology in the Theological Seminary of the General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the United States. Delivered in the College Church, Gettysburg, Pa., October 19th, 1904.

With this sentiment before me, and earnestly responsive thereto, the one practical question which concerns alike the Church, the Seminary, the students and myself, is: How can this Chair of Biblical Theology, to which I have been called, and the duties of which I have already entered upon, be made to contribute most largely to the equipment, intellectual and spiritual, of an adequate, efficient, godly ministry? All that the donors, whose generous gifts made this professorship possible, had in view, and all that the Church may rightly expect and ask from this department, is comprehended in this question. And the answer is conditioned upon a number of things, but for this occasion, and for the purposes of this address, the answer will depend upon what this Chair is, and what it shall be made in the work of the Institution. This is the final test of all theological training.

As a clearly defined, independent branch of theology, Biblical Theology is a modern science, and its addition, as it now stands, to the curriculum of the Seminary, dates back only four years. This statement applies only to the form, and not to the substance of Biblical Theology. As to the latter, it is as old as the Bible itself. In its origin and development this science furnishes an interesting illustration of the manner in which a great historic movement, revolutionary in character, in spirit hostile to the Bible, came, in the outworking of divine providence, to contribute to the better understanding, and the firmer establishment of the faith which it sought to overthrow. The Reformation, not to go farther back, was a spiritual revival. Luther and others apprehended the great facts and truths of the gospel with apostolic vividness. The theological results wrought out in this memorable struggle were put into systematic form by the scholastics of the seventeenth century. Then followed the period in which Rationalism held sway. This movement abjured all ecclesiastical authority; divested the Bible of its divine character, and assailed the Bible and orthodoxy in turn. It did great harm, and yet there is some compensation. The assault challenged defense, and out of the investigations necessitated by this attack was born the whole

group of accepted sciences which, in the broad sense, make up Biblical Theology.

The steps of the process through which this science passed in its disentanglement from related branches of theological learning are indicated by Oehler in his standard work on Old Testament Theology. "During the whole development of Church Doctrine down to the Reformation, and also in the old Protestant theology, no distinct line was drawn between the essential contents of revelation as they are laid down in the Scriptures, and the doctrinal formulas developed from them; and still less were the successive stages of revelation and types of doctrine which are presented in Scripture recognized." "The distinction between the law and the gospel, and the difference in degree between the revelation in the Old and the New Testament," were noted, but not sufficiently recognized. Of the early Fathers Augustine alone makes any real contribution to this science. No progress was made during the Middle Ages, the dominant tendencies being unfavorable. Sound hermeneutical principles were wanting, and so the study of the Bible frequently degenerated into wild and fanciful speculation. The Reformation principle of the supreme authority of Scripture, the interpretive principle requiring the expositor to get at the literal sense of the original text, did much in preparing the way for a correct understanding of the Bible. Particularly were the spiritual character of the Old Testament, and its preparatory and educational place in the divine redemptive plan, more clearly discerned. In the older Protestant theology much that should have been gained through the application of the sounder principles of interpretation which were now recognized, was lost because "the unity of the Old and New Testaments was conceived of, not as produced by a gradually advancing process of development, but as a harmony of doctrine." Proof texts for systematic doctrine were drawn alike from the Old and the New Testament. Bengel "insisted on an organic and historical unity of the biblical revelation with strict regard to the difference of its stages," while the Würtemberg school sought "especially to awaken a knowledge of salvation resting on insight into the whole of the divine kingdom." The ad-

vance toward a better understanding of the Bible here observable was hindered by English deism which swept over Germany. This assumed the naturalistic attitude, so prevalent in certain quarters at the present time. It treated the Bible not so much as a revelation from God to man, but as a record of man's striving after truth and his effort to establish religion. Oehler assigns to John Philip Gabler (1787) the honor of being the first to clearly differentiate this branch of study from others, and "to speak distinctly of Biblical Theology as an historical science." Gabler defined the work of Biblical Theology to be "the statement of the religious ideas of Scripture as an *historical fact*, so as to distinguish the different times and subjects, and so also the different stages in the development of these ideas." This definition differs in no essential particular from the one proposed by Oehler, and other accepted ones which will be cited later. The principles thus enunciated were taken up and applied by Lorenz Bauer in his *Theology of the Old Testament* (1796), Baumgarten Crusius's *Outlines of Biblical Theology* (1828), and Daniel v. Coelln's *Biblical Theology* (1836). According to Oehler these latter two "are the first works that make the transition to a thorough treatment of the subject." Other notable authors in this field are Hess, Menken, Hengstenberg, Hävernicks, Hofman, H. Schultz, H. Ewald and many others. In the study of the New Testament we have the names of Schmid, Messner, Van Osterzee, Weis and Beyschlag. By no means all that these men have written is to be accepted. Important principles applied by some of them are in unmistakable conflict with the view which the Bible takes of itself, and hence are to be rejected. Yet, by their great ability, their profound learning, and by their unwearying labors and research, they have done much to bring this science to its present status, and so have made all who desire a fuller knowledge of divine revelation their debtors.

Having thus hastily referred to the steps by which Biblical Theology has come to its recognized position, we proceed to state a little more fully what it is, its particular field, and its method. This will enable us to form an estimate of its worth and its relation to theological training.

The phrase "Biblical Theology" is used by writers with some latitude—now in a wider, and now in a narrower sense. This was to be expected. As an illustration of the employment of the term in a comprehensive sense, as well as for a clear statement of the reasons which justify its use in this manner, we may refer to Principal Cave. In his "Introduction to Theology and its Literature," "Biblical Theology" is made the third main division of the theological sciences, being preceded by Natural Theology and Ethnic Theology. He defines it as the "science—or more accurately the group of sciences—concerned with the facts presented by the Bible." It treats, "according to scientific method, of everything pertaining to the interpretation and exposition of Scripture. By collecting, classifying, examining and reasoning upon the data supplied by the Old and New Testaments, an organism of sciences is built up, to which collectively the name of Biblical Theology is given." In the classification of this group of sciences they fall under three heads, such as are preparatory to the interpretation of Scripture, as Canonics, Textual Criticism, Philology, Literary Criticism, etc.; secondly the exegesis of the several books of the Bible; thirdly the sciences resulting from the application of the knowledge gained by Exegesis, such as Biblical History, Biblical Dogmatics, and Biblical Ethics. So broad is the view of Dr. Cave as to what is embraced in Biblical Theology. He admits that this use of the term is at variance with the employment of it by some other writers. It is to be said for this learned and stimulating author that he presents the considerations which lead him to propose the divisional scheme he does, with great clearness and force.

In the narrower sense of the term, and this is the one that was had in mind when this position was designated the "Chair of Biblical Theology," it corresponds almost precisely to what Dr. Cave names the "Inductions of Biblical Theology." The definition of Gabler has been given, and need not be repeated. Oehler says, "the Theology of the Old Testament is the historical exhibition of the religion contained in the canonical books of the Old Testament." Schaff says: "Biblical Theology is a systematic representation of the revealed or Biblical

religion in its primitive form, as laid down in the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments, and as distinct from its subsequent development and comprehension in different ages and branches of the Church." Davidson puts his conception tersely: "Biblical Theology is the science of the religion of the Bible;" and in a way that appeals to the practical mind when he says, "Biblical Theology is the knowledge of God's great operation in introducing his kingdom among men, presented to our view exactly as it lies presented in the Bible." Analysis of these definitions will disclose the main features of this science.

First, the knowledge which it has to offer is drawn exclusively from the Bible. There are other sources of information but Biblical Theology does not consult them except incidentally and as the Bible itself recurs to them. The universe, including man in his rational and moral nature, is the thought and work of God, and to thoughtful and inquiring minds of all ages has evidenced not merely the Divine Being, but made some disclosure of his character and his relations to man. This knowledge is as the twilight, but, so far as it goes, Natural Theology is true. "It has been supposed also that the writers of the Old Testament possessed themselves, and imparted to favorite disciples, an esoteric faith, deeper and more catholic than that which they gave to their countrymen in writing. No traces of such a thing appear in Scripture." "Concurrent external traditions and to some extent coincident with the Scriptures, and for which is claimed the power of aiding, and to some extent controlling, the interpretation of these," the Old Testament Apocrypha, and "the so-called 'antecedents' of Biblical teachings discoverable in the literary remains of other nations, may all, in cases where they exist, and in some instances they do, contribute somewhat to the fuller understanding of the Christian faith," but when the subject in hand is Biblical Theology, they are outside of the field of inquiry. The only text book it recognizes is the Bible. (Davidson).

Second, deriving its knowledge from the Bible, Biblical Theology aims to set forth this knowledge in Biblical form. By this it is not meant that the presentation is in Biblical phrase-

ology, but truth in the order, the degree of completeness, and in the relationship which the Bible as a book, itself discloses. Divesting itself as far as may be of all preconceived notions concerning the content of the Bible, holding in abeyance all inferences and deductions in the creeds and systematic theologies of the Church, it seeks to read not only the divine message, but to read it in the manner in which it was delivered. Oehler quotes with approval the statement of Nägelsbach in his *Homeric Theology*, namely, that his "object was to give the knowledge which Homer's men had of the Deity; and the effects produced by this knowledge in life and faith." This is to understand Homer's story as he told it—manifestly a fair treatment. Biblical Theology accepts this principle; its religious ideas, convictions and truths are drawn directly from the Bible, and the Bible again is the principle which binds this material into an organic unity. This is to interpret the Bible biblically.

Conforming to this principle, Biblical Theology recognizes two leading features in the revelation which it seeks to set forth.

First, this revelation is in the form of a history extending over a long course of time. This statement is more fully applicable to the Old Testament than to the New. If we were entirely without any knowledge of a divine revelation and were asked to say how one would be given, what form it would take, we would hardly have named the one we find. And yet the more clearly we understand God's character, his attributes, and the end contemplated in revelation, the more are we persuaded that it could take no other form than the historical. These attributes are *moral* qualities, such as holiness, goodness, mercy and love. The end sought in revelation is identical with that in creation. The creative work culminated in man made in the image of God, and in virtue of this divine likeness standing in spiritual fellowship with God. This relationship was broken by sin. It is the aim of the redemptive scheme to restore this relation and bring it to its completion. In this undertaking not only is the advance from the divine side, but from the same source comes the endowment of power for man's participation therein. God takes the initiative by establishing

a covenant between himself and man. And the comprehensiveness of the aim in the divine revelation becomes apparent when it is remembered that Abraham is to be regarded not merely as an *individual*, but as the *head*, the *representative* of a nation, in the final view thereof, coextensive with humanity, and that the covenant, as developed in the institutions of Mo-saism, embraces all the spheres of man's life. So in the Old Testament we see God ordaining for this chosen nation not merely ordinances of worship, but social and civil institutions. We have depicted in intense and vivid form a national history, including the "migration of the ancestors of the people from the East," the descent to Egypt, the bitter oppression, the deliverance, the period of the Judges, the Monarchy, the division of the Kingdom, the parallel course of the two kingdoms, the Exile and the Restoration. This story with all its lights and shades of hope and despondency, of prosperity and adversity, together with the Message of the prophets, whose function was not merely to communicate the "Thus saith the Lord," but to interpret for the nation its own history, "thus to impress deep religious convictions upon the hearts of the people, and awaken a strong consciousness in them of a present God in the midst of them, and a deeper longing for fuller manifestations of the Messianic redemption," and the Wisdom, these constitute the Old Testament. In this history, covering more than a thousand years, as well as in Prophetism and Wisdom, is embodied the divine revelation.

Second, This historically communicated revelation observes a law of development. Christ not only teaches, but beautifully illustrates this feature when he says: "So is the kingdom of God, as if a man should cast seed into the ground; and should sleep, and rise night and day, and the seed should spring and grow up, he knoweth not how. For the earth bringeth forth fruit of herself; first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear." The day of full-orbed divine truth as contained in the whole Bible, comes to men, as the sun rises. The first indications along the horizon that the dawn is approaching are often so faint as to be scarcely discernable. Gradually they increase in clearness; there are distinct rays rising higher and

higher in the sky; now they are obscured by a passing cloud, but this is only momentary, and now—it is day. Symbol this of the coming of the Son of God, who is the consummation of this revelation. The day that witnesses his advent is preceded by a dawn extending over thousands of years. Nor are we to be regarded as reading this view into the Bible. It is the one it takes itself. The Old Testament does not regard itself as a finality. One of its characteristics is the spirit of eager expectation which pervades it. And when we turn to the New Testament we discover a corresponding note of completeness.

Such, then, being in general the character of Biblical Theology, and the principles which it observes, what of its value and relation to the realization of the purpose for which the Seminary exists, and for which this Chair was endowed? Accepting the legitimacy of this science, that it rests in well established principles, and earnestly pursued, what are some of the benefits which should accrue from its study? Several may be indicated.

1. Biblical Theology begets and fosters soundness in the faith. In one aspect of the matter we have fallen upon troublesome times. Never before, perhaps, have the Bible and the religion founded upon it, been subjected to such rigid investigation as at present. Time was when men's reverence for the Book as an inspired document made them hesitate to subject it to the tests of reason. Whether for better or worse, this is no longer the case. The air resounds with criticism. The authorship of the Bible, its text, its literary character and history, its morals, its doctrines, the Book in its entirety, are brought before the bar of reason, and made to stand or fall according to its dicta. Nor is it unjust to say that much of this criticism seems unfriendly in spirit. While loudly proclaiming its purpose to ascertain truth, the very principles in accordance with which its conclusions are reached, are often the veriest assumptions. Yet these conclusions are frequently put with a literary skill and adroitness, with such show of vast learning and a positive air of finality, as to almost compel acceptance. How, in the presence of this subtle, adverse influence, can the humble minister of the gospel preserve his faith in the

supernatural character of his message, and that in the Bible he has a trustworthy record of God's revelation to man? It is urged that he must meet the critic upon his own field, match skill with skill, argument with argument, learning with learning, and in this way expose the groundlessness of assertions put forth with the boldness and confidence of truth. This is one method of defense, but can the average minister, with his limited facilities for research, be expected to adopt it against an expert? In most cases it will be impracticable. Neither, on the other hand, can he take refuge in the denial of the right of criticism, assuming that the fact of inspiration removes the Bible from the field of investigation. The Bible claims no such exemption for itself. It allow and invites criticism. Its appeal is to man's intelligence, and while there are depths which the mind cannot fathom, sunlit heights which it cannot ascend, in neither aspect is it against reason. The Bible challenges faith, but not a blind and unquestioning faith. It undertakes to settle doubts and fears, to vindicate its high claims before the bar of every candid mind. Here, then, is a safe position. Does any one question that the sun is? Does he undertake to shatter our belief in the unique character and functions of the sun? We do not waste time and temper in dispute with such an one. We put our hand upon his shoulder, turn him about, thrust him through the door out under the cloudless sky of noon, and the sun overwhelms him with a thousand arguments. This is the effective way, and it is the way in which Biblical Theology proposes to assist those whose faith may be disturbed by the hasty, illogical conclusions of destructive criticism. The Bible is its own defense. Its truths are self-evidencing. To the open mind, the submissive will, the believing heart, they carry conviction.

2. Biblical Theology is intimately related to Natural Theology and Ethnic Theology. Recent years have witnessed a greatly increased interest, particularly in the latter subject. It is a superficial judgment which affirms that mankind has been, and is, supremely interested in things material and temporal. Despite the apparent indifference and almost earthiness of the masses, the nobler spirits have always been intent upon high

themes. Wonderful as is the order of nature in which man finds himself, great and rich and mysterious as is his own nature, these do not satisfy him. He seeks God. Without him he cannot rest. We may say, men do not care for God, and yet that truth is the centre about which life and history have been built. Plutarch affirms that "there has never been a state of atheists, and that belief in the gods is the bond of all society, and the pillar of all legislation." With deep insight and fine eloquence Max Müller writes, "the great epochs in the world's history are marked, not by the foundation or the destruction of empires, by the migration of races, or by French revolutions; all this is outward history, made up of events that seem gigantic and overpowering to those only who cannot see beyond or beneath. The real history of man is the history of religion; the wonderful ways by which the different families of the race advance toward a truer knowledge and love of God. This is the foundation that underlies all profane history; it is the light, the soul and life of history, and without it all history would be profane indeed."

While now this quickened interest in ethnic religions is in itself a favorable omen, it also has its own danger. There are not wanting those who in their investigations have reached the conclusion that the Bible is only one of a number of sacred books. In some aspects its superiority may be admitted, but the exceptional character of the Bible in its origin, revelation and truth, this is practically set aside. It is *one* among *many*. Such a conclusion we cannot accept. The Bible admits that there are other sources of knowledge of the supernatural, but in the domain of religion it claims to stand in a class by itself, as a source of complete, full and final knowledge of divine things. This claim Biblical Theology must help to make good and sustain.

3. Still more clearly does the value of this science appear when we note its relation to the studies, the work and the character of the ministry.

a. Whatever scheme of division of the several branches embraced in a full theological course we may adopt, Biblical Theology inevitably gravitates to a central and regulative posi-

tion. This is due to the unique character of the Bible itself. While it is not the only source of religious truth, it is the highest and the final source. Christianity is founded on the Bible, and its perpetuity, its progress and growth until it fills the whole earth are bound up with the ever clearer apprehension of its truth. And so it is that all theological studies find either their goal, or their starting point in Biblical Theology. Biblical Introduction, Biblical Criticism, Biblical Archæology, and Exegesis, and so forth, all have one common purpose, that they may ascertain all the facts necessary to a clearer apprehension and fuller understanding of the entire contents of the Bible. Ecclesiastical theology and doctrinal theology, on the other hand, have their origin in the Bible. This is the living, nourishing fountain whence they flow. "For," says one, "what is ecclesiastical theology? Is it not the scientific study of the doctrines and practices confessedly drawn by the Church of Christ from the Bible, which records the initial stages of these practices and doctrines? How then shall the development of Christendom be scientifically traced if its primary phases be not scientifically known? How shall the Post-Apostolic Age be accurately understood from ecclesiastical writers, if the Apostolic Age be not accurately understood from the writers of the New Testament? How shall the darkness of the Middle Age be depicted except by contrast with the brightness of the days when the Acts of the Apostles were penned? How shall the epoch of the Reformation be satisfactorily delineated, restorative as it was of the primitive Apostolic Age, unless the written records of the Apostolic Age themselves have been laid bare by capable writers of the New Testament times?" So also, creedal developments and doctrinal systems which professedly arise out of the Bible, must consent to return to it for comparison, for correction when necessary. They must be subject to Biblical Theology, not Biblical Theology to them.

b. Again, Biblical Theology bears directly upon the minister's work, and should better prepare him for the same. Among men there is no higher, holier calling than his, and none that entails a more solemn responsibility. His office is to teach, to expound and apply the Word of God. For the high and the low, the learned and the simple minded, he is to declare the

whole counsel of God so that they may hear, believe, and be saved. But how can he teach and enforce that which he does not know? The physician must be competent not only to examine his patient and determine the malady from which he is suffering, but he must also possess a full knowledge of his *materia medica* so as to be able to administer the proper remedy. The minister is a spiritual physician. He is in a veritable hospital. About him are the sick, the wounded, the dying, all victims of the one terrible disease, the leprosy of sin. But let him not be disheartened, nor turn away from any. There is balm in Gilead. His Bible will furnish him a specific for every spiritual disorder that he may encounter, but he must know where to find it, and how to administer it. Or, to change the figure, the minister's weapon of offense and defense is the sword of the Spirit. But, he must prove it, learn to handle it, to parry and trust therewith, or he will be as helpless with it in his hands as was the youthful David in the unaccustomed armor of King Saul. In the sermon, in the conduct of the order of worship and the administration of the sacraments, and in his pastoral work among his people, the one function of the minister is to bring home to the hearts and lives of men the truth, to bring from this divine, inexhaustible repository, treasures both new and old, so that each under his care may receive his appropriate portion. How can he do this? There is one way, and only one, by the constant, diligent, prayerful and systematic study of the truth. The criticism which may be justly spoken of much present-day preaching is, that it has gone too far afield. It is too much to expect of every one who ascends a pulpit that he shall be learned or eloquent in the ordinary acceptance of these terms, but it is not too much to require of him that he be soundly, earnestly biblical.

c. Important as the better and fuller understanding of the content of the Bible is to each of the particulars thus noted, I venture to say that its relation to the character and spiritual life of the minister is more important. A question debated in ecclesiastical assemblies and elaborated in religious magazines, almost to the point of weariness, is, "a ministry suitable for the

times." Not necessarily perhaps, but practically so, the form of the theme carries the implication that present times are so different, so greatly changed from times preceding, that the ministry adequate and suitable to the latter is not so for the former. It may not be easy to define wherein the deficiency lies, but the inference is that it exists. In the enumeration of the requisite qualities for a suitable ministry, emphasis is laid upon the necessity for more thorough collegiate training, for wider attainments in all the fields of general and special knowledge, a finer intellectual culture. This, on the one hand. On the other he must be a man of affairs, in touch with the spirit and tendencies of his environment, keenly alive to the ills that afflict and the dangers that threaten society in all its forms. He must possess the power of leadership and organization, be eloquent in speech, consummate in tact and common sense in dealing with men and things, a paragon of excellencies. With this standard I have no special fault to find—so far as it goes. The importance of all these qualities may be freely conceded. The underlying requisite, however, of an effective, God-honored ministry is not touched upon. Behind all these qualifications, whether social, executive or intellectual, is character. If this be not constituted in righteousness, and interpenetrated with the mind, the spirit, the devotion, the sympathy, the love, the purpose and faith and ideals of the Master, then the ministry, however gifted, and learned and humanly masterful, will never measure up to the needs of the times, will measurably fail—and I do not hesitate to say that it ought to fail. The Christian man is before and greater than the mere preacher, however accomplished. The upbuilding of the people of our churches, the moral restoration and spiritual uplift of society in all its phases, the steady progress of the Kingdom of God until it encompasses the whole earth—all this will be the triumph of the truth, not truth in the abstract, not truth written or printed so much, as truth in the concrete, the gospel of Christ embodied, exemplified in those who profess it and proclaim it. Given this character, and add thereto the other gifts referred to, and you shall

have a ministry adequate to the demands of this age, and of every age.

If now it be inquired how shall this preëminent qualification be attained, the answer is at hand, through the fuller knowledge of the truth. The study of the Bible according to the methods and principles of this science presents and unfolds God's revelation to man as a gradual process, "a development from less to more, through a series of ascending imperfect forms, each unfolding out of the other up to the perfect form," the fullness of God's face, the brightness of his glory, the express image in the person of Jesus Christ. He is the Alpha and the Omega of revelation, and to grasp this is to possess the key for its understanding. But this, so to speak, is only *half* the purpose. Keeping step with this ever widening and clearing vision of truth is the spiritual transformation of the beholder by the truth. The apprehension, belief and obedience of truth, this lifts men Godward. So writes St. Paul: "We all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord." Not merely present advancement in the divine life is conditioned upon beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, but the perfection of character, the fullness of unalloyed happiness and reward in the final consummation, are all predicated upon seeing him as he is.

This, imperfectly wrought out, is my conception of Biblical Theology, and its highest practical worth of in our Seminary. That its students may gain a somewhat completer understanding of the Book as a whole, that he who is its all and in all may stand out before them more distinctly, his life fill them, his truth enlighten them, his zeal inflame them, his love constrain them to place their lives upon the altar of that service to which he is calling them, for this end, God being my helper, I am willing to give my best endeavor.

ARTICLE IV.

DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE.

By Professor J. W. RICHARD, D.D., LL.D.

The State regards marriage, primarily, as a civil contract between one man and one woman, and makes large provision for the disannulling of the marriage contract upon the complaint of one or of both of the contracting parties; nor has the State enacted rigid laws against the remarriage of persons who have obtained the legal dissolution of the marriage contract. Rather does she proceed on the principle that it is against public policy to place barriers in the way of marriage. The procreation of a legitimately begotten population is a vital concern with the State, nor is it to be expected that she should place weighty emphasis on the religious and ethical features of marriage. She has to deal chiefly with the civil features of marriage. The attitude of the Church toward marriage is very different from that of the State. The Church regards marriage primarily as a divine institution—as the union of one man and one woman for life. In itself the marriage bond is indissoluble. "What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder." Matt. 19:6. The object of marriage is the reciprocal support and mutual happiness of husband and wife, and the legitimate propagation and Christian education of the human race. The Church, therefore, must have regard for the religious and ethical features of marriage. And, regarding marriage as a divine institution, the Church is bound to place the religious and ethical features in the ascendant. Consequently, the Church looks with supreme disfavor on divorce, and discriminates in the matter of the remarriage of persons who have been divorced. Indeed, the Roman Catholic Church, which teaches that marriage is a sacrament, and that the marriage relation can be dissolved only by death, does not in any case nor for any cause sanction divorce, nor does she permit her clergy to solemnize the marriage of any person who has been divorced.*

* Sess. 24, Can. 7, Council of Trent.

Protestant churches generally hold that there are two legitimate causes for divorce, and that the innocent and suffering party, when divorce shall have been formally pronounced by a competent tribunal, is free to marry again. To justify this position in regard to these two subjects, divorce and remarriage, they appeal for the most part to Matthew 19:9: "And I say unto you, whosoever shall put away his wife, except for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and he that marrieth her when she is put away committeth adultery," and to 1 Cor. 7:15: "Yet if the unbelieving departeth, let him depart: the brother or the sister is not under bondage in such cases." (*Revised Version*).

They generally maintain that adultery, whether committed by husband or wife, because it destroys the oneness of flesh enunciated in the original institution of marriage—"and they shall be one flesh," Gen. 2:24—does, *ex ipso*, disrupt the *vinculum conjugale*. "Or know ye not that he that is joined to a harlot is one body? for, the twain, saith he, shall become one flesh." 1 Cor. 6:16. A man cannot at the same time be one body with a harlot and one flesh with his wife. The union is of twain, not of three. "Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh." (Gen. 2:24). When now the husband has joined himself with a harlot, he no longer cleaves unto his wife. He has already separated himself from her and has joined himself to another. In its essence marriage is at an end. The innocent party is free, and shall not be called an adulteress if she marry another man. She cannot be expected to live with the man who has joined himself with a harlot and has become one body. She has the right to demand a formal divorce from such a husband.

In the case of malicious desertion, marriage has already been disrupted in its purpose of mutual happiness, reciprocal office and the lawful procreation of offspring. There is now no bodily union, no personal confidence, no reciprocal relation of giving and taking, no spiritual fellowship, no moral sustentation. The vocation of marriage is vacated absolutely in every one of its

features. The vow made before God and in the presence of earthly witnesses, to love, comfort, honor and keep, has been broken in its very roots. God's holy ordinance has been profaned. The two are no longer "husband and wife," according to the divine intention, nor according to the human need and use of "holy wedlock." The one has *renounced* possession. The other has *suffered* deprivation; that is, the innocent party has *suffered* divorce in the malicious, wanton and unjustifiable diremption of the *vinculum conjugale* by the deserter. Hence, he or she as deserted *sine causa*, has the right to demand formal release from the deserter, since said deserter no longer renders the *debitum conjugale*, no longer loves, comforts, honors, keeps; is no longer the wife of one husband, the husband of one wife, and has relinquished the headship of the family. Or as Dr. Harless has written: "This is that culpable separation which Paul has in view (I Cor. vii), and in which he pronounces one so deprived of possession, without blame on his part, free of the duty of considering himself still bound to the depriver."*

In the case of divorce effected on account of adultery, the words of Christ (Matt 5 : 32 ; 19 : 9) clearly concede the right of remarriage to the innocent person. In the case of malicious, irreconcilable and final desertion, the words of Paul (1 Cor. 7 : 15) certainly imply that the innocent person, who has *suffered* divorce, has the *right* to marry again. The *ὁν δεδουλωται* is *absolute*. It removes all subjection to former conjugal obligations, and consequently gives all the rights of freedom involved in the premises. For if there be any species of subjection that it does not remove, and any conjugal right that it does not restore to the innocent party, then it is not *absolute*. But *ex vi termini* it is *absolute*. The conclusion is inevitable. In the case of such desertion as is named—and no other is contemplated in the premises—the brother or the sister is not subject to the bondage of marriage. The deserter has forfeited every right comprehended under *what God hath joined together, let not man put asunder*; and the brother or the sister deserted

*System of Christian Ethics, Eng. Trans., p. 440.

has obtained absolute freedom—*ὁυ δεδούλωται*; and in this lies the fundamental principle: The wife is no longer bound by the law of her husband, and the husband is no longer bound by the law of his wife (Rom. 7 : 1-3.) In the one case (Rom. 7 : 1-3) death has annulled the marriage bond. In the other (1 Cor. 7 : 15), wilful desertion has annulled it, for the deserter has violated the terms of the contract. The cases are parallel in the main thing, namely, in the fact that the essential bond of wedlock has been broken. The dead can not, the deserter will not, have the other for husband or wife. In the one case as in the other the two are no longer husband and wife within the scope and intent of marriage. In the one case God's providence has dissolved the marriage bond, and has set the survivor free. In the other case man's wickedness has dissolved it, and has set the innocent person free. Hence, as in the one case the survivor is no longer *peculium*, no longer the possession of one person; so in the other case the innocent deserted person is no longer *peculium*, no longer the possession of one person; but has gained possession of the body. Therefore, as the survivor shall not be called an adulterer, or an adulteress, should he or she marry again; so the innocent deserted person shall not be called an adulterer, or an adulteress, should he or she marry again. The parallelism that holds in the one case must hold in the other, for freedom is not an empty sound. It has a content. As on the one hand it liberates from the *debitum conjugale*, so on the other hand it confers the *facultas ad contrahendum conjugium*.

It may be laid down, then, as a thesis that there are two scriptural grounds for divorce, namely, adultery and malicious desertion, and that in both cases the innocent party has the right to marry again.

Such has been the teaching in the Lutheran Church on the subjects of *divorce* and *remarriage*. This we now proceed to show.

LUTHER.

1. In *The Babylonian Captivity of the Church* (1520) Luther declares that he detests divorce, and that he prefers bigamy to

divorce. He says that "Christ permits divorce only in the case of fornication." Hence the Pope must necessarily be wrong, as often as he permits divorce for other reasons, nor ought any man forthwith to consider himself safe, because he has obtained a dispensation by pontifical audacity rather than power. I am not surprised, however, that they compel a man who has been separated from his wife by divorce to remain single, and if Paul bids us rather to marry than to burn, this seems plainly to allow of a man's marrying another in the place of her whom he has put away. I wish that this subject were fully discussed and made clear, that provision might be made for the numberless perils of those who at the present day are compelled to remain single without any fault of their own; that is, whose wives or husbands have fled and deserted their partner, not to return for three years, or perhaps never. I am distressed and grieved by these cases, which are of daily occurrence, whether this happens by the malice of Satan, or from our neglect of the Word of God.

"I cannot by myself establish any rule contrary to the opinion of all; but for my own part, I should exceedingly wish at least to see applied to this subject the words: 'But if the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases' (1 Cor. vii. 15). Hence the Apostle permits that the unbelieving one who departs should be let go, and leaves it free to the believer to take another. Why should not the same rule hold good, if a believer, that is, a nominal believer, but in reality just as much an unbeliever, deserts husband or wife, especially with the intention of never returning? I cannot discover any distinction between the two cases. In my belief, however, if in the Apostle's time the unbeliever who had departed had returned, or had become a believer, or had promised to live with the believing wife, he would not have been received, but would have been authorized to marry another woman." *

It will be observed that Luther speaks with some hesitation,

* Jena Latin, II, fol. 295. Wace and Bucheim's Translation, p. 225-7.

as he does at this period on many other subjects. But he sees scriptural grounds for divorce in the case of adultery and in the case of desertion, and he concedes to the innocent person, in both cases, the right to marry again. These two principles he steadily maintained in later and maturer years, and these principles, as will appear as we proceed, set the pace for subsequent Lutheran teaching generally on the subjects of Divorce and Remarriage.

2. In his *Explanation of 1 Cor. 7 : 15* (1523), Luther says : " Hence the Apostle absolves and declares the husband or wife free where an unchristian husband or wife has departed or will not allow the other to live a Christian life, and he gives to such an one the power and right to marry again. What Paul here says in regard to a heathen husband or wife, is to be understood also in regard to a false Christian, that is, where such an one would force the other to unchristian conduct, or not allow the other to live a Christian life, or departs. The Christian husband or wife is absolved and free to marry another. For if that were not right, then the Christian husband or wife would have to follow the unchristian husband or wife, or against his strength and will live without wedlock, and therefore on account of the wantonness of another, be bound and have to live in danger of his soul. Here Paul says No, and he declares that in such cases the brother or the sister is not bound, and is not personal property. As if he should say : ' In other matters, where married people remain together, as in conjugal duty and the like, one is bound to the other, and is his, so that such an one dare not marry another, but in those matters where husband or wife requires the other to live an unchristian life, or separates himself from the other, then that other is not bound or obligated to follow him. He is not bound, but is absolved and free ; is absolved and free, so as to marry again as though his spouse were dead.' How is this ? Shall not the Christian spouse wait until the unchristian spouse returns, or dies, according to the spiritual law that has hitherto been in force ? Whether she shall wait on him is a matter of her own will, for since the

Apostle here absolves and declares her free, she is not bound to wait for him, but in God's name she may marry."*

3. In 1525 Luther received a letter from the Council and Pastor of Domitsch, asking his opinion on the subject of the remarriage of the Pastor. He replies as follows: "In reference to your letter touching the conjugal life of your pastor, this is my sincere opinion in a word: Inasmuch as his wife demeans herself dishonorably toward him, I cannot make his right either narrower or wider than God himself has made it, who through St. Paul, 1 Cor. 7:15, has uttered the following verdict in such cases: If the unbeliever departs, then let him depart. A brother or a sister is not bound in such cases.

"So say I also: If any one will not remain, let him go hence. The other party is therefore not bound to remain unmarried, as I have written more extensively in my little book on this subject. That you can read. And if he cannot remain without a wife, let him marry another in God's name, since this one will not be [his wife.] Adieu." "MARTIN LUTHER."†

The reader will note (a) that Luther recognizes the dictum of Paul as the verdict of God, (b) that wilful desertion frees from the matrimonial bond and gives the injured party the right to marry again, (c) that Luther cannot make the premises either narrower or broader than God has made them.

4. In 1530 Luther published a treatise of some magnitude on the subject of marriage.‡ It was republished twice in 1540, that is, in Bugenhagen's tractate on *Adultery and Desertion*, and in Melancthon's *De Arbore Consanguinitatis et Affinitatis*. The views expressed in this treatise became influentially normative in the Lutheran teaching on the subjects of Divorce and Remarriage, and are much quoted by the dogmaticians and by other Lutherans who have written on these subjects. Several pages of this treatise are devoted to the discussion of Divorce and Remarriage.

* Werke, St. Louis Edition, viii, 1062-1063. Quoted also in Walther's *Pastoraltheologie*, p. 245.

† Erl. Ed, 53: 326.

‡ Erl. Ed. 23: pp. 91-162.

After quoting Matt. 19: 6, and instancing the case of Joseph and Mary, Matt. 1: 20, Luther says: "Accordingly when a husband or wife has committed adultery, and it can be proved, I cannot deny that the other is free and may be divorced, and may marry another person, though it were better, if possible, to effect reconciliation, and that they remain together. But if the innocent party will not do that, then he may avail himself of his right in God's name. And before all things such separation should not be made by one's own authority, but should be declared by the Council, or by the Pastor, or by the Magistrate. Then if he wish he may, like Joseph, put her away secretly, or he may leave the country. But if he wishes to remain he should effect the separation publicly."

In this connection Luther urges that the innocent party, in order to avoid giving offense and creating scandal, should not remarry for a year or two. He then continues: "There is also another case, as where a husband or wife leaves the country, etc. May the other then marry again?" He answers that if the husband has gone from home on business or on account of war, or in a case of necessity, the wife should remain faithful to her husband. But where one has deserted his wife and children without their knowledge and consent, and does not provide for them, nor write to them, and remains away for years, such an one has brought reproach upon marriage and upon the State, and "is a thief and a robber of the town and of his wife, house, home, goods, and should he return no one should or can harbor him. There is no scoundrel that I would so soon see hanged or beheaded as such a scoundrel, and if I had the time to paint or sketch such a scoundrel, I would make it evident that no adulterer can be compared to him." He advises that in case such a scoundrel remain away a year or longer, the pastor and the civil authorities advertise for him, "with the threat that he will be ostracised, and his wife shall be declared free," that is, free from the bond of marriage, and rendered competent to contract another marriage, for that, as we have seen, is what Luther means by being "declared free." But in this same treatise Luther declares that incompatibility of temper, or

the disgrace of either party, is not a sufficient cause of divorce.

5. In 1535 the Wittenberg theological faculty, Luther, Cruciger, Major and Melancthon, prepared and subscribed an *Opinion* on a concrete case of desertion. M. of Nordhausen had been deserted by her husband, B. H. The theologians recommend that the pastor shall first cite him to appear. If he does not appear in three months, they know well how to proceed. M. is to establish her character. "If she can show that H. has been in ill-repute with others, then the case is all the clearer.

"Even if she cannot establish adultery, but if only on account of malicious and final desertion she seeks to be absolved, then according to the rule of Paul, 1 Cor. 7, she shall be declared free from H., since he has wantonly abandoned her, and for three years has not shown that he desires to live with her, and therefore confesses that he has left her finally. By virtue of Paul's declaration M. shall be permitted to marry in a Christian manner, as has been the case formerly in the Christian Church, as Eusebius and Justin cite a case in *lib.* 4, and as is shown by the case of Fabiola." They proceed to say that in case M. should marry again, it is the duty of the civil authorities to protect her against possible injury from the deserter.*

As this *Opinion* is official, and is signed by four members of the Wittenberg Theological Faculty, it must be considered of great value in studying the history of Lutheran teaching on the subject of Divorce and Remarriage. And the value of this *Opinion* is enhanced when we learn that the same year Luther and Melancthon issued another *Opinion* in a concrete case. Jacob L. charges his wife with desertion and adultery. They recommend that he shall prove his charges against his wife, and also that he has not treated her with cruelty. Then shall the preachers declare him free from his runaway wife "according to the Gospel" and the ancient practice of the Church. "The runaway wife is not again to be admitted, and another Christian marriage is not to be forbidden the innocent husband."†

* Werke, St. Louis Ed. x. 744-5.

† Ibid, 744-6.

MELANCHTHON.

1. In Appendix I (1551) to the *Loci* of the third period, Melancthon teaches that adultery and desertion are scriptural grounds for divorce, and he concedes the right of remarriage to the innocent party. He says: "In the matter of divorce, the divine word frees the innocent person when the husband or wife has dissolved the bond of marriage by adultery, and it concedes to the innocent person, when the case has been adjudged, the right to contract another marriage, and such is the practice in our consistories. The same is held in regard to a person unjustly deserted, because Paul says, 1 Cor. 7: 'Yet if the unbelieving depart, let him depart: the brother or sister is not under bondage in such cases.' Expressly does St. Paul declare that the person unjustly deserted is free, and is not to be forced to follow a vagabond deserter. * * * * If divorce has been effected on account of adultery, no time is prescribed to the innocent person, after the matter has been adjudged. But in the case of desertion, it ought to be held under advisement for years, in order that it may be understood that the person has really been deserted, and is not concealing frivolity and perfidy under the pretext of desertion.

"The law in the Codex concedes to a betrothed woman the right to marry another man after two years, if, without her consent, the betrothed man, who is not out of the country, so long defers the public rite of marriage. * * * I have already quoted the passages of Paul in Corinthians, which sets the innocent person free, and especially also if the deserter is guilty of adultery. By no means then is a halter to be placed on the innocent person on account of the sins of another. But it is understood that in this case liberty is not a mere word. To the liberated person marriage is conceded."*

2. In the *Confessio Saxonica* (1551), under the heading: *De Conjugio*, Melancthon says: "In the matter of divorces the rule is most firmly maintained, that they sin who either by adultery or by desertion make the beginning of separation.

* C. R. 21: 1066-67.

Adulterers and adulteresses, deserters male and female, are condemned by the voice of those who teach in the churches, and by the voice of the judges in the consistories, and they are severely punished by the civil authority. But when the case has been investigated judicially, the innocent person is declared free, and marriage is not prohibited, in order that he or she may serve God and live a pious life. For since the Lord expressly frees the innocent person, (Matt. 19), when the other has been polluted by adultery, liberty does not exist in name only, but also in reality. And Paul speaks in the very same manner in the case of desertion. Thus our custom agrees also with the ancient Church."*

As the Saxon Confession was composed by Melancthon to be sent to the Council of Trent, and as it was signed by the representatives of universities, cities and provinces from the north of Germany to the south thereof, it exhibits not only official, but confessional teaching on the subjects of which it treats. It was declared to be in harmony with the Augsburg Confession.

Two things may be noted in our quotation: 1. Melancthon here affirms that the teaching of Christ and of Paul agree in the main things: Adultery and Desertion are scriptural causes for divorce, and remarriage is to be conceded to the innocent party. 2. At that time consistories granted divorce in case of adultery and of desertion, and conceded the right of remarriage to the innocent person.

In the *Appendix* from which we have quoted above, Melancthon says that "on account of cruelty, poisoning, and plots laid against life," the *lex Theodocii* granted divorce. He thinks that where a husband practices cruelty towards his wife "so that life is imperiled," the civil magistrate ought to apply the law of Theodosius. But he does not here speak of remarriage. He denies that divorce should be effected "on account of contagious and incurable diseases, as on account of leprosy." For a misfortune which occurs between the living without fault does not by any means dissolve the conjugal covenant.

* C. R. 28: 432.

THE DOGMATICIANS.

The Dogmaticians were reproducers rather than producers. On the good foundation laid by Luther and Melanchthon they reared splendid dogmatic systems that are characterized by deep knowledge of the Scriptures and by wide and varied learning. These systems will always be of value to the student of Lutheran theology, for here he will find the development, the elaboration and the fortification of the rich norms first exhibited by Luther and Melanchthon.

The literature which the dogmaticians produced on the subjects of Divorce and Remarriage would fill volumes. We must here satisfy ourselves with brief extracts from a few of the most eminent of those venerable theological worthies, who, though dead, yet speak, and whose words of wisdom on practical as well as on dogmatical subjects, the Lutheran Church cannot afford to ignore.

CHEMNITZ, 1522-1586.

In his *Examen Concilii Tridentini* this incomparable theologian of our Church has treated the subject of Divorce with great fullness as over against the position taken by the Council of Trent. He knows of only two scriptural causes of divorce. After expounding Matt. 19, and 1 Cor. 7, he says: "Therefore we have in the Scripture two causes for dissolving the bond of marriage, so that husband and wife may be separated, not as by man, but by God himself. 1. On account of adultery a husband may lawfully, rightly and without sin repudiate his wife. 2. If the unbelieving will not live with the believing, but desert, dismiss and repudiate her without the sin of adultery, but on account of faith, the unbelieving sins, both against God and against the law of matrimony. But the deserted innocent person is not subject to bondage, but is freed from the law of her husband, so that she is not an adulteress if she be lawfully joined to another husband. And these two cases even Chrysostom mentions in commenting on 1 Cor. 7. 'The unbelieving,' says he, 'furnishes a cause, also fornication.'"*

* Preuss' Ed. p. 498.

It is evident that Chemnitz sees no contradiction between the words of Christ in Matt. 19:9, and the words of Paul (1 Cor. 7:15), as regards the two main questions, namely, that Adultery and Desertion furnish scriptural reasons for divorce, and that in either case the innocent party is free to marry again. The reason he gives for allowing the innocent party to marry again is that he or she must not be forced by the fault of another to burn or to live in adultery.

In regard to divorce "on account of cruelty, poisoning, plots laid against the life," and "on account of contagious and incurable diseases, as on account of leprosy," he seems to hold identically with Melancthon, since he quotes Melancthon in regard to these matters, and that without note or comment; or, speaking more accurately, he has taken into his *Loci*, without note or comment, the whole of Melancthon's *Appendix I: De Conjugio*, thus placing his *imprimatur* on the teaching of his master.

GERHARD—1582-1637.

Gerhard treats the subjects of Divorce and Remarriage with greater fulness than does any of his predecessors. In explaining 1 Cor. 7:15, he defines "the unbelieving" as any person, whether Jew or Heathen, who does not embrace the Christian religion, or the faith of Christ. By "desertion" he means "rash, voluntary, malicious absence." "He must be regarded as a deserter who, with malicious intent, not led by any just and honorable cause, but by hatred of religion, or frivolity, or by impatience of conjugal restraint, or by other unnecessary reasons, departs from his wife, and will not be recalled by private admonitions, or by public citations, but goes away and travels to other countries, leaving no expectation of return or of reconciliation."

"In the third place, we must explain what is to be understood by liberation from bondage according to the words of the Apostle. Some persons think that by the word *bondage* is meant those mutual offices which husband and wife are reciprocally to render to each other, so that the meaning is that the person deserted is in no sense bound to follow the deserter who

has gone into foreign countries, and to render to him the offices of matrimony, but they deny that the way is open to the innocent person to marry again. We say that this explanation is *correct*, but it is *inadequate*, because by liberation from bondage, it is understood, not only that the deserted person is freed from rendering the offices of marriage to the husband or wife, but also that such person is freed from the matrimonial bond, if the malicious deserter will not live with her. 1. Because by no means are we to except from the matrimonial offices that which almost alone deserves the name of bondage, namely, that whoever is bound by the matrimonial bond, *does not have power over his own body*. 1 Cor. 7:4. In like manner by malicious desertion of the other party the deserted person is freed from bondage. He therefore receives power over his own body, and therefore after the action of the civil authority, he can marry again.

"2. What the Apostle means by *δουλεία* he himself shows clearly in Rom. 7:1: 'Are ye ignorant, brethren (for I speak to men who know the law), how that the law hath dominion over a man for so long a time as he liveth? For the woman that hath a husband is bound by the law of the husband while he liveth; but if the husband die, she is discharged from the law of the husband. So, then, if while the husband liveth, she be joined to another man, she shall be called an adulteress; but if the husband die, she is free from the law, so that she is not an adulteress, though she be joined to another man.'

"*Δουλεία* has reference to the dominion of the matrimonial law, on account of which the wife is bound to the husband, so that she cannot give power over her body to another. Hence, freedom from *δουλεία* includes this, namely, that by a new marriage she can deliver the power of her body to another.

"3. The malicious deserter, in so far as in him lies, wickedly breaks the conjugal compact and bond, dissolves the unity of the flesh, and by his rash act severs the undivided intercourse of life. Therefore, justly and deservedly is the way opened to the deserted party to marry again. If the right of a new marriage be not conceded to the deserted person, he is deprived of

his right without any fault of his, and he is exposed, maybe, to the peril of harlotry. The innocent party, as Melancthon says, *is not to be ensnared on account of the sins of another. But it is to be understood also in this case that freedom is not an empty sound. Marriage is to be conceded to the person that is free.*"*

On p. 214 of the same volume Gerhard writes: "Since it has been demonstrated from the words of Christ and of the Apostle Paul, that there are only two causes of divorce, namely, adultery and *malicious desertion*, it is easy to understand what must be determined as to the remaining causes, which others assign:" "Unbelief, heresy, a solemn vow of continence, crime, danger of life, sterility, supervening impotence, incurable disease, madness, relationship to a harlot, flight or banishment because of an offense." In all these cases he denies the right of divorce, except only that of peril of life, which he places in the category with malicious desertion.† "Besides adultery and desertion there are no just, legitimate and sufficient causes of divorce."

But Gerhard, following "Chemnitz, Mentzer and other theologians of our party," makes a very nice distinction between the words of Christ, Matt. 19 : 9, and 1 Cor. 7 : 15, and reconciles them in the chief thing, namely, that the innocent party is free. He says: "Christ speaks of *divorce to be made by the innocent party for just cause*. Paul speaks of *the divorce that has been rashly and unjustly made by the guilty party*. When the question is raised in regard to effecting divorce, the same is, For what causes may a man or a woman repudiate and reject wife or husband lawfully united? To this question the correct answer is, By the exclusive cause of Christ, that is, it is lawful on account of adultery alone. Nor does the Apostle make concession to the believer beyond that sole exception of Christ, so that he may repudiate the unbeliever on account of unbelief or of difference of religion. Much rather does he expressly add that if the unbelieving consent to remain, the be-

* *Loci*, xvi, 202-7, *passim*.

† *Zeitschrift für Prot. u. Kirche* 1858, p. 74.

believing shall not dismiss him ; but if the believing be unjustly deserted, and rejected by the unbelieving, in such a case of malicious desertion, so that the unbelieving cannot be induced to live with him, and he (the believing) cannot restrain himself, the Apostle declares that faith is not servilely bound, but is free. The occasion and the scope of the answer given respectively by Christ and the Apostle explains the whole case." He says that Christ "recognizes no cause for effecting divorce except adultery," but that Paul "consults for the conscience of the innocent and believing person on the presupposition that an unlawful divorce has been effected by the unbelieving. By no means is the deserted person to seek as the first thing, and immediately, to separate himself; rather on the contrary should he bring back the desertrix, and demand that she shall return to conjugal duty. If you say that *Paul concedes to the innocent deserted person a new marriage, therefore the bond of the former marriage ought to be dissolved, otherwise a new marriage could not be conceded by the Apostle, and hence that he presupposed that there are two causes of divorces, adultery and desertion*, we reply that we cheerfully concede this, but this does not detract from the exclusive cause of Christ, which makes adultery the sole cause of divorce, because he does not treat of one and the same question, and of one and the same case, with the Apostle; but Christ shows the cause of effecting a divorce; the Apostle the cause of suffering a divorce and of obtaining freedom on account of unjust desertion; Christ speaks of him who effects a divorce, the Apostle of him who is suffering divorce; Christ speaks of him who turns from his wife, Paul of him from whom the wife has turned. Christ speaks of voluntary separation, Paul of separation against one's will. Much less can it be shown from the words of the Apostle that the civil power can introduce other causes of effecting divorce, because the Apostle, moved by such an inspiration of the Holy Spirit as we do not recognize in other men, cannot adduce any crime that so affects the substance of marriage as adultery. Hence some of our theologians mention only one cause of divorce. Some

mention two, but there is in reality no contradiction, as is evident from the foregoing."*

QUENSTEDT—1617-1688.

Quenstedt has been called "the bookkeeper of the Wittenberg orthodoxy." In his *Theologia Didactico-Polemica* he writes: "*Malicious Desertion*. The bond of marriage is indissoluble. Hence the wife ought not to depart from the husband, nor he from her. But when the malicious deserter has gone, marriage is not denied to the innocent party or person who has been deserted *sine causa*. Here we must observe that not only is he guilty of malicious desertion who abandons his wife, but also he who drives her away by his cruelty and tyranny. Nor is the view of Luther to be rejected who to malicious desertion adds the persistent refusal of that which is due, mentioned by Paul, 1 Cor. 7: 3.

"*Adultery*. By adultery the bond of marriage is dissolved, so that it is allowed to the innocent party to enter a second marriage."†

SCHERZER—1628-1683.

Scherzer was professor at Leipzig. He composed a *System of Theology Finished in XXIX Definitions*. He defines marriage as the lawful union into one flesh of one man and one woman, dissoluble only by death, adultery or malicious desertion. *Index I*. He says: "Adultery opposes the unity of the flesh, and therefore also the substance of marriage by which two become one flesh. Gen. 2: 24. *For he who is joined to a harlot, has also become one body with the harlot*, 1 Cor. 6: 16. Therefore he is no more one flesh with his wife."

"As malicious desertion is very often, though not always, connected with adultery, it is therefore to be referred to adultery. But even if it be not connected with adultery, it is nevertheless cause of suffering divorce unjustly, as adultery is the sole cause of effecting divorce. And by thus making a distinction

* Ibid, pp., 183-4.

† Part iv. c. 14, 1. Th. 10.

between active and passive divorce, the different views of teachers can be reconciled."

That malicious desertion is a just cause of divorce, Scherzer proves from 1 Cor. 7:15, and by several other passages of Scripture. Finally he says: "He who is liberated from conjugal bondage has power over his own body, and of rendering obligation to another, and therefore can at will enter into marriage with another person. Unless the right of a new marriage be conceded to the person deserted, he is deprived of his right without any fault of his own, and is exposed to perpetual burnings and to the peril of harlotry and pollution."

In support of these views Scherzer appeals to the older Lutheran theologians, and thus preserves the consensus of Lutheran teaching on these subjects. He declares that refusal of the *debitum conjugale* must be referred to the civil authorities. Impotence anteceding betrothal impedes marriage. "Impotence supervening after the consummation of marriage must be borne along with other misfortunes." "Sodomy and bestiality tear away the substance of marriage, and are to be referred to adultery." "Let no one suppose that the Apostle, 1 Cor. 7:15, contradicts Christ, who alleges adultery alone as the cause of divorce, Matt. 19:9. He must understand that the *occasion* and *scope* are different. The Pharisees inquire of Christ whether on account of any cause it is lawful for a man to effect divorce. Christ replies *negatively*, and declares that it is not lawful, except on account of *fornication* or adultery. The Corinthians inquire of Paul, whether on account of unbelief, it be lawful to effect divorce. The Apostles answer *No*, and by this negation he does not contradict Christ. But he subjoins another case, as to what is to be done by the believing, in case divorce be suffered on account of the desertion of husband or wife, and replies: The party unjustly deserted can marry again. There is therefore no contradiction between Christ and Paul," p. 838.

BAIER—1647-1695.

Baier was general superintendent at Weimar and professor in Halle. His *Compendium Theologiae Positivae* is a compend of

the theology of Musaeus of Jena, and of "many other orthodox theologians." It was republished in this country, with very large additions, by the late Dr. Walther of St. Louis.

On the subjects before us Baier says: "*Divorce*, or the dissolution of lawful and valid marriage, so far as regards the conjugal bond itself, can happen in *two* cases: In the case of adultery, without doubt, where *ipso jure* marriage can be dissolved, and is dissolved, and the innocent party is permitted to enter into a new marriage; and in the case of *malicious desertion*, where the deserter rashly and malicious breaks the conjugal bond, and to the deserted party, when a competent judge has made a declaration, belongs the right of entering a new marriage."^{*}

In support of the first proposition Baier refers to and explains Matt. 19:9 and 5:32. In support of the second proposition he says: "According to Paul 1 Cor. 7:15: *If the unbelieving depart* (separate himself and effect divorce from the believing) *let him depart. The brother or the sister is not bound to servitude in such cases,*' so that neither he nor she may marry another. But he or she is free from bondage and from obligation to conjugal intercourse with the deserter or desertrix," p. 774.

It thus appears that Baier also sustains the Lutheran tradition on the subject of Divorce and Remarriage, and it may be added that Dr. Walther supports the propositions of Baier by pertinent quotations from Luther, Gerhard and Deyling, and also from the Schmalkald Articles.

HOLLAZIUS—1648—1713.

"His *Examen Theologicum Acroamaticum* recapitulates with great clearness and compactness the results attained by his predecessors, under the form of questions and answers."[†]

Hollazius says: "There are two just causes of divorce, adultery and malicious desertion." Like Scherzer he makes a

^{*}Walther's Ed. III, 773.

[†]Schmid's *Dogmatik*, Translation by Hay and Jacobs, First Ed. p. 678.

distinction between active and passive divorce: "The only cause of active divorce is adultery; malicious desertion is cause for passive divorce. The former goes against the very nature of marriage, and therefore dissolves marriage and opens the way for the injured party to marry again. Matt: 19:9.

"That malicious desertion frees the innocent party is proved (1) by 1 Cor. 7:15. '*If the unbelieving separate himself, the brother or the sister is not subject to bondage in such cases,*' so that neither he nor she may marry another, but he or she is free from the bond and from the obligation to conjugal intercourse with the deserter or the desertrix. (2) From the nature of divorce. Whatever directly injures conjugal faith and the *usus thori* dissolves the marriage bond, and therefore *jure ipso* opens the doors of a second marriage to the injured party. But malicious and incorrigible desertion, etc. Therefore. (3) *Ex absurdo*. Unless the right of a new marriage be conceded to the deserted person, he is deprived of his right without any fault of his, and is exposed to perpetual burnings and to the peril of harlotry and pollution, which conflicts with justice and with the divine law. Now for the purpose of avoiding fornication, let each one have his own wife."*

WALTHER, 1811—1887.

Dr. Walther was unquestionably *the* Lutheran Dogmatician of the nineteenth century. He was, in no mean sense, a *Huterus Redivivus*. He is distinguished for his rigid adherence to the Confessions of the Lutheran Church, and for his familiarity with the old Lutheran *Dogmatik*. His motto might have been simply *Nihil novi*. He sought to apply the old teaching without change to new conditions.

In his *Pastoraltheologie* Dr. Walther lays down the following thesis: "Although according to the Word of God there is only one legitimate cause of *effecting divorce*, namely, adultery (Matt. 19:9), yet according to the plain declaration of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 7:15: '*If the unbelieving departeth, let him depart, the brother or the sister is not under bondage in such cases,*' there

**Examen*, pp. 1380—2.

is another case in which the innocent party, though he dare not effect divorce, yet suffers divorce, namely, when an unchristian spouse *wickedly abandons* the other (*malitiosa desertio*), that is, leaves with the evident purpose of not returning again to the abandoned spouse, and that too when means applied to effect his return have been unavailing. In this case *remarriage* at the proper time is not to be refused the *innocent* party (of course when the legal separation has been obtained) since he or she is no longer 'bound,' that is, not bound to the former spouse (compare *οὐ' δεδούλωται* Rom. 7: 1—3)."*

This thesis is defended by Dr. Walther through seventeen octavo pages—chiefly by quotations from the older theologians.

To the testimony of Dr. Walther may be added that of his colleague, Professor Günther: "Pure doctrine of the evangelical Lutheran Church: Divorce in the case of adultery is allowable, and the innocent party is permitted to marry again. Proof from God's Word: Matt. 5: 32; 19: 9.

"False doctrine of the Romish Church: Divorce is not allowable in any case, and the innocent party is not allowed to marry again.

"God's Word says the opposite. 1 Cor. 7: 15: 'If the unbelieving departeth, let him depart: the brother or the sister is not under bondage in such cases,' vs. 10, 11. (If the innocent is allowed to marry in the case of wilful desertion, much more should he be allowed to marry in the case of adultery)."

We thus see that the teaching of the great theologians of the Lutheran Church on the subject of Divorce, and of the Remarriage of the innocent divorced party, is remarkably concurrent. They all agree that there are "two just causes of divorce," and that the right of remarriage is to be conceded to the innocent party, whether divorce has resulted from adultery or from malicious desertion. When they, perchance, mention other causes, as "peril of life," or "sodomy" it is because such, as individual instances, clearly and lawfully can be grouped under one or the other species. The marriage of an impotent person is not

*P. 246.

†Symbolik, third Ed., p. 417.

marriage within the scope contemplated by "the divine institution," as the union for life of one *man* and one *woman*, and that, for the simple reason, that an "impotent" is neither man nor woman. The languages of the world have another name for such a person.

Our theologians are also agreed that there is no contradiction between Christ, Matt. 19:9, and Paul, 1 Cor. 7:15. Paul, they hold, speaks under inspiration, and therefore speaks authoritatively. The scope and occasion of the two passages are different. Christ, as Gerhard says, "shows *causam divortii faciendi*; Paul, *causam divortii patiendi*." This is a just and wise distinction. The deserter has dissolved the *vinculum conjugale*, and has destroyed marriage in its purpose and intent as a divine institution. Freedom is not an empty sound. It restores power over the body, and gives the right of remarriage to the innocent party, who must not be allowed to suffer on account of the sins of the guilty party.

If now it be asked whether the practice of the Lutheran Church accorded with the teaching of her theologians, the answer is not far to seek.

KIRCHENORDNUNGEN.

The *Kirchenordnungen*, or *Church Orders*, contain, *inter alia*, rules and regulations for the administration of church discipline. They were composed by the lawyers and the theologians, and were introduced by order of the rulers. They are of special value for determining the practice of the Lutheran Church in matters of Divorce and Remarriage.

1. The *Goslar Consistorial Order* (1555) concedes to the innocent party, in the case both of Divorce and of Desertion, the right to marry again, after a decree of divorce shall have been obtained; but it urges that every effort shall be made, both in the case of adultery and of desertion, to reconcile the parties, so that they may live together.*

2. The *Brandenburg Consistorial Order* (1573), after urging

*Richter, II, 166.

that every effort be made in the case of adultery to effect reconciliation between the parties, says: "But where reconciliation cannot be effected, and divorce is desired by the innocent party, the case shall go to the Court, and divorce shall be declared according to law. Also to the innocent party, according to the purport of the Holy Scriptures, permission shall be given to marry again: In the case of malicious desertion the remarriage of the innocent party after from one to four years is permitted. In the case of *impotence* there shall be no divorce, but only the declaration that there never had been true marriage between the parties;" In the case of intolerable tyranny the guilty party shall be imprisoned until he gives assurance that he will do better. But where life is endangered by poisoning, or in any other way, by either party, "the assessors shall turn over such case to the civil authorities, who shall proceed with the accused as the criminal court of the Holy Roman Empire and the law require."*

3. The *Braunschweig-Grubenhagen Kirchenordnung* (1581) says: "On no account shall divorce be allowed or undertaken except for the two causes permitted by Christ and Paul in the Gospel. First, when one is clearly convicted of adultery, and it has been legally established, and if the innocent party cannot and will not be reconciled, the sentence of divorce shall be declared according to Christ's word, Matt. 19. Secondly, in case of malicious desertion, according to Paul, 1 Cor. 7. In such a case the abandoning party shall be three times summoned. If he does not appear and bring satisfactory reasons for his desertion, the divorce may then follow, and the innocent party may marry again, but the guilty party shall be punished with banishment and with prohibition of another marriage."

Anger and bitterness are to be punished by the ban and otherwise. "In other unusual cases, which cannot be brought under general rules" care shall be taken not to give offence, and not to wound consciences.†

*Richter, II, pp. 382-4.

†Richter, II, p. 456. ‡Sehling, K. O. I. pp. 243-4, *Dresdener Ehe-Ordnung*. Von Scheurl, of Erlangen, one of best authorities, says

Other *Orders* that we have examined have regulations of identical import. We have not examined any that have regulations differing in import from those quoted above.

We thus see that our Lutheran fathers of the sixteenth century did not teach one thing and practice another. They were consistent. No doubt "unusual cases" did sometimes occur, as they are likely to occur in any and every court, both civil and ecclesiastical, and which must be settled according to the principles of equity. They had fixed laws and regulations, and they applied them in so far as they were applicable.

We also know what was the *official* teaching, and what the practice of the Lutherans in the seventeenth century. There lies before us a great quarto volume, known as the *Concilia Theologica Wittebergencia*, containing a collection of opinions rendered by the Wittenberg Theological Faculty, from the time of Luther to 1664, on Religious, Ministerial, Moral and Matrimonial questions. This useful book was published by Calovius, Meisner, Quenstedt and Deutschmann, who as a matter of course placed their *imprimatur* on its teaching.

In 1623 the Wittenberg Faculty was called on to render an *Opinion* on a concrete case of divorce. After rehearsing the facts of the case, they say: "If then he remains away it would be proper for the complainant, as the innocent party, to be released and absolved from him. And although indeed the canonists in the papacy, still following the Council of Trent, do not permit the absolved innocent party to marry again, so long as the deserter lives, yet the evangelical theologians and Reformed Consistories hold that the innocent party is not to be burdened in conscience, because by reason of lawful divorce she can no longer live with her deserted husband. On the contrary not only must all occasion and appearance of evil be avoided, but it must be prevented. And this goes along with

"Adultery and malicious desertion are most undoubtedly scriptural grounds of divorce, and are for the most part expressly and exclusively recognized as such by the Evangelical Kirchenordnungen of the Reformation period." *Real Encyc.* IV, 98. Also in *Zeitschrift f. Prot. u. Kirche*, 1859, p. 19, 20.

divorce, in which the innocent party is absolved from the guilty, and is permitted to marry again, just as in olden times the wife who was put away might marry. Lev. 21 : 7 ; Deut. 24 : 2 ; Ezk. 44 : 22. Such is the opinion of Luther, not only in the *Tractate on Marriage*, Tom. VI. Jen. Germ. fol. 225 ; but also in Matt. 5. fol. 5 : 388. [Quoted by us on p. 43.] This opinion of Luther's exactly fits the present case. We hold also that this our opinion is in harmony with the facts and is approved by the evangelical theologians and is confirmed by the practice of the spiritual consistories."*

This *Opinion* is subscribed by the Dean, by the Senior and by the other Doctors of the Holy Scripture and Professors at Wittenberg. Comment is unnecessary.

We have before us also Dedekennus's *Thesaurus Conciliorum et Decisionum*. It contains opinions on Divorce, Separation and Remarriage. We here quote an *Opinion* of the Theological Faculty of Jena, given Dec. 10th, 1606. Eva N. had run away from her husband "without any given cause." They counsel that she shall be cited to return by a certain time. If she does not return, "then she is to be declared a *malicious slanderer* of her husband, and her husband is to be absolved from her, and he is to have permission, as he has opportunity, to marry another person."†

On the same page we find an *Opinion* of the Wittenberg Consistory in a concrete case of desertion by a husband. They counsel that if the deserter does not appear after having been cited, the complainant "is to be advised not to burden her conscience, but to marry again."

Opinions of this kind are numerous in this book, as given by theological faculties and consistories. There are also cases reported in which separation is allowed on account of deception and on account of impotence. Deception is treated as *casus adulterii*, and *impotence* as conflicting with the fundamental purpose of marriage.

And now that we may show that we have fairly represented

*Part IV, p. 91.

†Vol. III, p. 494.

the teaching and the practice in the Lutheran Church on the subjects of Divorce and Remarriage, we give a few authorities which will carry weight with the jury. Dorner: "He (Luther) considers wicked desertion (*desertio malitiosa*), to which also the *denegatio debiti* is to be added, as a sufficient ground of divorce, as well as the *πορνεία*."*

Friedberg: "Luther designated Adultery and Desertion as causes of divorce, and also recognized that for other cogent reasons the state might pronounce Divorce."†

Martensen: "The Lutheran Church decrees the lawfulness of actual divorce, and allows the innocent party to remarry. Holy Scripture names two cases in which divorce and remarriage are allowable. It says: 'Whosoever shall put away his wife except it be for the cause of adultery; and whoso marrieth her that is put away committeth adultery, (Matt. 5 : 25). And again XIX : 9 : 'Whosoever shall put away his wife, *except it be for fornication* and shall marry another, committeth adultery.' The Apostle Paul adds another case, namely, that of malicious desertion (*desertio malitiosa*), when one leaves and of his own accord forsakes the other: 'If the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or a sister (i. e. the Christian partner) is not under bondage in such cases' (1 Cor. VII, 15). He here concedes to the forsaken, the suffering one, the privilege of remarriage. * * * And we cannot but acknowledge, that Lutheran divines are fully justified in including among valid reasons for divorce, continued cruelty, personal ill-usage (*sacvitine*), and plotting against one another's lives (*insidiae*). So Melancthon, and after him the Danish Theologian N. Hemmingsen. To these reasons others were subsequently added, e. g., refusal of the *debitum conjugale*."‡

Köstlin: "He (Luther) then treats of divorce, which he regards with horror. * * According to Matt. V, marriage can be dissolved only on account of adultery. * * * and, still further, that, as Paul in 1 Cor. VII, allows the person for-

*Hist. Prot. Theol, Trans. I, 270.

†Kirchenrecht, pp. 270-1.

‡Christian Ethics (Social), Eng. Trans., pp. 41-2.

saken by an unbelieving partner to give up the latter and marry another."*

Schmid's *Dogmatic* (Eng. Trans.): "As, however, marriage constitutes the closest bond of spiritual and bodily communion, it is also in itself indissoluble, and a divorce of those who have entered this estate can take place only when one of the parties has already practically rendered the continuance of the married life impossible by adultery or malicious desertion."† Schmid supports his statement by pertinent quotations from the Dogmaticians.

Meusel: After stating that the evangelical [Lutheran] Church always permitted divorce on the conception that the civil power must protect the innocent, and that neither the wilfulness of one nor of both parties, nor any supervening misfortune can justify divorce, and that remarriage was not allowed the guilty party without a dispensation, this reliable Lutheran authority says that "there were yet different opinions as to the question, What charges, according to the Scriptures, form a justifiable ground for dissolving the marriage covenant? The stricter view, proceeding from Luther and Bugenhagen, limited the causes of divorce to those named in the Scriptures, (Matt. 5 : 32 ; 1 Cor. 7 : 15) namely, adultery and malicious desertion, that is, the arbitrary sundering of the life-communion by escape to a place that could not be reached by the judicial arm, with which latter (desertion) was also catalogued the obstinate refusal of the conjugal duty. The milder view, following Melancthon (*De Conjugio*), recognizes also intolerable abuse and plots laid against life as causes of divorce. At first the more rigid standpoint prevailed by extending the Scriptural grounds to unnatural carnal crimes, and to so-called quasi-desertion, that is, the obstinate and absolutely unconquerable refusal to return to the one abandoned, or to conjugal duty. But since the close of the seventeenth century when jurisdiction in marriage was turned over to the civil courts, and was brought under the influence of the natural-rights conception, there was a change,

**Theology*, Eng. Trans., I, 405.

† First Ed., pp. 636-7.

which in the Prussian Constitution went so far as to allow mutual consent to be a ground for divorce."*

These testimonies, to which others of similar character might be added, show that we have not misrepresented the Lutheran teaching on the subjects of Divorce and Remarriage. Said teaching recognizes only two Scriptural causes of divorce, viz: Adultery and Malicious Desertion. That there was a milder and a more liberal tendency does not imply any contradiction or any fundamental difference of view.† Unnatural crimes are absolutely inconsistent with the idea of marriage as "one flesh," and can easily be catalogued with adultery, without even straining the letter, to say nothing about the spirit of Matt. 19: 9. Cruelty and plots against life can easily be catalogued with malicious desertion. Such conduct renders marriage null and void in its spirit, its aim, its content. Such conduct not only endangers the life of the suffering one, but it interferes with the service of God and endangers salvation; and this is the reason, as understood by our great teachers, why Paul says: "Let him depart. The brother or the sister is not under bondage in such cases." If the unbelieving husband requires the wife to commit crimes, or to abandon her religion, or to bring up her children as heathens, or plots against her life, then he has dirempted the marriage covenant, then he has destroyed the *individuum vitæ consuetudinem*. Then the two are no longer

* *Handlexikon*, II. 310.

† After citing the views of Gerhard on the causes of divorce, Dr. Von Scheurl says: "If we compare Gerhard with the other theologians of our Church it will appear that there is really absolutely no, or at least a very insignificant, difference. All agree that adultery and desertion are the two sole lawful causes of divorce. Where they speak of other causes of divorce, there we have only a loose way of speaking, and the cases are always those that are subsumed under adultery and divorce. The sole difference is that a few theologians regard divorce as permissible where there are sins as great as adultery; and to the questions, Whether divorce dare be effected on account of cruelty, and, When should desertion be looked upon as malicious, some have given a milder, and others a more rigid answer, in which we see that they do not treat of fundamental principles, but only of their application." *Zeitschrift für Protestantismus und Kirche*, 1858, pp. 73-4. See also Richter's *Kirchenrecht*, Eighth Ed., pp. 1177 et seqq.

in essence "one flesh." The wife has *suffered* divorce. She can appeal to the civil law for protection. Shall the Church, whose calling it is to guard and nourish the Christian life of her members and to assist in training children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, be less humane, less provident, than the State?

And as to the right of the innocent deserted party to marry again (after a competent judge has made the declaration), based on 1 Cor. 7:15, there is no difference of opinion among our standard teachers, and the practice as shown by the regulations found in the *Kirchenordnungen*, and by the extant deliverances of the consistories in concrete cases, evidently corresponded to the teaching of the theologians and of the faculties.

We now sum up the Lutheran dogmatic teaching on divorce in the language of Hollazius: "The just causes of divorce are adultery and desertion. Adultery is the sole cause of active divorce. Malicious desertion is the cause of passive divorce." We know of no Lutheran dogmatician who opposes this teaching; and we find that this teaching is sustained by Harless in *Christian Ethics*,* by Martensen in his *Social Ethics*,† by Luthardt in his *The Moral Truths of Christianity*,‡ and by Wuttke in his *Handbuch der Christlichen Sittenlehre*, II, p. 481, all Lutheran Theologians of the highest rank.

We exhibit the Lutheran confessional teaching on the remarriage of innocent divorced persons in the words of the Schmalcald Articles: "Injusta etiam traditio est, quae prohibet conjugium personae innocenti post factum divortium."§ German: "So ist dies auch unrecht, dass, wo zwei gescheiden werden, der unschuldig Theil nicht widerum heirathen soll." That is, to translate the Latin: "Unjust is also the tradition [of the Roman Catholic Church] which prohibits the innocent person from marrying after divorce has been made." These articles were subscribed by no less than thirty-three "doctors and

* Eng. Translation, p. 440.

† Eng. Translation, pp. 38, *et seqq.*

‡ Sec. Ed. English Translation, p. 133.

§ Müller, *Symb. Bucher*, p. 343.

preachers." We are not aware that they have been formally repudiated by any part of the Lutheran Church. And that the Lutherans did not limit this confessional teaching to cases of divorce on account of adultery, but applied it in other cases, we prove, first, from the Prussian *Consistorial Order* of 1584: "Desertion. The deserter shall be cited and summoned. If then he does not appear, the case shall be finally and definitely settled and the innocent party shall be permitted to marry another;" and, secondly, from the Württemberg *Marriage Order* of 1687: "Quasi-desertion. We allow that the innocent party shall be completely separated from the finally renitent, and shall be allowed to marry again." II, 13, 32.

We cap the climax by quoting from the *Jurisprudentia Ecclesiastica seu Consistorialis* of Benedict Carpzov, consistorial councilor, and professor of ecclesiastical law at Leipzig, who fortifies his "definitions" by quotations from the theologians and illustrates them by the *verba decreti* of the consistories. He writes: "Is it lawful, then, for the deserted party to contract a new marriage? According to the teaching of Paul, 1 Cor. 7: 15, where he says: 'If the unbelieving depart, let him depart; the brother or the sister is not subject to bondage in such a case.' This Andrew Osiander explains as follows: 'The deserted party is not bound on account of the malicious absence of husband or wife to abstain further from marriage.' Although the Apostle speaks specifically of the desertion of the believing by the unbelieving, nevertheless the theologians most rightly extend this to every kind of malicious desertion, relying on the words of Paul, 1 Tim. 5: 8: 'But if any provideth not for his own, and especially his own household, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever.' And we must care especially lest, if the right of contracting a new marriage be denied the innocent party, a snare be laid for his conscience by the crime of another, whereas sins ought to bind those who commit them. And let no one suppose that this cause of divorce is disapproved by Christ, since adultery alone is mentioned by him as the cause of divorce, Matt. 5: 32; 19: 9. Christ speaks of the person who rashly rejects husband

or wife, which is by no means allowed. But we must hold differently in the case of a person who has been unjustly deserted, whom the magistrate ought to assist by allowing him a new marriage, in order that he may live a pious and peaceable life. Christ speaks of him who effects divorce; the Apostle, of him who suffers divorce."*

And now with these facts before him, the reader cannot be in doubt as to what is the teaching in the Lutheran Church on the subjects of Divorce and Remarriage. If there has been any material dissent from this teaching by standard theologians in the Lutheran Church, we have not happened upon it in our investigations, which have extended over a much wider field than may be indicated in this essay. And what is more, and indeed of the highest significance, is that this teaching is based on the Word of God. Our teachers have had no scruple in regard to the inspiration of 1 Cor. 7 : 15, nor do they see any contradiction between Paul and Christ, nor do they hold that verse 15 in 1 Cor. 7, must be explained by verse 11. They quote verse 15 as decisive and in the premises final.

Such are the facts. We do not here raise the question whether this old Lutheran teaching is correct, is scriptural, is in accord with the fundamental principles of right and honor, is salutary for the conscience, is promotive of Christian virtue; but we say that the Lutheran theologian, who denies that it is scriptural, etc., and the Lutheran Synod that resolves to modify it, whether by abridgment or by expansion—both are morally bound to show wherein it is not scriptural, and is dangerous to the conscience, and to society, and are bound to show cause why a Romanizing, or the Greek, or some other doctrine of Divorce and Remarriage should be substituted for it. Lutherans will not be found forward to forsake Lutheran doctrine and Lutheran practice without asking *Why?* And should a con-

* *Liber II*, p. 187, Edition of 1685. Pufendorf is of opinion that divorce does not arise "from any positive law of God," but that if we regard barely the law of nature, adultery and "base desertion" are sufficient causes for divorce. *The Law of Nature and of Nations*, VI, I., 21. His annotator, M. Barbeyrec, elaborately explains 1 Cor. 7 : 15 as unquestionably furnishing ground for divorce.

test arise in view of possible disciplinary action, it will be found that prescription—"ancient and immemorial use and enjoyment"—is quite as potent in ecclesiastical as in civil cases; and it will also be found that Lutherans who have not been convinced that the Lutheran teaching and practice on these subjects are wrong, are not likely to be deterred by synodical resolutions.

But so far as we have observed no Lutheran Synod has undertaken formally to show that the old Lutheran doctrine of Divorce and Remarriage is unscriptural, and therefore is wrong; that is, we do not know a single instance in which that doctrine has been formally and by name renounced, by any Lutheran body competent to act in the premises. Just what limitation may have been imposed on the Church in Europe since the matter of Divorce was turned over to the State, we are not informed. But in this country where the Church is free in her own legitimate sphere, the full Lutheran tradition, so far as we can ascertain, has been departed from by only one general Lutheran body—we mean the General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the United States. In Canton, Ohio, 1893, the said General Synod passed the following resolution: "This Synod understands the divine law as allowing no dissolution of the marriage bond except for the one cause specified, viz: adultery, and consequently as not permitting remarriage of persons divorced on other grounds, or of the guilty party in the case of a legitimate divorce."* (Matt. 19:9 is referred to).

It is needless to say that this resolution is not an adequate expression of the Lutheran doctrine of Divorce and Remarriage. Perhaps it was not intended to be such. But the time has come when the General Synod should reconsider her action, and should either place herself on the unabridged Lutheran platform on these subjects, or give full and clear reasons for ignoring 1 Cor. 7:15, and consequently for her abridgment of the Lutheran, and indeed of the generally accepted Protestant, doctrine of Divorce and of the remarriage of the innocent

*Minutes, p. 84.

divorced party.* (We here take no account of the new Episcopal canon.). And especially will such reconsideration become necessary when it is learned that other Lutheran bodies in this country recognize that there are *two* just causes of divorce, and that the innocent party in *both* cases has the right to marry again. For instance:

1. Of the Joint Synod of Ohio, Dr. F. W. Stellhorn writes:

COLUMBUS, OHIO,)

Oct. 20, 1904. (

REV. PROF. J. W. RICHARD, D.D., Gettysburg, Pa.

Rev. and dear sir: In reply to your letter of the 15th inst., I beg to say that to my knowledge our Synod has never *officially declared* its position on the question whether in case of divorce on account of malicious desertion the innocent party should be allowed to marry again; but as far as I know the *universal practice* in our Synod is to permit such marriage, as in my opinion Paul does undeniably permit it. For so I understand 1 Cor. 7: 15, agreeing in this respect with the great body of our Lutheran theologians of all times. St. Paul here speaks of the case when a Christian has to *suffer* a separation and in consequence is no more bound by the former marital ties, hence also is free to marry again. Christ, on the contrary, speaks of the case when, in consequence of the adultery of the one spouse, and as a punishment for it, the innocent one may legally *bring about*, or *inflict*, the separation. So there evidently is no contradiction between Matthew 19, 9 and parallel pages on the one hand, and 1 Cor. 7, 15, on the other. They speak of entirely different cases and supplement each other.

Yours truly, F. W. STELLHORN.

2. The Iowa Synod has never taken formal action on the subject of Divorce. But Professor M. Fritschel, of the Wartburg Seminary, writes that said Synod holds that there is *only one* lawful cause for effecting Divorce, namely, adultery, Matt. 19; 9, and that the Church cannot refuse marriage to the innocent party. "But where one spouse has left the other with the

*See Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, III, 393-7. A. A. Hodge, *Com. on Conf. of Faith*, pp. 415-7.

evident intention of not returning, and has resisted all means used to change his mind, the innocent party, who in this case does *not effect*, but *suffers* divorce, according to 1 Cor. 7:15, is not bound to the former spouse, and therefore when a legal separation shall have been obtained, is not to be denied remarriage nor refused it by the Church." But the pastor must assure himself that it is a genuine case of malicious desertion, and not desertion in anger, or flight on account of crime, or a case of abuse of the spouse.

3. The Missourians have not taken any action on Divorce, but "the Missouri pastors, one and all, are governed by the rules laid down by Walther in his book on the subject.* Consequently we solemnize marriage of the innocent party in case of *malitiosa desertio* if such desertio is fully proved and is a fact. In that case the former marriage tie is actually broken, and no longer exists—cannot therefore bind the innocent party any longer." So writes the Rev. H. H. Walker, a Missouri pastor.

4. The General Council has published *Theses on Marriage and Its Relation to Divorce*, of which the third, fourth and ninth read as follows: *Violations of the Marriage Covenant*, completely disrupting it, are (a) adultery, Matt. 5:32; 19:5, 6. (b) malicious desertion, 1 Cor. 7:15.

"While the language of the passages in Matthew seems to restrict divorce to but one ground, 'adultery,' St. Paul, in 1 Cor. 7:15, shows that desertion is the essential principle of adultery.

"Where the marriage covenant has been broken and the judicial decree has made public and formal declaration of the fact, the innocent party is freed from all obligation assumed, and stands in Divine Law as though such covenant had never been made. To the innocent party belongs, therefore, the right of remarriage."†

In regard to these theses Dr. Krotel writes: "While, therefore, the General Council has not yet taken final action in regard to the matter, it is altogether likely—nay, I might say

* *Pastoraltheologie*, 326, quoted by us on a preceding page.

† Minutes, p. 218.

certain, that the position taken by the theses presented by the committee, will be adopted at the next Convention."

Thus it will be observed without further investigation that far more than half of the Lutherans of this country uphold the traditional Lutheran teaching on the subjects of Divorce and Remarriage. Hence it is not likely that the four Lutheran bodies above named will fall in with the "denominational comity" scheme headed by the Episcopalians, which aims to abate the present iniquity and excess of divorces by recognizing only *one* cause of divorce, "adultery," and by refusing the Church's blessing to the marriage of all divorced persons, except of those who are the innocent parties in cases of divorces for adultery. Whether the General Synod will finally abandon the full Lutheran doctrine and practice in the subjects under discussion, and will follow the hegemony of a Church with which she has very few things in common, and will say, "We will do as you do," remains to be seen. But it is safe to predict that she will be required to give clear and unanswerable scriptural reasons for her abridgment of the Lutheran doctrine and practice, before she can succeed in binding the consciences of her clergy to the essentials of the new Episcopal canon, and in inducing them to bind themselves by a "comity" scheme to try to abate an evil by a method which touches that evil only in one of its least baleful effects. Besides, there is a well-grounded suspicion that the new Episcopal canon points toward Rome, and that it may be but the preliminary to the acceptance of the Roman Catholic doctrine of Divorce. A few of our sons and daughters may prophesy Roman alliances, and a few of our old men may dream Catholic dreams, and a few of our young men may see Episcopal visions, but the great majority of all classes are far more likely to cling to the saner, nobler traditions of their fathers.

And, looking at the Episcopal canon in its practical features, and also at certain resolutions recently promulgated by certain Lutheran Synods in regard to the remarriage of divorced persons, we cannot repress the conviction, that said canon and resolutions exhibit a lack either of insight or of courage, or of both. Either the clergy do not see the core of the iniquity, or

they are afraid to attack it in its roots. Remarriage of divorced persons is only a remote phenomenon. Divorce itself is but an effect. The clergy have to do primarily with "the hardness of heart" (Matt. 19: 8), out of which divorces proceed. The lancet should be driven into the core. There is the place to show one's self valiant. To refuse to bless the marriage of certain divorced persons is to touch the evil with the tips of the fingers, and that too at a safe distance. It looks like salving the conscience to atone for the neglect of the paramount duty.

How many of the readers of THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY have ever heard a sermon preached on the sixth (seventh) commandment, or on the divine institution of marriage, or on the indissolubility of the conjugal bond, or on the reciprocal duties of husband and wife? How many? The writer has never heard a sermon preached on any of these subjects, and inquiry reveals the fact that very few other persons have ever heard sermons preached on these subjects. This shows an almost criminal dereliction on the part of the clergy. As a consequence, in large part, of this dereliction, it may be safely affirmed that scarcely one marriageable young person out of twenty understands that marriage is a divine institution, that God created them male and female unto that end, that marriage *cæteris paribus* is a Christian duty that has its roots in the ethos as well as in the pathos of human nature, and that marriage is indissoluble, except as the result of the commission of a grave crime against society, and that marriage is divinely intended to be the complementing and the perfectioning of man and of woman in this earthly life.

As a consequence of the prevalent ignorance of young people on these subjects the great majority of them enter on "the holy estate of wedlock" with scarcely a thought that marriage in its inner significance is spiritual and ethical, is "only in the Lord" (1 Cor. 7: 39). Hence it may be safely assumed that too often "holy wedlock" is contracted under the inspiration of love songs and erotic poetry, or under the impulse of "the lust of the flesh," or at the instance of a bank account, or in the delusion of social distinction. The result will be a bodily conjunction rather than a spiritual union. Disappointment and

disgust are inevitable; divorce and separation are probable. And now for the clergy, having neglected the paramount duty, to resolve that they will not marry the divorced is about as wise and as philosophical as it would be to try to purify the waters of the Mississippi River by casting the healing branch into the Gulf of Mexico instead of into the fountains and tributaries of the mighty stream. The place for the clergy to operate is in the home, in the Sunday School, in the catechetical class, but preëminently in the pulpit. The hardness of the human heart must be broken by the word of the Gospel. The boys and young men must be taught that when they become husbands they "so ought to love their own wives as their own bodies" (Eph. 5:28), and not to kick and cuff, choke and beat them until they are black and blue (ask the law judge); and girls and young women should be taught that as wives, they are to be "chaste, workers at home, kind, being in subjection to their own husbands" (Tit. 2:5), and not to be insolent, fretful, nagging and wasteful. The divine economy of marriage must be expounded, and its ethical principles must be inculcated as the foundation of that personal communion of life and vocation to which holy wedlock invites man and woman, for it is notorious that the great majority of unhappy marriages and *mesalliances* come from ignoring, or from violating the moral restraints and obligations that the divine Word and the law of nature and the principle of congruity, have laid on husbands and wives.

One ounce of prevention is worth more than many pounds of cure. Hence *Obsta Principiis* is the best motto for the clergy. And yet it is just here that the clergy have been most derelict. Often it is too late when the husband has turned with brutal violence upon the wife and imperils her life. Often it is too late when the wife has become suspicious, malicious, spiteful, vindictive. But still worse. Many a Christian woman finds herself "polluted" (Oh, horror!) almost from the very hour of her marriage (ask the physician), and knows that in fulfilling her vocation as mother she must transplant her husband's physical and moral *virus* to her children. This is hell, and shall such have two hells, one here and one hereafter? And if the innocent party escape the hell on earth, shall she be

denied the benediction of the Church in a second marriage? Is there not sometimes adultery before marriage, as well as after? Or is adultery only *post conjugium*?

But what shall we say of those who are without? Are they entitled to "benefit of clergy"? Do they marry in the Lord? Can they be addressed as "*Beloved in the Lord*"? It is from this class chiefly that divorces come. Christian men and women will not grow weary of each other, and will not give fatal occasion for separation, but will be ever acquiring fresh love and esteem for each other, for as Luther says: "Christians should be pious from their hearts. Such need no law. They retain their wives while life lasts. But where there are no Christians, it might be well even now to keep this law (viz., the Mosaic precept of giving a writing of divorcement), and to let them separate from their wives and take others like the heathen, lest by their discordant lives they should have two hells, one in this world and one hereafter. But let them know that by reason of such separations they are no longer Christians, but heathens and in a state of condemnation."*

But we forbear, except to say with the old Roman Jurisprudence: *Suumus jus, suprema injuria*.

The State has *her* function in the matter of marriage. She is bound by the law of self-existence to regulate marriage and to guard the happiness of her citizens. But she cannot be expected to give moral and religious instruction on "holy wedlock." The Church has *her* function in regard to marriage, but this comes chiefly *before* marriage. Her teachers must get men and women *ready* for "marrying in the Lord." They must face the *causes* of adultery and malicious desertion, and not satisfy themselves by playing valiant round the effect, for scarcely one clergyman out of three will ever have occasion to play valiant by refusing to solemnize the marriage of divorced persons. But all can show the more excellent way, and can labor to bring into vogue the New Testament standard in re-

* Erl. Ed., 51. 37. Dr. Luthardt says: "It is true that national legislation may, like the law of Moses, have occasion 'for hardness of heart,' i. e., because of the prevalence of immorality, to make some concessions," *Moral Truths of Ch. Sec. Ed.* p. 324.

gard to "holy wedlock." The clergy are not ignorant of the fact that according to the marriage ceremony, "God has laid upon this estate many a cross and affliction," and that it is still written over the gateway to connubial life that "man shall eat bread in the sweat of his face," and that the woman "shall bring forth with sorrow, and that her desire shall be to her husband, and he shall rule over her." It is the duty of the clergy to preach and to teach on these subjects, line upon line, and precept upon precept, for these things are the natural attendants of wedlock. They enter into its very essence. They help to make it a discipline for this life, and a preparation for heaven. And all the more is it the duty of the clergy to preach on these subjects, because the days are full of evil. The frequency of divorces and the facility with which they are obtained and the frivolous notions entertained by many persons in regard to the institution, nature and purpose of marriage, are imperiling the sanctity of the home, degrading the tone of society and endangering the stability of the State—"race suicide."

Synodical resolutions and ecclesiastical canons directed against a remote phenomenon of the abuse of marriage, can resist this tide of evil about as a handful of bulrushes can resist the tides of the ocean. The evil is a moral one, and must be met by moral resistance. The people must be educated on this subject. The laxity of views now widely obtaining in regard to marriage must be expelled by the inculcation of a better sentiment, and the laxity of legislative action and of judicial administration in regard to divorce must be overcome by showing legislators and judges that divorces granted for any reasons except for those noted in the New Testament, or for such as can be grouped under principles clearly involved in the words of Christ and of Paul, are degrading to society and injurious to the State.

And in these matters the way of the Lutheran clergyman is clear. His Church has always laid stress on teaching, and especially on the teaching of the young. He cannot afford to barter away this instrument of strength for a resolution that is the very incarnation of weakness. Only when he has taught

and inculcated and testified against the iniquity of the causes that lead to divorce, can he consistently say that he will not bless the marriage of divorced persons. Only when he has magnified the divine law of wedlock, has rebuked the passion of men, and has reproved the frivolty of women, can he deign to lay hold on a synodical resolution as an instrument for extirpating this moral cancer that is preying on the vitals of the American people.

Besides, the Lutheran clergyman has before him the historical teaching of his Church as touching Divorce and Remarriage. That teaching is to be his guide in theory and in practice. But even that teaching may not be held and applied as were the laws of the Medes and the Persians, for all teaching, all legislation, all practice, in order to be both humane and effective, must live and operate in the spirit rather than in the letter; since, as the old Church Order says, "there may be unusual cases which cannot be brought under general rules."

But Bishop Martensen, in treating of this very point, wisely writes: "We are aware that *analogy* is in this matter a dangerous way, and one which has led to that so much discussed, and certainly lamentable laxity of legislation, which is, however, surpassed by the laxity with which authorities administer the law. But *abusus non tollit usum*, i. e., the right use is not obviated by abuse. The reaction, which has from time to time arisen in the Protestant Church against this pernicious laxity, cannot be declared unjustifiable. But when individual clergymen have either refused to marry the divorced in general, or have only consented to marry those to whom the reasons expressly stated in Scripture apply, we can only see in such conduct a non-evangelical partiality, which, besides, can never be carried out in a national church, and is opposed to the old consistorial practice of the Lutheran Church. If the saying of Christ is taken as a literal law, intended for direct and literal observance in the Church, the great difference existing between the social circumstances of His time, against which His words were directed, and those which subsequently prevailed in Christian States, is utterly lost sight of. In the time of Christ, a divorce pronounced by the authorities was unknown; and it was left

to any man to give his wife a writing of divorcement. It was of this that Christ said, 'Moses, because of the hardness of your hearts, suffered you to put away your wives; but from the beginning it was not so' (Matt. xix. 8; Mark x. 5). It was against the frivolous and capricious use of this concession which prevailed in His days, that our Saviour's words were directed. If it had been His purpose to institute a law literally binding upon all, for His Church and for all times, we should have reason to complain that this law should have been communicated in so very incomplete a form. For the words in question, especially as reported by that evangelist who was at the same time an apostle (St. Matthew), speak exclusively of the right of a husband when his wife is guilty of a crime, but contain nothing at all concerning the rights of a wife—an omission which could not possibly occur in an actual law. This circumstance, in particular, calls upon us to direct our attention to the principle involved in the occasional, and to a certain degree incompletely expressed, words of our Lord."*

The danger from the present Protestant reaction is, that it will lead to "a non-evangelical partiality" which cannot command the respect of the saner portion of the community, and which will tend to the secularization, that is, to the degradation of marriage, by turning over its official ratification to aldermen and justices of the peace. There must be place left for discrimination. Evangelical principles, rather than ecclesiastical inhibition, must sometimes be allowed to decide. Consciences must not be burdened. "For it is better to marry than to burn." 1 Cor. 7:9. The preëminent function of the clergy is to strive to elevate the public conscience, and to hold up the moral and religious features of marriage. When they shall have done this faithfully, they may then also avail themselves of the proper kind of resolutions.

* *Social Ethics*, pp. 43-4.

ARTICLE V.

GRACE AND FREE-WILL.

By Professor W. VOLLERT, PH.D.

Rightly has the *relation of the divine action to the human will* been regarded as the greatest problem of theological science. On the difference of attitude to this question rests the different doctrinal positions of the Evangelical, the Reformed and the Catholic Churches. If we deny to man the *posse resistere* we fall into the Calvinistic Predestination. If we give up the *capacitas mere passiva* we fall into Semipelagianism. "Men are not able to be justified before God by their own powers, merits or works, but they are justified freely for the sake of Christ by faith, and this faith God imputes for righteousness before himself. Rom. 3:4." In this confession in Article IV of the Augustana we have the simple doctrine of the justification of the sinner before God alone out of grace for Christ's sake. Around this, its life-principle, has the Lutheran Church of the Reformation grouped all her symbolical definitions. "We hold fast to this chief article, and will not depart one iota from it, though heaven and earth and everything perish." He who thus bases salvation wholly on the free grace of God, involves the presupposition that the human race, which is to be redeemed, is in a condition in which it cannot comply with the will of the Holy God. Guilt must rest upon the sinner, so that by nature he is a child of wrath. Eph. 2:3. Thus Article IV requires Article II, that of *Original Sin*. But because the question of the relation of the divine activity to human freedom is likewise here not clearly stated, Article XVIII and XIX became necessary.

Eck had actually affirmed, so says Melancthon, that God is the cause of sin—though this is contrary to John 8:44, where the devil and man's perverted will are named as the cause of sin, where the holiness of God is guarded, and where the guiltiness of man is asserted. The further objection, that the new doctrine of justification renders all good works impossible, is

meant to be rejected by Article XVIII, *De Libero Arbitrio*, which is the explanation of Article II. The question of the relation of Free-will to divine grace after the Fall is its subject. Articles II, XVIII, XIX belong together, and receive their light also from Article IV, *De Justificatione*. Here is found nothing more of the earlier Determinism of the Reformers, but also nothing of the later Synergism of Melanchthon. This result was not reached without a long and severe conflict.

Luther at the beginning, still under the influence of Mysticism, confounded the question of the relation of grace to the sinner with that of the relation of God to the creature. Consult his theses of the years 1517 and 1518, and his *Commentary on the Psalms*. The consequence was an absolutely *predestinarian* view. Consult his *Commentary on Galatians* and the explanations of the Psalms of the years 1520 and 1521, and also his *Preface to the Epistle to the Romans*. The *De Servo Arbitrio* of 1525 formed the culmination. Here Free-will is regarded as a lie, and God's decree as unchangeable. Subsequently the matter was very much clarified. The great evangelical principle of the decisive significance of the *Word* as the special organ for the divine manifestation and action, and of the Sacrament as also the bearer of the saving activity, preserved Luther, on the one hand, from the Zwinglian absolute conception of the idea of God and from the disregard of the sacrament as "a vehicle of the Holy Spirit;" and on the other hand, from making, with Calvin, Predestination, and not man's *seruum arbitrium*, the center.

In his letter to the Christians of Antwerp, in his *Trostschrift*, 1528, in his letter to Aquila, 1530, and his *Commentary on Genesis*, 1536, the pure evangelical doctrine is stamped. Man's will is indeed unfree. He brings nothing to grace but indifference, yea, hostility. External reverence he can furnish, but he cannot know, love, reverence and fear God. Yea, he does not inquire after God, for he is corrupted and blinded by the devil. By God's grace alone is he to be brought to conversion, "to hear Christ, to be baptized in his name, to love his Word, to be made certain of his salvation, for Christ is the foundation and the mirror of salvation" (*Trostschrift*, 1528). In its ripest form

Luther's faith is stamped also in the Small Catechism, when in explanation of Article III it is said: "I believe that I cannot of my own reason or strength believe in Jesus Christ, my Lord, or come to him. But the Holy Spirit has called me through the Gospel."

Melanchthon also had to overcome *predestinarian* views before he could gain that clear knowledge which he placed in the Augustana. In his *Loci* of 1521 and in his notes on Romans of 1522, to him the natural substance of man is only sin. "There is nothing in us except death and sin. Therefore nature can do nothing but sin." As the fire has an internal power by which it blazes upwards; as in a magnet there is a peculiar power by which it attracts iron; so in man is there an indwelling impulse to sin. "Since all things happen necessarily according to the divine predestination, there is no freedom of our will." Opposition to the Catholic conception as it had been established by the Scholastics, drove him to these excesses. It was a means of protesting against the *meritum de congruo*, according to which a person can dispose himself for the reception of grace, and against the *meritum de condigno*, according to which, by means of the grace received, he becomes further qualified for doing good, and for enjoying God. No wonder, since original sin is *the least of all sins* (Andradius), that, *original sin* is properly only a *fomes peccati*, which after baptism no longer has the character of sin. Then also Free-will is in a condition to do that which is morally good, yea, *to love God above all things by its own powers*, and grace makes this good also a *bonum meritorium* (Biel). Melanchthon rightly did all in his power to reject this doctrine, since it looked upon man's sinfulness as a weakness of nature, or as a necessity of nature. Both he and Luther are concerned to restore its central position to the grace of God in Christ. But the proposition that God is the absolute Lord who does whatsoever he pleases, and the discussion of the relation of God to the creature instead of that of the relation of grace to the sinner, necessarily led them both into error. From the year 1525 on a marked change took place also in Melanchthon. This changed position first appeared in his *Visitation Articles*; and in his *Commentary*

on *Colossians* in 1527. In the *Instruction to the Visitors* it is said: "Man has not the power to purify his heart and to work divine gifts, as also Paul says in *Romans* 8: The natural man cannot do the things of God. This freedom is hindered by the devil, for when man is not protected and governed by God, the devil impels him to sin, so that he does not even maintain outward piety." The *Commentary on Colossians* (1: 15) goes further: "We must distinguish between the natural life and the relation of the human will to the activity of God in the natural life, and the Christian life, the relation of the human will to that which is good before God." God's general action in all creatures is, nevertheless, in the case of men, determined by the human personality, by the different nature of each individual, that is, by the natural freedom of choice which he himself has given to man. Therefore man can abstain from murder, theft and the like, and can perform civil righteousness. On the contrary only the person who is converted by the Spirit of God through repentance and faith, can attain to true spiritual willing, can do the truly good. God does, indeed, according to his mercy, effect the election of men, but by the *word* and the *sacraments* he makes the heart fit for believing; and thus a basis is given for the distinction between legality and morality. The sacraments also preserve their character as *seria et efficacia*, because now the whole matter is looked at, not from the absolute will of God, but from the conscience of man. Both the interest of Christian morality, and that of the alone-activity of grace, and of the newness of the Christian life, are now preserved. The "external works" and "the internal affections" of Article XVIII of the *Augustana* are kept distinct. "The human will has some liberty for performing civil righteousness and for choosing the things that are subject to reason, but it does not have the power to perform the righteousness of God." Thus perishes the scholastic distinction between actions good in themselves as man can perform them, and those that are acceptable to God as they are conditioned by grace. Freedom of choice is limited to the *accidental of acts*; it has no reference to the *substance of acts*, which is the fear of God and the love of God, and which takes place only when the Holy Spirit

works faith through the means of grace. Consequently the *liberum arbitrium* in spiritual things is out of the question. As the Christian's justification is objectively founded in the grace of God in Christ, subjectively conditioned on his part by faith, so he knows that he does not have this faith out of his own reason or power, but that he has been brought to Christ by the Holy Spirit. Consequently if in conversion man holds himself *pure passive* ("he does not have the power without the Holy Spirit of performing the righteousness of God or spiritual righteousness, because the carnal mind perceiveth not the things that are of God, 1 Cor. 2,") so nevertheless on the other hand we will have to say that man is enabled to *coöperate* with grace, and to decide for it, because the center of gravity of the nature has been changed by the working of God. On this subject the Confession does not contain any more accurate definition, as likewise on the question, Whether the idea of *civil righteousness* comprehends all that is made possible to man; Whether even in the sphere of the natural life a relation to God mediated through the religious moral consciousness of man, may not be possible. Justification has delivered the Christian from the deep moral corruption ("after the fall of Adam all men are born with sin, Ps. 51:7; Gen. 6:3; 1 Kings 8:48; John 3:6; Eph.: 2:3") which consists both in the "want of righteousness, or of integrity, or of original obedience (*vitium originis et concupiscentia* Art. II), and has brought him to a condition in which he can fully and tenderly love God (reverence and fear of God, and confidence toward God, Arts. II, XVIIIb), and has given him power to fear God, the failure to do which things, according to the Apology, constitutes the essence of that deep corruption. Even concupiscentia, which consists in "our seeking not only the pleasures of the body, but also carnal wisdom and righteousness, and in confiding in these things, and in contemning God, is now broken in its destructive effect. Even real, positive sins in thoughts, words and deeds, are by the believer rightly characterized as follows: "And though I sin through weakness, yet sin doth not *reign* in me." Of course (*Si Deus non adjuvat*, Art. XIX), that is, when he permits a person to go his own perverse way, without interfering, then

the devil through the perverse will dwelling in man (*voluntas malorum*) causes him to turn away from God wholly (Art. XIX), so that he is lost in consequence of his own guilt.

The *Form of Concord* speaks with great fulness on these subjects, which had not yet been settled. Its Articles I, II, XI, form a *parallel* and *supplement* to the corresponding Articles II, XVIII, XIX, of the *Augustana*. On the one hand it rejects the Manichaean extreme of Flacius, who taught that original sin is the substance of man. While the confession makes a distinction between "nature and sin, substance and accident (S. D. I: 1-4; 26-30), it nevertheless holds on to the *justitia civilis* of man and to his capability of being converted (S. D. II: 9; I: 33-46). On the other hand, Strigel's doctrine of the *modus agendi aliquid boni in rebus divinis* is rejected as an error; the reality and intensity of original sin according to the definitions of the earlier confessions is copiously repeated (S. D. I: 5-25), and is even *sharpened* by the definition that man now as regards the good is wholly corrupt and dead (S. D. II: 7), the servant of sin and the slave of Satan. From this it follows that not a spark of spiritual strength remains in man (S. D. II: 7). Man is so corrupt that he does not understand the Word of God, is alienated from God and is turned to all evil. The Holy Spirit alone must work all in him if he is to be saved. He must give him new spiritual powers and faculties and a new heart (S. D. II: 48; 61-64; 69-71). The human will is thus not *causa efficiens*, it suffers, it does not work. The Scripture proof is taken from 1 Cor. 2: 14; Gen. 8: 21; Rom. 8: 7; Eph. 2: 5; 2 Cor. 3: 5 ("that we are fit to do anything good is from God"). The conversion of man results when the Holy Spirit, by means of the Word and sacrament, operates upon him. Man can hear this word *externis auribus*, but God must open man's heart and bestow his grace, if conversion is to be wrought in him. The preaching of the Word and the hearing of the same on the part of man are the means by which God wills to convert him, Rom. 10: 17. Man is in so far not like a stone that he can receive an impression from the divine Word (S. D. II: 52-55; 69-72). Conversely, if man despises the means of grace, he remains the "dead block," the "unhewn stone,"

that he is, and is lost of his own fault. "For God compels no one." But in him who has become a subject of grace the *servum arbitrium* is changed into an *arbitrium liberatum*. By means of the new powers the will, renewed by the power of the Holy Spirit, works sanctification, though amid many weaknesses (S. D. II: 35-39; 65-66). "As soon as the Holy Spirit, through the Word and the sacraments, has begun in us his work of regeneration and renewal, then by the power of the Holy Spirit we are able and we ought to coöperate, though much weakness still persists."

In Article XI the Form of Concord makes a sharp distinction between God's eternal prescience and the eternal election of his children to salvation. Prescience extends to all creatures, good and evil. God does not work the evil. That comes from the devil and from wicked men, though God so directs it that it redounds to the honor of his name and to that of the elect. On the contrary, Predestination has for its object only the pious, and is the cause of their election. But who belongs to these? In order to know that we must not trouble ourselves with the secret, unsearchable counsel of God (S. D. XI: 9), but we must look back to the revealed Word. That points us to Christ (S. D. XI: 13-26, 52-65). "In him hath he chosen us before the foundation of the world," Eph. 1: 4. Christ now calls all to himself. It is not his will that any be lost, Ezek. 18: 32; 2 Peter 3: 9; 1 John 2: 2. It is God's will to save all who believe in Christ, but no others. Epit. 13; S. D. XI: 65. This revealed will of God is the same as his secret will, because between the two no contradiction is conceivable, unless we "assign contradictory wills" to God, S. D. XI: 35.

1. God's *will of grace* is thus *general*, but it is embraced in Christ: "No one comes to the Father except through me."
2. It is *serious*. We are "not to regard the call of God through the Word as a delusion, but we should know that through it God has revealed his will for the purpose of enlightening, converting and saving men," S. D. XI: 29. On this rests the Christian's joy and comfort, S. D. XI: 45.
3. It is *not irresistible*, but is conditioned by man's conduct (*Verhalten*). The reason why many are called but few chosen (Matt. 22: 14), lies

in the impenitence of so many. God has resolved to reject the impenitent, as conversely he has resolved to accept the believing. God bears long with the former as vessels of wrath (Rom. 9:22), but finally he inflicts upon them the punishment of hardening. *Conf.* Pharaoh, S. D. XI:84. Hence it is said of Israel: "Oh, Israel, thou hast brought thyself into distress, but thy salvation is alone in me." Hos. 13:9.

So far the Confession. In recent times these articles have become the subject of lively controversy, in so far as the Missouri Church in America, especially under Professor Walther, has brought out a conception of the matter which differs essentially from that of the Evangelical Lutheran theologians of Germany. Even in Germany some theologians side with the Missourians, and have felt constrained to leave the State Church, inasmuch as it "teaches Semipelagianism." The best view of the Missouri doctrine is given by Pastor Brauer of Dargan, Mecklenburg, in a pamphlet entitled: *Public Testimony against the UnLutheran new Doctrine of the Theological Faculty of Rostock*. It was written when Dieckhoff was at the head of that Faculty. It is also necessary to read many articles in *Lehre und Wehre* which discuss the same subject. According to Brauer, there is in us, according to the teaching of the Form of Concord, no ground of God's election, not even foreseen faith as our act of faith, for God first himself works faith. The ground of election is alone God's gracious will. On the other hand, God seriously wills that all men be saved. These two propositions: "God's will of grace is general," and: "The election of grace is unconditioned and particular," must remain unreconciled with each other. Over against this mystery the understanding must hold itself captive under the power of faith.

In the pamphlet entitled: *Professor Dieckhoff's Doctrine of Conversion and The Form of Concord*, it is said: "If the will of man is so set at liberty by grace that he has the capability of deciding for or against God, then there is an inner contradiction in saying that this neutral position of freedom of choice has been given to man by the Holy Spirit, who, nevertheless, draws him to God. If we speak of a voluntary decision on the part of man, then there is always meant a *facultas in*

viribus naturalibus, since the Holy Spirit can give to man no indifferent position toward God. But then falls the star of our Church, the *sola gratia*. Finally: Grant that God does indeed offer salvation in Christ to all, yet he sees to it that only the elect lay hold of it, and do not lose it. An elect person can indeed fall from grace, but he cannot die without having first come into full possession of it again. God works according to his good pleasure in a man even though he resist him—though man is lost of his own fault if he be not converted by grace. To reconcile this with the alone activity of grace is impossible, and the attempt leads to a Semipelagian aberration from the Confession." Such is the Missouri conception of our articles.

The *reconciliation* of the universal will of grace with the particular election of grace, must not be made to bring in the working of the Holy Spirit in such a way as Martensen does, who says that "Freedom can surrender and open itself to prevenient grace as the flower opens itself to the rays of the sun." "The susceptibility for grace," it is further said, "is in all men, but it is made fruitful by the impulse of grace, which either bursts through the natural hardness of the heart, or lures the spiritual seeds as with a gentle warmth." (*Dogmatic*, §220). Or as Julius Müller (*Lehre v. d. Sünde*, S. 207) says: "In the consciousness of the law of volition we have a witness of our moral imperfection, but also a witness of our formal freedom, by virtue of which obedience to grace proceeds from our own decision in such a way that also the possibility of resistance lies in us. Consequently it is by the consciousness of this law of the will that the person comes necessarily to the consciousness of the possibility of evil." There is thus in man both a tendency to resist and a tendency to incline to the divine Word. This leads to Erasmus's and Strigel's *facultas se applicandi ad gratiam*, and the doctrine that conversion is only an awakening, not a new creation. With the proposition of the irresistibility of the will of grace in the predestinated, is given the unconditioned predestination, for only when the predestinated, by reason of the freedom that has been given them, can also resist, does the ground of their possible destruction lie with them.

selves, and not with God. This freedom that has been given them is the freedom restored by the Holy Spirit. The Form of Concord in its Articles II and XI under these circumstances means nothing more than to exclude all human merit from conversion, and to vindicate for grace alone the glory of the salvation of the sinner. In this connection, not that "given freedom," but God, is *causa efficiens*. In so far God alone is the factor of salvation. But through his call, which is proclaimed to man, and which works energetically in him, the will of man is in so far delivered from sin, that now by a decision of the will he can accept grace, or he can thrust it off. Salvation is thus made ready for us *sola gratia*. Prior to the call man is dead in sins. Grace causes him to believe, that is, it causes him to consent to the grace that draws him. But that grace works in him is possible only when he lays hold of it, and that is *his* act. Synergism does not come into the question, because grace has first given him all that is needed to save him. But he must be able to consent, because he can also resist, and because otherwise the ethical factor would be removed from the whole process, and a magical change would be effected. Hence J. Gerhard is right when he says: "It cannot be denied that in conversion the mind of man assents, and the will longs for grace (*Conf. Cath.* III, 1331). Take away Free-will and there will be nothing to be saved. Take away grace, and there will be nothing by which to be saved. The work of conversion cannot be effected without both. God is the author of salvation. Free-will is only susceptible of salvation. Only God is able to give it (salvation); only Free-will is able to accept it." Only on the basis of this decision of man's will, which is made possible through grace, will man be saved or not. This is the reason why God has ordained some to salvation, the others not. (See Dieckhoff, *The Missouri Predestination and the Form of Concord*). So teaches also the Confession, for it teaches that God will perfect the good work in those in whom he has begun it, provided they do not turn away from God, but abide in the goodness of God, that is, the perseverance or the non-perseverance of those in whom God has begun the good work, depends upon their own conduct (*Verhalten*). Also the Form of Con-

cord says that God has ordained in his counsel that the Holy Spirit shall call the elect through the Word, enlighten and convert them, and shall justify and save all those who by a proper faith accept Christ. On the contrary if grace is irresistible, then we are led to Predestinationism.

This is one point. The second point has reference to the situation of man as over against *grace*.

If we speak of man in his purely natural condition and estrangement from God, then there is no question about a *causa efficiens*, or even about a *desiderans* of man. But who will say to what extent the heathen even are blown upon and touched by the breath of God's grace? Nor are we yet to exclude the fact that the Word of God preached by every Missourian finds a different kind of soil, a greater or less inclination, that is, resistance. Who will say whether the *capacitas* here is not already sometimes *actus*? Hence the Form of Concord is *not* to be approved, when in its articles it assumes an equal disinclination of all to the Gospel, in so far as this is said to be *equally great*.

The third point has reference to *conversion itself*.

According to the Confession, conversion is not the same as infant baptism, but it includes the motions of the new life. Here, now, there is *synergia*, the *liberum liberatum*, on the basis of that first impression. Hence Chemnitz says, *Loci*, I, 184: "After the movement made from above, the human will is not absolutely passive, but, moved and assisted by the Holy Spirit, it asserts and becomes *συνεργὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*." The person is restored to the condition of the first man. Just as the first man did not occupy a neutral position in regard to good and evil, but was determined toward God, so it is with the converted person. As Adam, by free self-determination must keep himself in the condition created by God, so must also the regenerate. Only when the being-laid-hold-on by grace and the full decision are identified do we get out of the right way. The long process of conversion, extending through the entire life of a person, the daily laying-hold on grace, is conditioned by the fact that I have been won by Christ: "Thou hast been too powerful for me, and I have suffered myself to be won." This is the *Deus*

hominem non cogit of the Form of Concord. Finally, as regards the "block and stone and pillar of salt," to which the rational man is likened, we reply calmly with Chemnitz: "The will, moved and assisted by the Holy Spirit, does *not* receive an impression like a block, but it *begins to will and to work*. *There is no such struggle in a block.*" In a word: "It cannot be shown by a mathematical point where the liberated will begins to act" (*Loci*, I, 184). But if we rightly understand by "block" the unconverted heart, we have nothing else than what the prophet says of the stony heart which God supplants by a heart of flesh. The Scriptures teach the total inability of man for good in the spiritual sense. They characterize conversion as a work of grace, both as an *act of God* and as an *act of man*. God works to will and to do, Phil. 2:13; makes man alive, John 5:21; Eph. 2:1 *et seqq.*; 2 Cor. 5:17, and works the factors, repentance and faith, which constitute conversion, Acts 5:31, 11:18; 2 Tim. 2:25; Eph. 1:19, 2:10. The beginning and the progress of the entire process is from God, Phil. 1:6. On the other hand, conversion even as a work of *man*, is demanded: *Μετανοεῖτε*, Matt. 3:2; = *Καὶ πιστεῦετε*, Mark 1:15; = *Καὶ ἐπιστρέψατε*, Acts 3:19; Conf. 9:35, and reception of the divine Word can follow with greater or less willingness, 1 Thess. 1:6. Faith is obedience of man rendered with absolute freedom, Rom. 1:5. "Turn yourselves to me," says the prophet, "and I will turn myself to you," Mal. 3:7. *Ἐπιστρέφεσθαι*, is used passively only in Peter 2:25. Elsewhere it is used in the active and middle sense, Matt. 13:15; 2 Cor. 3:16. That man can also resist is often enough emphasized. The Saviour's lamentation: *οὐ θέλετε εἰσεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ*, John 5:40: *οὐκ ἠθέλησете*, Matt. 23:33, and that of the apostles: *αὐτῶσεῖσθε τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἀξιούσ κρῖνετε ἐαυτοὺς τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς*, Acts 13:46, throw upon man the entire responsibility of his conduct (*Verhalten*) as over against the working of grace. To what extent man has freedom of choice is shown by all the persons to whom salvation has been brought nigh, especially in the New Testament, as for instance the rich young man, Matt. 19:46 *et seqq.*; the scribe, Mark 12:28 *et seqq.*, especially verse 34; and Felix,

Acts 24: 25. "Convert thou me and I shall be converted," Jer. 31: 16. This is the theme of the whole Bible.

Let us sum up: The Form of Concord identifies the secret will of God with the will of God revealed in Christ. Its exclusive purpose is to secure to grace alone the glory of saving the sinner. But there is no reconciliation of the two attested truths: The universal will of grace and particularistic election of grace. In so far as this reconciliation fails we have to supplement the Confession; but in so far as it assumes an equal disinclination toward the gospel, and quotes only passages of Scripture which prove the corruption of the human heart, we have to rectify and to complete it. Man, despite the Fall, possesses the *capacitas passivas*, *aptitudo naturalis* to salvation. Grace works in him an appropriating *Verhalten* without taking away his natural freedom, in that the Word comes to him. Man can hear the Word when it addresses itself to him. Whether he then longs for it is decided according to the preceding course of his life, and according to the greater or less morality existing in his natural disposition. The Word works in any case. By this the old bondage of the will is broken. The freedom of choice which he possesses in the sphere of the natural life is restored to him even for the sphere of the spiritual life. The Spirit of Christ bestows on him the possibility of receiving salvation. This working-of-grace is irresistible in so far as it takes place unconditioned; but it does not act magically, and is resistible in so far as the process is decided in the self-consciousness one way or the other in consequence of the position taken by the human personality. Only now does man have spiritual freedom. The new affections created by grace are intimately connected with the moral nature of man, and with the concrete stage of his development. Through the regenerating power of the call thus mediated, the activity and spontaneity of man are restored, and now in continued conflict with the remaining sin they work a new spiritual life. This process is called conversion. At every point on this line the initial condition of being-laid-hold-on, and of laying-hold-on, is repeated. Grace alone holds the new Ego fast to the way that directs to God, but ever according to the measure in which man's arbitrium liberatum cooperates with it.*

* Translated from the August (1904) No. of *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift* published at Erlangen in "the firm basis of the Lutheran Confession" under the editorial management of nearly two scores of representative Lutheran professors, prelates and pastors. Owner: A. Deichert, Erlangen and Leipsig.

ARTICLE VI.

THE PROBLEM OF THE WILL.

By THEOPHILUS B. STORK, ESQ.

Perhaps we might better say the puzzle of the will; for to your philosopher it is as fascinating as a game to hunt down with logical engines this paradoxical element of man's personality. It may well be asked if after such endless discussion another word can be added. At the mere mention of the will one name occurs to every mind. Of Jonathan Edwards, it might be said, if of any one, not *solvitur ambulando*, but *solvitur equitando*; for that great expounder of the freedom of the will is said to have ridden forth like some philosophical knight errant to think over his intellectual problems and to have come home laden with the spoils of his metaphysical chase in the shape of strings tied to each coat button and representing every one some conclusion reached, or rather ridden down in the course of his excursion. The dispute over the Freedom of the Will as set forth in his great book on the subject seems to centre upon two points, one upon the manner of reconciling its freedom with its government by motive, the other upon the impossibility of thinking the Ego or the will as a self-determining entity capable of originating, in and by itself, an action without cause precedent. Both points are essentially the same, they simply present the one fundamental difficulty in two different aspects.

This fundamental difficulty, expressed as abstractly and generally as possible, is the incapacity of the human mind to escape in its thinking from the category of causality as Kant expressed it.

That is to say, the Ego, no matter how free it *feels* itself with respect to itself and its will, when acting, is constrained when it thinks of itself or of its will, to think them under the category of causality; for when it makes itself or its will an object of thought, it makes them like all other phenomena that come into consciousness from the external world, subject to space and time and to the categories of thought. It must

think them in the only way it can think objects, in space and time and subject to all the laws of thought.

Indeed we might, taking a Hegelian view of the matter, declare that the Ego, acting [as subject] is part of the Absolute Ego, the one infinite mind, and its conviction of freedom when acting, is an attribute of that infinite mind, while the Ego, as an object of thought, [the Empirical Ego] is finite, and therefore subject to all the errors of the finite mind and its limitations in space and time and under the categories of thought.

In acting the Ego does not feel these; it is conscious of no restraint, but feels itself and its will to be free. It may be that in so doing it is correct; its feeling that it is under no restraint may be more truly representative of the reality than its thinking. This feeling is as much a deliverance of consciousness as thought itself.

It may be that there is a knowledge of reality obtained by it in this way, which is impossible by thought; what a knowledge of reality is we cannot tell, for we have no means of testing such knowledge. It has been guessed by some that reality must be known, if at all, directly, immediately, with no intervening channel of sensations, of qualities and attributes that somehow and mysteriously affect our hearing, seeing, feeling, and so on. It may be that such a confidence as we have when willing, when acting, that we are free to act, may be the result of some direct knowledge such as has been guessed as the possible way of knowing reality, say by the Divine mind for example. At any rate we have no more reason to distrust this feeling because it may be suspected of not correctly representing reality to us than we have to distrust that process of thought by which we learn the grounds of our suspicion. Because we cannot think ourselves or our will as free, is no conclusive reason for declaring that they are not. At most it presents us with a contradiction between the conclusions of two different Egoistic processes; between our conviction of freedom when acting and the impossibility of thinking it. Both processes are equally genuine, equally entitled to respect *prima facie*, indeed of the two, our thinking is the more open to suspicion, for our feeling of freedom is clear, constant, direct, self-consistent, and

is only impeached by the process of attempting to think it, which on the contrary is self-contradictory, and confused and justifies, not so much the assertion that our thinking is contradictory of our feelings in this respect, as that it is unable to think the freedom of the will or of the Ego intelligibly. It is not that the verdict of thinking is against the freedom of the will so much as that thinking is unable to reach a verdict. It is a jury that disagrees, and the longer it is kept locked up the more impossible does any agreement seem. For what is the verdict of our thinking? The Ego finds itself confronted, let us say, with a vast variety of phenomena, objects, the manifold in intuition, its endeavor is to think them intelligibly so that it may understand them. And its first effort to understand is to unify them in some way; why this renders them intelligible is elemental; there is no reason for it. Causality is one of the corollaries of that effort at unity; it thinks them as united to each other by the relation of cause and effect. Its instinct for uniting them to make them intelligible forbids its thinking each item of phenomena as independent. And so, as already remarked, it must think the will and the Ego when it places them with phenomena, among the objects of its thought; it cannot think them as free and independent of other objects of thought, phenomena, etc. It must think of them also as cause and effect in order to unite them with the rest and render them intelligible to itself. Such a thing as a self-determining will or Ego is unintelligible and therefore impossible to be thought. It thinks them, therefore, as mere results of precedent and as causes of precedent, phenomena, etc., with the rest. But again, the Ego having applied, or if you choose invented this category of causality under the impulse of its instinct for unity to all the objects of its thought, is now cast upon the horns of a new difficulty.

It is a matter of accepted experience that new phenomena, objects of thought, manifold in intuition, or however you choose to designate the sensations presented to consciousness by the external world, are constantly arising. Everything as presented to consciousness is changing; there is nothing that remains permanent or stable for a single moment. It is im-

possible for the Ego, under its law of causality, to think these changes as really new realities in the sense of a new creation arising out of nothing. *Nihil ex nihilo fit* forbids this. It cannot think of anything beginning to be out of nothing, but only as something the result of a cause precedent. Its corresponding inability to think anything as always existing, never beginning to be and never ceasing to be, while equally imperative upon its thinking is not here in question. Because it is impossible to think anything as never beginning to be does not render any less imperative and compulsory the impossibility of thinking it as beginning to be or ceasing to be. The two impossibilities or Kantian antinomies, while mutually contradictory, are each equally imperative and compulsory. The Ego is compelled, therefore, to think all things as existing unchanged from the beginning—wherever and however that was—that the creation and destruction of things are equally impossible. When, therefore, it beholds the appearance of the new or the disappearance of the old, all the change of phenomena known to experience, the growth of plants, change of the earth's surface, destruction of planets, it is compelled to declare them mere appearance, it explains them as mere modifications in qualities, attributes of the permanent, never changing substance or matter of the world which it invests and endows with the permanence the indestructibility, all the qualities that it cannot find in its only actual experience, phenomena, but which is imperatively demanded by the law of its thinking the category of causality. For the category of substance is made necessary as a corollary to that of causality. By the mental contrivance "substance" the Ego is enabled to reconcile the inconsistent demand of causality that no creation of non-existing reality or destruction of existing reality shall take place with the apparently constant occurrence of new and disappearance of old phenomena. By supposing that there is a substance, a something permanent, unchangeable, indestructible, that *stands under* like a silent depth of ocean below the waves of superficial appearance, a reconciliation may be effected and we may understand how substance and causes may always exist unchanged, while appearances are constantly changing.

But how imperfect and unphilosophical is this reconciliation by the contrivance "substance."

We are compelled to posit this substance, this matter of the world, as something existing forever and itself always the same, yet producing, notwithstanding, all the changes of which our experience makes us aware in phenomena as presented.

In other words, the same matter or substance at different times produces different results, has different qualities. But the same substance or matter must, under our laws of thinking, always produce the same results. Given in the beginning a certain mass of matter constituting the world or the universe, and presenting certain qualities or attributes by which it makes itself known to our consciousness, there can be no change of attributes qualities without change in the matter the substance. They are to each other cause and effect, and cannot change their mutual relationship. To overcome this objection some philosophers consider the original matter not as stable but in a continual state of flux, of becoming, of passing from one state into another. They thus account for the endless changes in phenomena—that is in that by which alone we may know matter—by attributing it to this flux, this continual movement in matter itself. This posits matter as the same in quantity, but changing in its form; if it is intelligible it assumes some identical atom, and that these atoms, identical in shape and qualities, by different arrangement with regard to each other, produce the changes we know in phenomena.

But this plunges us into new difficulties; whence comes the cause or causes which set this flux of matter in motion? We must suppose that these causes, whether separate or inherent in the matter, produce certain kinds of motion or fluxes which produce the various changes in phenomena. We must, however, always suppose, in obedience to the laws of our thinking, that these causes of motion in matter always produce the same kind of motion. If they produce different motions or arrangements we cannot consider them as the same causes. So that by this hypothesis of the flux of matter we have simply substituted one puzzle for the other. For we must now suppose either that the causes of the motion change in order to produce this dif-

ferent arrangement of the atoms or that some other cause comes in to modify the first cause of motion. For we are not more able to think a change of motion without a cause than to think a change of matter itself. Either supposition is forbidden by our laws of thought; we cannot think of an original cause changing its nature or its effects of its own accord, without some external other cause, and we cannot think of any other cause coming in to work this change, for such cause must be a new cause, and therefore a new creation, which is forbidden, or it must be an old original cause doing something, having an effect which it did not previously have, which is equally unthinkable, since the same cause can never without cause change its effects or its nature and do something entirely different from anything hitherto done by it.

Thus we are utterly unable, under the laws of our thinking, to think either that the changes we see in phenomena can be caused by a permanent substance that is always the same, nor can we think that the apparent changes in phenomena are real changes in matter that is something new in reality; for we feel compelled by the laws of thought to think that no really new things ever can be. An ingenious reasoner might even add an unexpected clincher to the argument with the objection that any really new thing or reality however minute would run the risk of possibly increasing the weight of our planet to such a degree as to throw the whole stellar system out of balance. And yet we know by the only means of knowledge that we have of the external world that new things of some sort do appear, changes are continually taking place which we can neither think intelligibly nor deny as facts of perception. In no possible way can this obvious and patent contradiction between the facts of experience and the necessities of thought be reconciled philosophically.

For the sake of clearness it may be worth while to put our problem in still another way. By the laws and constitution of our mind we cannot think of the world save as always existing, we must think that all matter, all causes of motion have existed as they are now unchanged from the beginning. We cannot think of any change except such as may be brought

about by cause; but we cannot think any new cause as coming in *de novo* any more than we can think of any new matter intruding itself into the world. All matter and all causes therefore remaining unchanged the same as when originally created or launched or placed—however and wherever the origin, the beginning of the world took place—how are we to think the various changes in phenomena presented to us? How can something that never changes produce or exhibit changes? The possibility of making changes by new combinations of the same matter, new combinations of the same causes is unsatisfactory unless we are content to simply juggle with words. For new combinations cannot take place without a cause of the new combinations. In short, we cannot think how what is thought as always identical can produce, without any new cause, different results—changes of appearances, of attributes, at different times. It will not suffice to style the changes merely development, growth, the working out of the original cause in matter, for development growth is only a name for a succession of changes, and for every change there must be a new cause or new combination of old causes. To conceive any cause or any specific thing with its bunch of qualities tied together like a bouquet of flowers by the metaphysical ribbon—substance, changing its qualities, its attributes of itself without external cause, exhibiting first one and then a different set of results, is to make such cause, such matter, in effect as self-determining as a Free Will or free man. A cause or substance, unchanged itself, which is conceived as first producing one and then another and different set of results, which is capable in other words of changing its effects without changing itself, is a self-determining thing, the very thing which we cannot think.

Thus we see the impossibility of thinking a will or an Ego as absolutely free, self-determining, is nothing more than the general impossibility, general inability due to the same laws of thought which compel us to think not only our will and Ego, but the facts of the external world in a way that is self-contradictory and unintelligible. We cannot explain the indubitable facts of experience any better than the freedom of the will and for the same reason.

We have now considered our problem from one point of view and developed some of the reasons for our inability to think a will, a man, or anything as free, *i. e.*, self-determining, and the contradiction of this inability of our thinking by the facts of our experience. Let us next take up the other aspect of the problem, namely, the difficulty of reconciling the freedom of the will with its government by motive. The will must act as the stronger motive dictates. Of this Jonathan Edwards remarks: "If self-determining power in the will be necessary to moral agency, praise, blame, etc., then nothing done by the will can be any better, praise or blame worthy than so far as the will is moved, swayed and determined by itself * * * None will deny that bias and inclination may be so strong as to be invincible and leave no possibility of the will's determining contrary to it and so be attended with necessity * * * Therefore, if necessity be inconsistent with liberty, than which fixed inclination is to such a degree of strength, it utterly excludes all virtue, vice, praise or blame."*

To emphasize this position he cites as an instance the freedom of the will which we must concede to be God's. God's will and God Himself must be free to act as it and He pleases, yet we cannot assume that God's will can be so equally poised that it is free to choose with entire indifference either good or evil. We must assume by reason of the inherent goodness of God's nature that His will would do the good act always and never the evil compelled by His goodness, and, if you please, robbed in like manner by that quality of its freedom to do the evil act.

Had that acute thinker pushed his reasoning to its logical conclusion, it would at once have been evident that here again we stumble upon the limitations which on every hand fetter our thinking. We cannot think any man or thing except as qualified, limited; the absolute, which is the man or thing without quality, is an impossibility of thought. We must think man and God Himself as a being composed of qualities, as having character of some kind; thus, and thus alone, are we capable of knowing them. Such an abstraction as a man without these

* Edwards' *Freedom of the Will*, Vol. II, p. 112, Wark's Edition, 1857.

would be to thought a mere blank. He would be much like a thing, a substance without qualities, unknown and unknowable. Our knowledge of man, of God, of ourselves being thus a knowledge of qualities of character, those qualities, that character, for us is the man himself. When, therefore, we say a man's will is coerced by a motive or desire or feeling so overpowering that it allows of no choice we are simply saying that the man's will is coerced by his own character by himself. This character of the man is himself, makes him an individual, if he had no feelings, no desires, no preferences, he would be a blank, an abstraction. These feelings, desires, making up his character, are his will, himself. We posit a will as a sort of machine by which the Ego acts; it seems a superfluous sort of article, a relic of mediaeval thinking, an abstraction of the particular desires or feelings that prompts each particular act. A man chooses, exercises his will, as we say, to take one thing and refuse another, according to his particular character; there is no coercion of motive or desire that compels any one choice, for the desire for one thing as preferable to another is part of himself. It is as reasonable to say that the man coerces himself as to say that his desires coerce him, these desires are himself, go to make up his individuality as distinct from all others.

To think of a person or character, with all that character implies of traits, qualities, limitations, inherited or otherwise acquired, and then to think of that person as free to act under any given set of circumstances with perfect indifference, is critically examined, a contradiction in terms. Every trait, every quality is, by its existence or limitation, a fetter upon that person's freedom of action. The only intelligible conception is to look upon these limitations as forming part of the person, not as constraining but as constituting the individual. A man without such limitations, without desires to dictate his actions, without character, might be perfectly free, perfectly unconditioned, it is true, but he would be an intellectual monstrosity, a blank, a void, an empty shell utterly unthinkable and unknowable. Moreover, a person possessing such a theoretical ideal freedom of the will, would not be a good man, could not be, since the positing goodness is the positing of limitations, of qualities,

characteristics which would forbid his deliberating or hesitating between a right and a wrong act.

This view does not avoid the difficulty that a man, with his character, his likes and dislikes, his qualities, good and evil, is formed, shaped and moulded by external influences beyond his own control, and that thus the real difficulty is only put one step further back. For underneath this problem of the will, and giving it that importance which has made it the battleground of contending theologians for centuries, is the vital question of man's moral responsibility for his acts and the justice thereof. If a man has free will, is a self-determining individuality, can, as he pleases, choose good or evil, then it is just according to our human ideas of justice that he should be punished or rewarded for his acts; if he is not free, then it seems to us most unjust that he should suffer either good or ill for acts over which he has no real control.

It is in this respect that our putting the difficulty further back has advanced the discussion; for it enables us to understand the justice of Almighty power even according to our human standards. For it is now become the question asked by the Scriptures: "Shall the thing formed say to Him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the the clay of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor?"* To this there is but one answer: the maker may do with the made as he will; and there is no just ground to complain that He has made it of one sort rather than of another. There is no obligation laid upon Him to make it in any particular way. Our sense of injustice upon this question of the freedom of the will and the punishment of men for their acts arises from a confusion of thought. We may concede that the Almighty might have made men as he pleased without any reproach of injustice; that they, like the pottery in the Scriptures, had no right to complain of the fashion of His making. But if, as we posit, the Almighty made men and endowed them with power to be, not as pottery without self-determining power, but creatures with self-determining power, capacity to act as they pleased,

* Rom. 2 : 20-21.

to choose good and ill; that if He then, by the act of creation impeded, fettered with the bond of circumstance this self-determining power, so that it was a mere delusion, so that apparently free, they were really bound hand and foot, and if He held them responsible for the exercise of a freedom of will which was mere illusion, that then He was open to the charge of injustice.

It may be noted here in passing, that, so feeble is our grasp upon these high matters, we cannot think how any creative act could so create either man or thing without qualities, attributes, characters which would in the very creating fetter his freedom. To satisfy our human thinking man would have to be created without any character, a blank existence empty of all meaning, in order to render him perfectly free. This by the way.

But we confuse two different methods by which man may suffer good or ill with entire justice. Either like the pottery he may be created without this self-determining power, and may, like it, be made either good or ill. Or as we conceive, he may be made with self-determining power, and only suffer for what he himself freely does or is. These are two distinct grounds upon either of which he may be held to suffer justly what he does suffer. It is a contradiction in terms for us to assume that the Almighty power created man with freedom to do as he pleased and held him responsible for the exercise of that freedom, yet at the same time so handicapped him with qualities, conditions and circumstances, as to make that exercise impossible, and the responsibility for his acts thereby entailed, unjust.

Man is created either with or without freedom of the will, either with or without self-determining power; in either case he suffers justly for his acts although on different grounds.

We may summarize our conclusions, therefore, somewhat in this wise: That men are free to will as they please, we have the direct evidence of consciousness; to witness that in our acting and willing we cannot recognize any restraint except under special circumstances of fear, of physical pain, of compulsion, evidently exercised and known to us, and which we distinguish

as such from the freedom of our ordinary acting. The contradiction of this evidence of our consciousness to our freedom by our thinking is confused, not consistent with itself, nor with other facts of our experience which it contradicts just as it contradicts this feeling of the freedom of our wills.

Upon the injustice of inflicting rewards and punishments upon men we see with even greater clearness that upon either hypothesis of freedom or of fatality the matter is without difficulty. For if they are free and morally responsible, the reward or punishment of their acts is no more consistent with justice than if without freedom, and therefore without moral responsibility, their reward and punishment follow simply as a result of their creation like the honor or dishonor of the pottery made by the master potter.

Against the justice of this last position it has been urged that even conceding that God, the great and Almighty potter, has the right to make his pottery as He will, yet that God owes it to His own character of justice, love and mercy not to create men miserable or unhappy. To which there are two replies: first, that we cannot conceive an Almighty bound by any rules save its own, and, of course, having power, always to dispense and abolish them, otherwise we have presented to us the inconsistent and impossible conception of an Absolute, an Almighty, which is not Absolute and Almighty, but an Absolute and Almighty, controlled and limited by the finite ideas of justice and right formulated by the finite mind of man.

But passing this difficulty, and yielding full weight to the argument that the mind of man demands for its moral satisfaction that God's acts should appear to it just, loving, merciful; that this is necessary to its conception of the Almighty then it may secondly be urged that our finite ideas of justice, love and mercy are not competent for application save to finite objects. We cannot know what infinite justice, love and mercy are. What we may conceive in the universe as conflicting with these finite ideas may not do so in reality, but be perfectly consistent therewith. This does not impeach the truth or validity of our ideas of these qualities so far as we are called to apply them to ourselves or to our acts, but restricts their meaning to

those finite realms for which alone they were intended as guides.

All of which it may be said are arguments of imperfection, of human impotence, finite limitations, and really are negative rather than positive; a sort of *non possumus*. This is in large measure true, but it is no more true of this moral difficulty than of many intellectual difficulties. It defines our limitations and shows us a reason for them.

But again, and finally, we may be asked how can we have any feeling of responsibility for the exercise of a will of whose freedom we have no intellectual assurance except in a negative way; whose freedom we cannot understand or think clearly. To which the reply may be made that we have no more assurance and can think no more clearly the existence of the external world, yet notwithstanding, we all, philosophers and ordinary men, not only accept the existence of the external world as true, but are compelled to accept it just as men from the earliest times have accepted as true and acted on the freedom of the will and their responsibility therefor.

ARTICLE VII.

PETER'S SERMON TO CORNELIUS.

BY C. F. SANDERS, A. M., B. D.

The experience of Simon Peter in connection with the Baptism of the Centurion, Cornelius of Caesarea, as recorded in the tenth chapter of the Acts, is of far-reaching importance for the study of the founding of Christianity. It is one of the turning points of history. Something new is happening—something determinative of vast consequences. Old traditions are breaking down. Thenceforth the policy of the Apostles is regulated by a much broader principle. Not only so, but the conception of salvation itself suffers an elementary change. The resulting change is so radical as to lend a more than ordinary interest to the inquiry into the causes producing it. The problems it contains have a direct bearing upon vital points in the philosophy of history at present agitating among scholars. It is therefore with an exceeding interest that we enter upon this little study. We may not attain a final solution of all the problems. If only we can indicate certainly the direction in which the solution lies we shall be satisfied.

The Tradition. The Jews hated the Gentiles bitterly. During long centuries they had felt themselves the sole subjects of Divine favor. God had chosen them. Jehovah had blessed them. To them had been given the Divine testimonies. To them was the promise of the Messiah made. The promised Messiah was *for them*. The disciples were among the Jews. Entering upon the Apostolate, their traditional exclusiveness clung to them. They offered the Gospel or redemption to the lost sheep of the house of Abraham. Jesus' teaching had not broken their exclusive conception of His mission to the world. It was the Holy Spirit who would take of the things of Christ and show them unto them.

The Time. It is of utmost importance that we fix the chronology of this event with certainty. It may be true that the

writer of Acts is recording events "without any necessary implication of historical sequence."

But narration in detail implies the relative proportion of decisive importance pertaining to the events narrated. All agree that the baptism of the Ethiopian Eunuch, Cornelius, and of the Gentiles at Antioch followed the dispersion consequent upon the persecution which reached its climax in the martyrdom of Stephen. But this leaves room for much speculation. Nevertheless this one point of agreement is significant. Stephen had been stoned to death for his rebuke of Jewish formalism from the viewpoint of the spiritual religion of the Gospel. This fact would enjoin caution. If there had been any slightest disposition to reckon lightly with the prevailing conservatism, it would be by such an experience. The Apostles had above all else learned to trust their Master implicitly. Pentecost had justified their obedience and trustfulness without making them presumptuous. After this demonstration of hostility they could not but seek Divine guidance for every advance step. With this fact in mind let us proceed to locate the order of events.

In the matter of chronology the priority of the Baptism of Cornelius as against the Baptism of the Gentiles of Antioch is of chief significance. The time of the Eunuch's Baptism is of little consequence as we shall see farther on. If, according to Grieve, the "events are dovetailed into each other without regard to any implication of historical sequence," the fact that Peter gives his experience in the case of Cornelius in evidence, when the matter of the status of the Antioch Gentiles is before the Jerusalem council for settlement, renders it conclusive that Cornelius' Baptism held the priority. Furthermore the account Peter gave of the Cornelius affair, when called to account, shows that his act was without precedent.

Cornelius. Of greater importance than the time of the event is the status of the man. Upon this point the investigations of Shürer have brought decisive light. In the Acts he is called *εὐσεβὴς καὶ φοβούμενος τὸν θεόν*. The question, therefore, is, what was the religious status of one so designated. Neander says: "There is scarcely any room to doubt that he be-

longed to the class of Proselytes of the Gate." Harnack, writing at a much later day and under much fuller light, passes over it with exceeding deftness. After pronouncing definite judgment upon the status of the Eunuch, he goes on: "This man was not a Jew, but belonged to the 'φοβούμενοι τὸν θεόν,' furthermore he could not as a Eunuch become a Jew. In that he was inducted into the Christian congregation, he, the 'half' Proselyte and Eunuch, one rigid barrier had fallen down. One event alone does not yet decide, neither can a second similar event—Peter baptizes the 'φοβούμενος' Cornelius in Caesarea—have had the principal significance which the author of the Acts gives it. As long as it concerns Proselytes, even though they belong to the outer circle, even the strictest Jew could find a viewpoint which would permit him to regard the acceptance of such permissible." Thus does the great historian pass over the middle term in his logical process, permitting his great name, presumably, to supply it. It is an example of getting rid of a fatal obstacle to his theory most dexterously. A point so important to Harnack's theory of history demands detailed proof or a reason why such proof is not necessary. Ramsay learnedly tells us that "Cornelius was a God-fearing proselyte." He then proceeds to describe the position of Proselytes of the Sanctuary, and of the Gate, relatively to the Jews, and then informs us that "in Acts the second class is always described as they that *fear God*." He further tells us of the Mosaic regulations which these God-fearing Proselytes were bound to observe. But this very explanation of the ceremonialism under which the Proselyte of the Gate was placed, upon the evidence afforded by Peter's vision of the clean and the unclean, throws his assertion, viz., that Cornelius is a Proselyte of the Gate, into very great doubt.

McGiffert says: "Though a pious and God fearing man, Cornelius was neither a Jew nor a Proselyte, and therefore his admission to the Christian Church was a distinct violation of the principles that had hitherto controlled the action of the disciples. It is in this light that Luke pictures the event. He evidently regarded it as an occurrence of the very greatest sig-

nificance, as nothing less, in fact, than the official recognition by the apostles and other Christians of Jerusalem of the Christianity of the Gentiles, and of their right to enter without passing through the door of Judaism." Nösgen says: "For not only the invitation of Cornelius, but the vision which was vouchsafed to him, made known to the Apostle that he should proclaim the Gospel in the home of a heathen and administer baptism to him. Just the method by which Peter justified his step before the congregation, proves irrefutably that a revelation of God alone led him to it." "It (the case of Cornelius) proves that the kingdom of God is open to Gentile and Jew upon equal terms (in völlig gleicher Weise) and it is not necessary for the former to enter through Judaism."

We will now give Shürer's argument which resolves the difficulty and decides conclusively in favor of the idea that the "*σεβόμενοι*" are not *Proselytes of the Gate*. "With those two classes, the *σεβόμενοι*, on the one hand, and the *προσηλύτοι* properly so called on the other, Christian scholars are uniformly in the habit of identifying the two categories of an apparently kindred character that are met with in Rabbinical literature. It is quite usual to say that the *σεβόμενοι* correspond to what in Rabbinical language are called 'proselytes of the gate,' and on the other hand, to what in the same language are known as 'proselytes of righteousness.' In point of fact however it is only this latter part of the statement that is correct, the *σεβόμενοι* and the *ger hasshar* have nothing whatever to do with each other. Those Rabbinical designations are as yet entirely foreign to the usage of Mishna, where the only distinction met with is that between the 'ger,' pure and simple, and the 'ger toshab.' The former means a Gentile who has been converted to Judaism, the latter again corresponds to what in the Old Testament is understood by a *ger*, namely, a stranger dwelling in the land of Israel." "This can only mean that one who was not a Jew, but who lived permanently in the land of Israel, had at least to observe those precepts that were equally binding on the whole human race. * * * * From this therefore it is evident that the

'ger toshab' have no connection with the *σεβόμενοι τὸν θεόν*, just as it is further certain that what we know from history regarding these latter is utterly incompatible with the Rabbinical requirements in regard to the 'ger toshab'." This is the solution from the facts. In view of the facts which Shürer produces it is the only consistent solution. And it is this solution alone which will fit the case of Cornelius in a manner which will harmonise all that we know about him. This gives the case the importance necessary to account for Peter's hesitancy on the one hand, and the challenge of his act on the part of the Jerusalem Church on the other. Cornelius, therefore, was a Gentile, and he was baptised before the Antiochians.

The Eunuch. This man from far-away Ethiopia, we are told, came to Jerusalem to worship. When Philip found him he was reading the prophecy of Isaiah. His admission into the Christian community occasioned no criticism. The case does not come in evidence when the new departures of Caesarea Antioch come under discussion. It is never regarded in the light of a new departure, nor as establishing a new precedent. Modern scholars are agreed that the Ethiopian Eunuch was a proselyte of the gate.

Peter. Among the apostles, Peter was always the most ready to undertake radical steps. His impulsive nature may serve partly to explain this fact. But even an impulsive nature has causes behind its motives. Behind Peter's impulsiveness there was an implicit faith. If he was uncalculating, it was because he so completely trusted his Master. If he appears reckless, it was because an absolute confidence assured him of safety where others only saw disaster. If he dared, he also demonstrated. Peter was an indispensable factor in that period of transition. Furthermore, we find him in possession of a leader's personality. Whatever may have been the cause, he at least had the respect of his fellow disciples to the extent of submission to his judgment. To his every act where he takes the initiative we find the apparent inference that it is inspired by the feeling that his Lord would justify (except where he is driven as in the case of his shameful denial). In the case be-

fore us Peter takes the initiative, and deliberately takes a radical step in advance.

The Event. Peter has his scruples nullified by a vision (scruples which he would never have had in the case of a Proselyte of the Gate), and enters the Gentile home in Caesarea with the declaration of having attained to a broader view of the Divine plan: "I perceive that God is no respecter of persons." The fortune of Jewish birth and the ceremonial rite of circumcision, fortuitous though this now seems, were until then regarded the indispensable prerequisites of Divine favor. The occasion is momentous. Peter's feeling must have been intense. He has, as it were, thrust himself forth to walk on another untried path (as he did on Galilee). The Lord had incited him to it. His intense spirit was watching to note the justification of his act. Like on Pentecost, but with greater brevity, he relates the great facts concerning Jesus Christ. The assuring hand of his Lord is extended to him, as "while he yet spake the Holy Ghost fell on all them which heard the word." (Acts 10, 44). The admission of the Gentile was justified, not by the vision at Joppa, nor even by it in connection with its counterpart in Caesarea, but by the outpouring of the Holy Ghost.

The Doctrine. The Trinity of the Divine Being is the clear theology of Peter's sermon to, and baptism of, Cornelius. It is in the matter of Christology and Pneumatology that there has been difference of view. From the time of Arius onward verse 38 has been used by those who have been busy to show that Christ was only man. "But here again exegesis is a higher thing than grammar. Grammar may be a valuable servant to theology: but the earth is disquieted for a handmaid that is heir to her mistress." If one would arrive at the truth he must do justice to the thought of the text. *ὁυτός ἐστιν πάντων κύριος*, the close of the verse 36, expresses an independent thought. Every suggestion which attempts another explanation is strained and artificial. This parenthetical sentence gains in emphasis by its very position. It attracts attention. It defines an idea. By it Cornelius is informed that Jesus Christ, whose name has just been mentioned, "is

Lord of all." Thus the word *κύριος*, in the given connection becomes of decisive importance. And we find it is the New Testament term applied to God to express the idea of Adonai in the Old Testament. Applied to Christ it expresses of Him a relation between Him and us identical with that of Adonai of the Old Testament. Christ is Adonai. He is Lord of all. His deity could not receive stronger expression.

Verse 38 has also been the center of much discussion. *Ἰησοῦν τὸν ἀπὸ Ναζαρέθ, ὡς ἔχρισεν αὐτὸν ὁ θεὸς Πνεύματι Ἁγίῳ καὶ δυνάμει.* These words express the fact that Jesus of Nazareth possessed the Holy Ghost and power, and the difficulty arises over how He came by it. Hence *ἔχρισεν* must contain the distinctive idea. The verb *χρίω* "is used of the symbolical anointing with holy oil, whereby men ordained of God to special service in His economy of grace were not only set apart and consecrated, but gifted and endowed for that holy service which demanded powers above and beyond those naturally belonging to men." It is used of various offices such as prophet, priest and king. The office determined the character of the duty, and the power given corresponded thereto. Going back to the parenthetical sentence which defines the name Jesus Christ, we have "this Jesus from Nazareth is anointed Lord of all." The only question remaining is whether he is Lord *by* the anointing. To which there is nothing in evidence which can in any wise justify an affirmative answer. It is something of a parallel case with the first verse of the Fourth Gospel, "the Word was with God, the Word was God." He was the embodiment of what anointment symbolized. The symbolism He had not experienced, but He had the office and the power of Lordship—He was Lord of all. The idea impressed by ages of symbolic ceremony here attains personification. "To this one bear all the prophets witness." The existing fact goes begging for language in which to express it. *Anointed* is the best term the Apostle can use, and even it reveals our poverty of language. But, properly studied, permitting all true light to enter into the solution, the result is beautiful. Peter has crossed the boundary from Judaism into Heath-

endom for the first time and in the sublimest eloquence proclaimed the *Divine Christ* to the *Gentile Cornelius*. He there furnished the figure of speech which sacred history had prepared for that occasion and transmitted it to all after time. *Jesus Christ, the Anointed, is God.*

We have yet to do with the Pneumatology contained in this event. Harnack and his school are very anxious to get rid of the Holy Spirit. They must succeed if they would make good their presuppositions. For their theory that Christian doctrine can be accounted for by or from Greek philosophy, the priority of the admission of Gentiles at Antioch is far better adapted. But as we have seen above, that has not been established. Furthermore, it is the witness of the Holy Spirit which furnishes the final argument leading the Apostles to conclude to admit Gentiles into the Christian community.

It is also worthy of notice that the Holy Spirit came upon all while Peter yet spake. It was not in connection with the laying on of hands. It did not follow, nor did it happen in connection with, baptism. It was immediate. It came together with faith in Christ *after Christ had been preached*. The preached word is the bridge upon which the Holy Spirit crosses into the soul of man.

The condition of salvation here set forth also marks the definite advance which Peter made over the traditional idea. He takes it wholly out of the realm of rites and ceremonies, wherein it wholly consisted before, and makes it consist entirely of spiritual factors. At the consummation this Anointed Lord will judge "quick and dead." Then "through His name every one that believeth on Him shall receive *remission* of sins."

Resumé: This event marks a revelation. Without precedent, Peter admits the Gentile Cornelius into membership with the body of Christ by Baptism; he administers Baptism upon authority of divine certification of acceptance through the gift of the Holy Ghost; the divine authorization succeeded the preaching of Christ and accompanied the acknowledgment of faith; this is the decisive transition factor in the passing of the Gospel mission from Judaism to the Gentile world.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE CHANCEL AND ITS FURNISHINGS.

By GEO. H. COX, D.D.

By way of introduction, it is but fact to say that a more enlightened understanding of our subject is both necessary and desirable, not among laymen, only, but among ministers, as well. Church buildings have often been erected, furnished and used for years, without a thought as to fitness, historical correctness, scriptural significance, meaning or symbolism; just as if God had never given any directions with regard thereto; that there is no meaning attached to them; and that individuals and congregations are to be guided solely by their own taste, or want of taste, as the case may be. As a consequence, it is not unusual to behold a great lack of churchliness in the buildings themselves, as well as in the furniture thereof, and the arrangement, use and adornments of the same.

In considering the subject that is before us, it will be well for us to remember that magnificent church buildings, artistic furniture, impressive ceremonies, gorgeous rituals, elaborate liturgies, costly robes, and the like, are not essential to true worship, any more than that a simple, plain, unpainted house, with inartistic furniture, and a bald, puritanic form of worship is any bar to acceptable approach to God. But let us also remember that appointments of artistic beauty and refinement are pleasing and acceptable to God, and appeal to the very highest instincts in man; and that barrenness and ugliness are not, and never can be, synonyms for holiness, godliness or spirituality, nor at all after the pattern that God gave to his people, in the beginning of what we may call church-life.

One has but to read the minute directions, entering into the very smallest details, that God gave to Moses relative to the erection of the tabernacle, its furniture, its arrangement, its service, and indeed everything connected with it to be convinced that they were not artificial nor arbitrary, but that each and

everything meant something; or, in other words, were shadow pictures, or object lessons, devised by God, and intended to teach men how they were to approach and worship Him, and through which their religious life was to be developed. And although the people of that day and time may not have grasped the lessons that they were intended to convey, yet, when we come to the study of them, under the searchlight of the centuries that have since passed, we cannot fail to recognize their profound spiritual significance.

The Christian sanctuary of to-day is in regular and uninterrupted line of descent from the ancient tabernacle, and is, in all of its parts, as fully significant as was its predecessor. No detail pertaining to it is unimportant.

The design of this paper is, in its humble way, to assist in the study of these things. No time shall be wasted in discussing the far fetched symbolism that have been attached to everything pertaining to the chancel, but the effort shall be to endeavor to ascertain the most accurate historical and scriptural conception and significance, and apply the same to our day and times and circumstances. In doing this, it will not be expected that all the arguments and reasonings by which conclusions have been reached, will be given in detail, but only the principles governing the arguments, and the results reached.

The worship of God, from the very beginning, has always been associated with the altar, it always occupying the central place in worship, the place where God meets with man, and where man comes into communion with God. In the beginning, the altar was very crude and simple; but was exactly adapted to the necessities of the people, and was sufficient for the accomplishment of its purpose.

The first altar of which we have any mention in Scripture, was that built by Noah on leaving the ark; though it is not unreasonable to suppose that there were others prior to that time, as was evidently the case with Cain and Abel, who, in the very first divine service of which we have any record, must have erected altars upon which they presented their offerings to God.

There are numerous references in Scripture to these monuments of piety, in the form of altars, erected by Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, during their sojourning in the land of Canaan; the most remarkable being the one erected by Abraham, upon which he fully expected and intended to offer his son, Isaac.

So, too, we are told that Moses built an altar at Rephedim, and another at Horeb.

Usually these altars were built upon certain spots that had been hallowed by some religious event or association, and often in places where the Lord had appeared to them, or where He had, in some way, communicated with them. Sometimes they were erected at the express command of Jehovah, while at other times they were the voluntary expression of a desire to worship Him.

At first the altar was but a small, rude structure made of earth and unhewn stones; but as time advanced and the race increased in numbers, and became more and more enlightened and devoted to the service of God, there was a gradual, yet steady development of the altar as to its form, size and material, as well as in the form and character of its service; the evolution always being in the line of advancement, as well as enlargement.

Then God gave directions for the establishment, erection and maintenance of the Tabernacle, together with all its forms and ceremonies. In this advancement the altar was not succeeded by the tabernacle, as if it had accomplished its design, and was no longer needed, but it was carried over into, and became a part of, the tabernacle, still continuing to occupy the central place in worship.

Then, in due time, the tabernacle was followed by the temple; without, a veritable mountain of marble and gold, and precious stones, shining and glistening in the light of the sun; and within, adorned in incomparable splendor and magnificence; and served by the accredited priests of the most high God, arrayed in the brilliant robes and paraphernalia that He had Himself prescribed. As before, however, the temple did not abolish the altar, but both altar and tabernacle, still following the line

of development, passed over into and became a part of the temple.

Since then the temple has been succeeded by the Jewish synagogue, and it by the Christian church, in which the central and essential object still is that with which worship first began; the altar, the place where God meets with man, and where man comes into communion with God.

Thus tracing the teachings of God in the development of the altar, tabernacle, temple and synagogue, down to the Christian church, it is not difficult for us to understand that every part of the church, together with its furniture and the arrangement and adornment of the same, all have a definite purpose, use and significance, which we should carefully study if we would understand the mind of God in their establishment and preservation.

Taking the tabernacle as the pattern that God has given us, let us examine its parts somewhat in detail; and, making a full allowance for the changes of times and circumstances, let us study it as the original pattern for the house of the Lord.

And first there is the tabernacle itself: "The House of the Lord," the "Tent of Jehovah," the "Dwelling-place" of the most high God. No building has ever, relatively speaking, approached the grandeur and magnificence of that for which the divine Architect Himself, furnished the plan and specifications. It was a structure of incomparable splendor for the age in which it existed, of wonderful significance; and was the visible centre of the whole fabric of the religion of Jehovah; the one place in all the world where the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob had promised to dwell and meet with His people and hear their prayers, and accept their praise, and bless them; the one great distinguishing feature always being that it was dedicated and consecrated to the pure worship and loving service of Jehovah.

So, too, the Christian sanctuary of to-day, is the "House of the Lord," and whatever its style of architecture may be, it must be in perfect harmony, and must exhibit the sacred purpose to which it is dedicated. It may be the grand, magnificent cathedral of the densely populated city; or it may be the

rude log-hut of the wilderness ; or it may be any intermediate between these two extremes ; but whatever the style of architecture, however rich or poor, or spacious, or limited, its distinguishing feature is, and must always be, that it is "lovely unto the Lord," dedicated and consecrated to the pure worship and the loving service of God, and from which all things else are to be rigidly excluded.

The tabernacle always stood with its ends east and west, with its entrance at the east end, and the Holy of Holies at the west end.

When the temple was erected, it was placed in the same way ; that is, east and west, with the entrance at the east end. But when the Jewish synagogues came into use, they were placed so that the worshippers therein should be facing toward Jerusalem, whether that should be east, west, north or south ; thereby teaching that while the original and historically correct position for the "house of the Lord" was east and west, yet when circumstances required, either or any position is acceptable to God, and no bar to acceptably approaching him.

The Holy of Holies, in the west end of the tabernacle, was where Jehovah had promised to dwell, and where he actually did dwell, between the cherubim, on the mercy-seat that rested upon the ark of the covenant, that contained the tables of stone upon which God Himself had written His law. Shrouded in darkness and mystery, and inaccessible to all except the high priest, it was a type of God's abode, heaven, which is clothed in deepest mystery, invisible to mortal eyes, and inaccessible to sinful man except through the mediation of the great High Priest, the Lord Jesus Christ.

To this Holy of Holies there was but one way of entrance : that was through the outer "Court," standing for the nave of the church, directly by the "altar of Burnt Offering," representing the great sacrifice offered for our sins ; thence by the "Lava," representing the sacrament of baptism ; thence through the "Holy Place," standing for the chancel of the church, between the "Table of Show-Bread" and the "Golden Candlestick," representing the Word of God ; thence by the way of the

"Altar of Incense," representing the sacrament of the altar : thence into the "Holy of Holies," thus symbolizing for us that the way into heaven, our "Holy of Holies," is through the Church, in the use of the ordinances of God's appointment.

The "Holy Place," with its furniture, was the prototype of that which we now call the church, and occupied one fifth of the floor-space covered by the "whole" of the tabernacle. Letting the "Court" of the tabernacle represent that which we now call the nave, or auditorium, of the church, therefore, will give us some idea of what should be the relative size of the chancel ; and while it is not claimed that it must always be in that exact proportion, yet we are thereby reminded that, in the erection of our houses of worship, ample space should always be given to the church, and that there is little or no danger of giving it too much.

Without for a moment tolerating the many fanciful and far-fetched symbolisms that men have attempted to connect with the chancel and every article of its furniture, and rejecting the superstitions that Rome so strenuously insists upon, we cannot fail to recognize and admit that the chancel is that which gives character to the whole structure. From here the Word of God is to be preached, and from here the Holy Supper is to be administered, and therefore it, the chancel, is, indeed, the "Holy-Place" of the church, where everything is connected with the deep mysteries of meditation and access to God. It should, therefore, receive our closest and most intelligent attention in its furnishings and arrangements, as well as our watchful and constant care that it be not used otherwise than that for which it is designed.

It is good form to have the front part of the chancel elevated at least one step above the floor of the nave ; that part where the pulpit and lectern stand, a step higher, and that part where the altar stands, still another step, thereby making the altar at least three steps above the nave.

Standing in the "Court" of the tabernacle, just in front of the entrance to the "Holy-Place," was the "Lava," where the

priests performed their ablutions of purification, and which stands, for us, as the representative of our baptismal font.

The ancient churches had what was called the "baptistery," or the place where baptism was performed, which was, most generally, a separate building from the church. In the sixth century the movement began to return the "baptistery" to the church itself; and from then, and gradually, the baptismal font was introduced.

As time has passed, the place or location of the baptismal font has been subject to many changes. Sometimes it was inside the chancel; sometimes outside; sometimes on one side, and sometimes on the other; and sometimes in the middle; but wherever it was placed, it was always kept as near to the people as possible.

Where the entrance to the chancel is at the side, as it is in most of our churches, the most appropriate place for the baptismal font is at the side opposite that occupied by the pulpit, so placed as to be easy of access, and in plain view of the congregation: and if the pulpit occupies the middle position, as it does in most of our churches, then the baptismal font should be on the left side, as you face the chancel.

Where the steps leading into the chancel are at the front and centre, as they should be whenever practicable, the baptismal font should stand outside the chancel, immediately in front of the steps, with its base resting upon the floor of the nave: thus making it most conspicuous, and most convenient for pastor and people, and indicating that baptism meets us upon the level of our natural lives, to bestow upon us the blessings that it brings.

Passing from the "Court" of the tabernacle into the "Holy-Place," one would see the "Altar of Incense" immediately in front of him, midway between the north and south walls of the "Holy-Place," and near to the veil hanging between it and the "Holy of Holies," but not touching it. Thus placed it was in plain and unobstructed view. This altar, both as to form and position, was the prototype of the altar as we have it in the church to-day.

Many superstitious beliefs, and many gross errors and flagrant abuses have, at different times and places, been held and taught regarding the altar, of which we need not speak at this time; but it is a great satisfaction to know that the Lutheran Church has never yielded to either, but has openly and emphatically condemned and rejected all and everything not clearly taught in God's Word, and has, and does carefully guard her altar as that which stands for her as the representative of the Holy Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, or, as the fathers loved to call it, "The Sacrament of the Altar."

With us the altar is recognized as something more than a mere table, placed in the church for the sake of convenience, even though the words "Altar" and "table" are in the scriptures sometimes used interchangeably.

There is a deep significance in the altar, whatever its form may be; though the inclosed form, in imitation of the "Altar of Incense" of the tabernacle, is, undoubtedly, the most historically correct form. It stands for us as the representative of the Holy Supper of the Lord, even when the sacrament is not being administered. It speaks eloquently to us of a communion with the Lord, in which we draw nearer to him, and he to us, than at any other time or place.

For some reason, that I have not been able to ascertain, it has become quite common to place the pulpit near the centre of the chancel, with the altar immediately in front of it; but this is, undoubtedly, a mistake. According to the arrangement of the tabernacle, as already shown, it should be in the back-centre of the recess of the chancel, with absolutely nothing between it and the nave. This arrangement was also followed in the ancient church; and even when the altars were multiplied in numbers, the "High Altar," that is the chief altar, occupied this position, whatever positions the others might occupy.

The altar should be elevated at least one step above the floor upon which the pulpit and lectern stand, so as to be plainly visible to the whole congregation; in fact the central and most conspicuous object in the whole church.

The size of the altar may be governed by the size of the

church, and particularly of the chancel; but care should be taken that it be not too small.

Its form should be that of an oblong, usually about twice as long as it is wide, and of sufficient height to be convenient; and, as already said, should be closed on both sides and ends.

An ordinary table is often used as an altar, but the regular altar is more churchly, and should be used in preference to all other forms.

Sometimes the altar is placed against the wall, and sometimes fastened to the wall, as if it were a mere shelf; but such an arrangement is never churchly, nor Lutheran, and should not be permitted.

The altar may be as elaborate as desired, but its carvings and other adornments should all be chaste and pure, and only such as would indicate its holy purpose.

It should never be used as an ordinary table. It is not unusual to see a pitcher and glass, containing water for drinking; Sunday School library books; lesson literature, etc., upon the altar. All such is eminently improper, and has a tendency to lessen the thought of its sacredness as the place for the celebration of the Holy Supper.

When there is no lectern in the church it is not at all improper for the minister to stand at the altar to read the gospel and epistle lessons. In such a case it would be appropriate to have the Bible upon the altar, but it would be better for the lessons to be read from the pulpit.

In like manner, when there is no baptismal font in the church, the vessel, containing the water for baptism, may be placed upon the altar, but it should be removed so soon as the baptism has been performed.

The altar is the proper place for the offering of our sacrifices of prayer and praise, and the gifts of our devotion: hence the minister, upon receiving the offerings of the people, is directed to "Place them upon the altar."

Natural flowers are always appropriate upon the altar, and artificial ones may be used, in seasons when real ones cannot

be procured; but it is better to have none, rather than artificial ones.

A cross, or crucifix may be placed upon the altar, and in some Lutheran churches candles are used.

It is in good form and Lutheran custom, to drape the altar with what are known as "Altar Vestments," these being cloths of different colors and ornaments illustrating and emphasizing the lesson of the different parts of the Church-year. The colors of these are, from the beginning of advent to Christmas, violet. From Christmas to the first Sunday after Epiphany, white. From the second Sunday after Epiphany to Quinquagesima inclusive, violet. From Easter to the evening before Pentecost, white. Pentecost and Trinity Sunday, red. Sundays after Trinity, green. Minor church Festivals, Harvest, Reformation day, etc., red.

When a full set of vestments cannot be had for all the seasons of the church year, the vestment for constant use should be either red, crimson, or green.

The designs of the embroidery upon these vestments may be as simple or elaborate as may be desired, but should always be some one of the familiar Christian emblems, or some suitable text of the holy Scriptures; but, whatever they are, they should always be large enough, and distinct enough, to be seen, read and understood from any part of the church.

These vestments may be made of any desired material, but broadcloth is by far the best, because it is durable, easily embroidered, does not soil easily, and always looks well. Strong, fast colors should always be used, and the embroidery should always be of such color and material as to harmonize well with the material and color of the vestment.

It is proper to have vestments for the pulpit and lectern, but they should always be of the same color, material and design as those for the altar. No vestments should be used upon the baptismal font.

In addition to these it is Lutheran custom to have what are called "Altar Linens," consisting of the "Altar Cloth," "Cor-

poral," "Pall," "Purificators" and "Veil." These are all made of smooth, white linen.

For the protection of the altar, there should be placed upon it a cover made of some thick, woolen stuff, cut to exactly fit the top of the altar. Over this should be placed the "Antependium;" that is, the colored vestment for the season of the church year, or the one constantly used. It is placed upon the altar so as to hang down in front, and be wide enough to cover about the middle half of the front of the altar, leaving one-fourth its face exposed upon either side. That part of the vestment hanging down in front of the altar may be richly embroidered, and may bear the symbol of the season of the church year. Over this, covering the whole top of the altar, and hanging slightly over the front and about half-way to the floor, at the ends, should be the "Altar Cloth." It is made of fine, white linen, never in colors, and is to be always on the altar; thus signifying that the altar is the "Table of the Lord." This cloth may be perfectly plain, or it may be embroidered with some suitable device; but it must be immaculately white.

When the sacrament of the Lord's Supper is to be administered, the "Corporal" is used. It is a square of fine, white linen, almost as large as the top of the altar, upon which the communion vessels are placed. It must be perfectly white; its edges may be delicately embroidered.

The "Pall" is a piece of heavy cardboard, about six inches square, covered with white linen. It is used to cover the top of the chalice to protect from flies or other foreign matter, and should be kept in its place except during the acts of consecration and administration. A suitable design for embroidery would be the letters "I. N. R. I." worked on the top side, surrounded by a crown of thorns, or either the letters or crown alone.

The "Purificators" are small, white napkins or towels, used for cleansing the rim of the chalice during the administration.

The "Veil" is made of the finest white linen, or of mull, and should be sufficiently large to cover all of the communion vessels, but not large enough to hang down below the edge of the altar. Just before the act of consecration it should be re-

moved from over the vessels, carefully folded and laid upon the altar, and replaced over the vessels after all have communed.

The "Dosen" is a cloth kept always hanging above and behind the altar. It is a piece of tapestry, designed as an ornament, and may be as elaborate as desired, provided, always, that the designs upon it are appropriate to the place and in harmony with its surroundings.

During the act of consecration the minister should stand facing the altar, with his back to the congregation. The Pope, in the Sistine Chapel, at Rome, stands behind the altar, facing the people; but such is contrary to all Lutheran custom.

In pronouncing the benediction, the minister should stand before the altar, facing the people, and not at either the pulpit nor the lectern; the pulpit being especially for the preaching of the Word, and the lectern for the reading of the lessons; while the altar is the only proper place for sacramental and sacrificial acts.

The altar should always stand crosswise of the building; that is, with its long side facing the people. It is the custom in the Protestant Episcopal Church, and it is not unusual in the Methodist Episcopal Church, for the minister, during the act of consecration, to stand at the end of the altar, facing the other end, with his side to the people; but such position is incorrect and unLutheran. It probably has been caused by the fact that, during the Puritan ascendancy in England, the altar was brought down into the body of the church, and set lengthwise with the building, and the minister stood at what we might call the back end, with the altar between himself and the people. When the altar was restored to its proper place and position, the custom of standing at the end was continued. In a Methodist church, when the pastor had a brother minister to assist him, I have seen them stand at opposite ends of the altar, facing each other during the consecration, and then, in the same position, kneel and administer to each other, reaching across the altar to do so.

Standing in the "Holy Place" of the tabernacle, with the "Altar of Incense" immediately in front of him, one would see the "Table of Show-Bread" upon his right, and the "Golden

Candlestick" upon his left; these were prototypes of our pulpit and lectern. The arrangement of these, in the temple, was analogous to that of the tabernacle.

In the ancient church, the Bishop's cathedra, or in other words, his chair of office, in which he sat, and from which he spoke, was in the apsis, back of the altar. On the right and left, corresponding to the "Table of Show-Bread" and the "Golden Candlestick," were two "Ambos," or pulpits, from one of which, the one on the left, the Epistle was read, and from the other the Gospel. The platforms, upon which these "Ambos" stood, were slightly elevated, and placed as near to the people as was possible, that the reading and preaching might easily be heard. Whenever the Bishop did not preach, as was often the case, a deacon read a homily, standing at the left or "Epistle Ambo."

On account of the distance of the "Bishop's Cathedra" from the people, and the consequent difficulty in hearing, it very early became the custom for the Bishop also to preach from the "Epistle Ambo." This, no doubt, explains the left position of the pulpit in many prominent churches. At the present time there seems to be a growing practice of placing the pulpit on the right side, where the "Gospel Ambo" stood; and while this is contrary to the custom of the Church, followed for many years, yet there can be no serious objection to it, and in fact, very good reasons for it; still if we wish to be historically correct, the pulpit should be placed at the left side, as near as possible to the people, upon a platform slightly elevated above the floor of the nave, so as to be in easy hearing distance, plainly visible, and not high enough to render the position of the hearers uncomfortable.

The lectern is the complement of the pulpit, and, as already stated, is of very ancient origin, corresponding to the Gospel Ambo of the ancient church. Thus placed it gives symmetry to the arrangements of the chancel, and brings the reading of the service and lessons within easy hearing distance of the people. It should always stand on the side opposite that of the pulpit.

When there is no lectern in the church the service and lessons may be read from either altar or pulpit; but preferably from the pulpit. When read from the altar, the minister should stand with his back to the altar, and facing the people.

It is pertinent to remark here, that no portion of the service demands more dignity, gravity and thoughtfulness than the reading and expounding of God's Word from both pulpit and lectern. The minister should never permit himself to be betrayed into a hurried or thoughtless manner. The sacred volume should be touched and handled with the very greatest show of respect. Roughly turning the leaves of the book; pushing the book about upon the lectern or pulpit; pounding the book by way of gesture, while speaking; slamming the lids of the book together when closing: should all be carefully avoided. The book should never be closed until the reading or speaking is completed, and then, gently and quietly.

It may be well to remember, in conclusion, that all of these things, of which we have been speaking, belong to the adiaphora; that is, neither a sin to use them, nor a sin to abolish them; and that they may be used freely, provided that we do not abuse them, or so use them as to cause them to become stumbling blocks in the pathway of weaker brethren.

Rightly understood and properly used, they may become a source of great comfort and joy, and add much to the beauty and solemnity of the services of the church.*

*The Editors give wide scope to discussion by contributors, but feel obliged to express their dissent from the view presented in the above Article, especially with respect to the significance and place of the altar.

ARTICLE IX.

CURRENT THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT.

I. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN.

By Professor M. COOVER, A.M.

Recent study of the term, *Ashteroth Karnaim* (Gen. 14:5), "Ashtaroth of the two horns," brings considerable light to the Old Testament student in explanation of the character and attributes of Astarte. This goddess was widely worshipped. At Ninevah she was the goddess of love, lust, and generation. The code of Hammurabi represents her also as the goddess of war. In Canaan she is known as "Ashtaroth of the two horns." It was first thought that the horns referred to two mountains, the chief places of her habitat. And again the horns are regarded as representing the crescent moon. In Babylonia Ishtar appears frequently in astro-theology.

The late Prof. Robertson Smith identified her with the cow-Astarte of Sidon, or with the sheep-goddess. In Deut. 7:13 the produce of the flock is called "Ashtaroth of the sheep."

The excavations at Gezer seem to corroborate the opinion of Prof. Smith. A bronze statuette four and one-half inches in height, a nude, ill-proportioned figure of a female, apparently symbolizing Astarte, has been found. Just above the ears of the too-largely figured head horns coil downwards very similar to the horns of a ram, though they possibly represent cow horns, since other figurines of cattle have been discovered on the same site.

From these findings the indications are forcible that the Canaanites worshipped Astarte symbolized as a cow, just as they worshipped Baal under the symbol of a bull.

—*The Expository Times* for December.

In the same number of *The Expository Times* Professor Tasker makes allusion to the ancient custom of laying founda-

tions of buildings in blood. After the custom of human sacrifice at the laying of the foundation stone was abandoned, ransom money in the form of coins was substituted. Newspapers and coins bearing the date of the erection of modern public buildings are now placed in the cornerstone. The coins are a relic of a significance long forgotten.

The history is a long and interesting one, and a brief summary may be added to the allusion made by Prof. Tasker.

The history begins with the sacredness of the threshold. When wild men lived in caves the door was both entrance and altar. There the fire was kindled, and there was the hearth which was also altar. Sacrifices were offered at the altar, which was likewise the threshold. In the tent the entrance was both fireplace and altar.

The altar of burnt offering was not in the Hebrew temple, but just over the threshold of the temple court. Medieval weddings took place at the cathedral door; and there also stood the baptismal font. David chose the most sacred spot when he said he would rather be a doorkeeper in the house of his God than dwell in the tents of wickedness. Mosaic legislation directed the master to take the servant, who, at the opening of the Sabbath year after six years of service, chose to be a perpetual bondservant to his master, and bore his ear against the doorpost that the blood might trickle on the threshold as a covenant between them, the seal of their agreement. *Babel* means "door of God;" the Sultan of Turkey is called the "Sublime Porte." When the ancient Romans marked the site for city or temple the plow that drew the line was not to desecrate the space reserved for door or gate; so they carried (*portare*) the plow over the threshold, which was designated *porta*, door or gate.

The whole of some Shinto temples consists of a magnificent gate. The doorway of great ancient temples is the most architecturally grand feature of the structure.

The threshold is too sacred for anything contaminating to come into contact with or to pass over it. The dead may not be borne over it to sepulture. In Alaska the sick at the near approach of death are carried out on their cot to expire in the

open air to obviate the bearing of the corpse over the threshold.

Korea's capitol has a little door in the rear city wall used solely for the exit of the bier at the burial of the dead.

The old houses in Italy have at the side of the door of common use a small door for obsequial use only, called *porta di morti*.

Jesus said the thief digs through the wall. The oriental robber does not burglarize the door; he reveres the threshold. Our Scandinavian settlers in the west leave an unbarred door by night.

In ancient Babylonia according to Dr. Hilprecht the sacredness of the threshold extends to the corner of the building. The cornerstone and the threshold may at one time have coincided, or the corner was regarded as the limit of the threshold. Blood covenants were most sacred at thresholds. God directed Moses to make the seal of the covenant of Passover at the doorway of Israelitish homes in Egypt. Jewish tradition says that the Hebrew people observed the Passover immediately after the passage of the Jordan into the promised land, as a threshold covenant upon entrance into the land of their inheritance.

When General Grant made his tour around the world, he received a covenant greeting of oriental character at Assiout. As he stepped off the boat to land on Egyptian soil, he was met by the American Consul at that port, who was an Egyptian. A bullock was sacrificed so that the blood flowed over the gangplank just where it touched Egyptian soil, and General Grant in stepping over the covenant seal entered upon sacred privileges and assured safety in Egypt.

As the threshold was deemed conterminous with the corner stone, the blood sacrifices appropriate at the threshold were also regarded as essential for the sanctification of the walls of the building, and the blood covenant was observed at the laying of foundations.

A human sacrifice, at first alive, afterwards slain, was buried under the wall to give it permanence and to sanctify the structure.

The sacrifice of animals was later substituted for human vic-

tims, and in eastern countries animals and fowls are still slaughtered at the laying of foundations. The blood sacrifice of an animal was observed at the institution of the new railway from Joppa to Jerusalem. In Thuringia the human sacrifice is still deemed most fitting. But instead of the human victim being buried alive or slain, a casual passer-by has his shadow quickly and clandestinely measured by the builders, and the measuring string is placed under the foundation stone with the expectation that the man whose measure is thus taken will soon be a shade, and his sacrificed spirit become the sanctification of the building.

But humaner becomes the sentiment when the man is no more a victim of human sacrifice, and a ransom is acceptable and satisfactory.

His worth in ransom money is placed in or under the corner stone of the structure, which substitute makes the building duly sacred and stable.

The coin placed in the corner stone of the modern public building has lost its ancient significance, but its history is traceable.

If Abram and Hammurabi, or Amraphel, were contemporaries, then Abram left Ur of the Chaldees in the 23rd century B. C.

How does this aspect of chronology affect the early history of the Hebrew people? The progress of the idea of development cannot let the civilization of Israel pass by. The same forces and slowly developing conditions that fostered the growth of other great world kingdoms certainly were not altogether lacking in the history of the Hebrew people, though the immediate causal force of Israel's progress was divine. The idea of development applied to God's chosen people seemed at first to sweep away the divine factor; but now this element of gradual growth takes on another aspect, which in its working coordinates the history and chronology of early Israel in substantiation of the divine record.

The period of the Judges, from the old standpoint of chronology, reckoning Abram's departure from Ur in the 19th cen-

tury, and the exodus from Egypt in the latter half of the 14th century, was too meagre for the development of the political and religious institutions of the Hebrews before the period of the monarchy.

It also gives too much time for the patriarchal age if we reckon the period of Hammurabi as the date of Abram's exit from the far East and allow 430 years as the time for the sojourn of the children of Israel in Egypt and place the Exodus so late as the 12th century B. C., as by McCurdy.

"When did Israel enter Canaan?" This question is asked and answered by Mrs. Louise Seymour Houghton in *The Bibliotheca Sacra* for July, 1904. Mrs. Houghton dates the Exodus in the latter half of the 15th century.

The factors which enter into the reckoning of the chronology of early Israel are the following:—

"First. The data found in the Bible.

1. The statement in 1 Kings vi:1 that the fourth year of Solomon's reign was the 480th after the Exodus.

2. The claim of Jephthah to Israel's right in the country east of the Jordan, namely, that they had been in possession 300 years (Judges xi: 26).

3. The notes of time in the book of Judges, which, added together, give 410 years from the death of Joshua to the death of Samson.

4. The fact that to this period must be added the time of the wilderness wandering (forty years), of the Conquest under Joshua (an unknown period), the judgeships of Eli (forty years), and of Samuel (an unknown period, as is also the reign of Saul), the reign of David (forty years), and the first four years of Solomon, making a total of 530 years besides the unknown periods.

5. The statement of St. Paul (Acts xii: 20) that the Judges' period before Samuel was 'about 450 years.'

6. The statement in Gen. xlvii: 11 that Joseph settled his father and brethren in the land of Rameses.

7. The statements in Exodus I and II that the Israelites built for Pharaoh the cities of Pithom and Rameses, being

forced a part of the time to make bricks without any provision of straw.

"*Second.* The data from Archeology.

1. The somewhat recent discovery by Edward Naville of the long-lost treasure-city, Pithom, with a number of bricks made without straw.

2. The tablets found in 1887 at Tel-el Amarna, on the Nile.

3. The so-called Merenptah stele found in 1896, bearing an inscription in which the name *Israel* occurs.

"*Third.* 1. The general agreement of scholars, especially since Naville's researches in Pithom (Succoth), that the Pharaoh of the Oppression was Rameses II of the 19th dynasty, and the Pharaoh of the Exodus, his son, Merenptah, or, more probably, his grandson, Seti II.

2. Recent astronomical calculations, especially by Mahler, by which the dates of Egyptian kings of the 17th, 18th, and 19th dynasties have been fixed with approximate accuracy, and that of Solomon's accession almost certainly at 990 B. C."

In consideration of these data what must be the approximate period of Israel's entrance into Canaan?

Professor Mahler, from his astronomical investigations, and from the tradition of the Jews that the Exodus fell on a Thursday, reckons that the people of Israel went out from Egypt Thursday, March 27th, 1335 B. C.

But the Amarna tablets (1587-1340) mention Canaanitish towns bearing the names *Jakob-el Joseph-el*, towns already under the regnancy of the children of Israel. And more important still is a stele of Merenptah, the commonly supposed predecessor of the Pharaoh of the Exodus, which among its inscribed victories contains the following statement: "The people of Israel is devastated, it has no grain."

To meet this early date of Israel's occupancy of Canaan some scholars postulated the breaking away from Egypt of the clan of Asher, and probably of Judah, and their invasion of Canaan by way of the isthmus and the Negeb several centuries previous to the full exodus of Israel.

So early an invasion of Canaan by the whole Hebrew race as is indicated in the stele of Merenptah was deemed impos-

sible owing to the prevalent and strong control of Egypt over Syria till the close of the 19th dynasty of the Pharaohs.

But the 18 dynasty was pitifully weak, and was unable to cope with the rebellious political revolutions taking place in Canaan, as is recorded in the Amarna letters.

Moreover, Ebed-Tob, king of Jerusalem, in his correspondence with Amenophis IV, the weak Pharaoh of the 18th dynasty, recounts the victories of the Habiri over certain towns as Bethel, Bethaven, and Gath-rimmon, in Canaan, and as threatening his own capitol.

These Habiri were at first regarded as "Confederates," allied clans of unknown origin; but now they are recognized as the Hebrews. Thus in the days of the Amarna correspondence the Hebrews were already in Canaan making conquests under Joshua or other of their leaders.

The victorious career of Thothmes III. of the 18th dynasty in its extension over Assyria and Canaan had weakened the inhabitants of the land and broken their spirit. The Hittites were temporarily subdued, and the smaller collective powers, such as the Jebusites and Perrizzites, were demoralized. But the glorious reign of Thothmes broke down under the weight of military conscription and the zeal of despotism, and when Israel reached Canaan the inhabitants had not rallied from their demoralization and political dissolution, and Egypt under the weak rule of Amenophis IV. was unable to give assistance to the dependencies in Canaan against the invading Hebrews.

Thothmes III, being regarded as a Pharaoh of the oppression, and Thothmes IV the Pharaoh under whose rule the Israelites made their exodus, places the exodus in the year 1423 B. C., forty years before the reign of Amenophis IV.

These coincidences satisfy many biblical data, but leave unexplained the statements respecting Israel's relation to the city Rameses, and the bricks without straw. Mrs. Houghton's solution of this difficulty is scarcely satisfactory, though there are plausible probabilities of a reconciliation with the coincidences and dates which bear so forcibly toward the early settlement of Canaan by the Israelites. The period of the Judges is thus favorably prolonged, and the development of the politi-

cal conditions into a monarchy receives appropriate recognition.

The history of the celebration of Christmas on the 25th of December is a "Tale of Three Cities." The Christians of the first two centuries paid no regard to Christ's nativity in the form of a public festival. This sacrosanct day appears first in the history of the Church in Jerusalem, Antioch, and Rome. It was in the first half of the fourth century before significant stress was laid on Christ's natal day. At Rome the pagan festivals were transformed and given a Christian meaning. The feast of Saturnalia (December 17-25) was a celebration in which for one week the slave was as good as his master, and assumed all the privileges of a freedman.

This was followed by the feast of Brumalia (December 25) in celebration of the birth of the sun. Now the day began to lengthen, and the sun regained his strength. Light and life were returning.

Then followed the feast of Sigillaria at which festival parents presented dolls to their children. The true sun is the Sun of righteousness; and why should not his natal day be observed in lieu of the feast of Brumalia? The Roman Church substituted the Christian festival of Christmas for this pagan feast. According to John Chrysostom the Christmas festival began to be observed in Antioch about the year 376 A. D.

But in the East the spiritual birth of Christ was the significant festival, observed on the 6th of January, the feast of Epiphany. His spiritual birth was at his baptism in the Jordan; and this baptism by John was regarded as taking place on the thirtieth birthday anniversary of Jesus according to Luke 3, 21-23.

Therefore in Jerusalem the Epiphany festival took the place of Christ's *birth after the flesh*. But the Christmas celebration was growing prevalent, and was being regarded as a necessary feature of appropriate reverence by the Church.

In Jerusalem, however, this celebration could scarcely well coincide with the sacrosanct festival of the holy Epiphany.

A letter purported to be written by Cyril, bishop of Jerusalem, to Julius, the Pope at Rome (337-352), asks for counsel

in respect of the difficulties involved in the observance of the double feast of Christmas and Epiphany on the 6th of January. It was with great inconvenience that Christians observed Christ's *birth after the flesh* which must be celebrated in the cave of the Nativity at Bethlehem, six miles south of the Holy City, and then that they hurry back for the feast of Christ's *birth according to the Spirit* to be observed eighteen miles away on the banks of the Jordan where John baptized Jesus.

Cyril asks Julius to examine the books taken by the Jews to Rome in the age of Titus for information that might settle the difficulty. Julius discovers the books of Josephus, and finds that Zacharias had his vision in the temple at the feast of Tabernacles, and calculating from this date decided that Jesus was born on the 25th day of December. This solution of the difficulty, however, was not readily accepted, for in the middle of the sixth century the Jerusalem Church still observed the double festival at the feast of Epiphany. The Christians of Armenia still to this day observe Christmas on the 6th of January, Christ's spiritual birthday and thirtieth anniversary of his birth after the flesh.

The Baptist Syrians still observe the direction of Paul of Samosata and are baptized on their thirtieth birthday anniversary.

When the 25th of December as Christmas day became comparatively universal, the Lenten festival of forty days, which originally followed immediately the holy Epiphany, January 6, was set forward to the forty days preceding Easter eve, and the Epiphany festival became the feast of the visit of the Magi and the manifestation of Jesus to the Gentile world.

The early Church regarded Jesus as born the Christ in the waters of Jordan. Eastern art depicted the baptismal scene with little fish swimming about the feet of Jesus in the water; and in the catacombs at Rome Jesus is symbolized as a large fish because he was born in the water, and Christians as little fish-born Christs at their baptism. A happy coincidence was discovered in the Greek word *ἰχθὺς*, which contains the initial letters of *Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς θεοῦ υἱὸς σωτήρ*.

The early Church gave special significance to the spiritual

nativity of Jesus; we pay special regard to his miraculous conception and physical birth. The first framers of creeds, however, make mention of the miraculous conception and Virgin birth, and then pass to Christ's experience at the hands of Pontius Pilate, without allusion to his baptism. The incarnation was at first widely regarded by a large part of the Church as Jesus' reception of the Divine at his baptism, at which time he was thought to become the Christ.

Though the Church at Rome set great store by Christ's humanity, the human sympathetic Jesus ere long became so spiritually enthroned and separate from men, so unapproachable in his divinity, so inaccessible to prayer, that the Holy Virgin and numberless saints must needs become intermediaries between Saviour and saved.

A fierce battle is now on over the significance of the incarnation. Which shall the Church deem the more important, the Virgin birth, or the spiritual Jesus? the spiritual conception, or the spiritual baptism? What was the original significance which the Church gave to Christ's person? The history of Christmas is not necessarily the history of an inspired Church.

Stress must be laid on both of two things, a human, and a divine nature in Christ, else we have no divine incarnation.

Disagreement over the temporal point of juncture between the natural and the divine in Jesus does not destroy the fact of the union of the two; but it does affect philosophically and ethically the aspect of each man's possible relation to the spiritual and divine.

The error of the early Church in deeming the spiritual birth of believers at their baptism to be a birth of the baptized into Christs, into lesser incarnations of the divine, takes on today the philosophical aspect of a divine immanence in every man amounting virtually to a divine incarnation.

Christ becomes less the Christ when all men may become Christs. The divine incarnation in Jesus, if it be but the effect of a mere spiritual baptism, becomes simply the possible and rightful immanence of God in all men. So we have and need but an ethical Saviour, an evolutionary type of what we all are destined to become.

God saves by immediacy in man, and there is need only of a mediator of knowledge, a revealer of lofty but imitable character, who is a type of manhood realizable by all. Virtue is knowledge; and sin is but ignorance. God is knowledge, light. Illumination saves man. Baptism is a symbol of awakened intelligence.

The history of Christmas is a serial story of the Christian centuries. It has become a tale of a thousand cities.

II. GERMAN.

BY PROFESSOR S. G. HEFELBOWER, A.M.

Just three days before the death of Prof. Volck of Rostock, which occurred, May 30th, 1904, there appeared from his pen, in the *Theologisches Literaturblatt*, a review of the second edition of Prof. Guthe's *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, which was published earlier in the year. The article is of interest, not merely because of the importance of the book reviewed, but more especially because it is the last utterance of this venerable champion of a conservative Old Testament Higher Criticism. He does not attempt in this brief review to give a full statement of all the objections that he might have to offer, but takes up just one cardinal point of dispute and treats it in such a way that the fundamental difference between his position and that of the writer, whose book is criticized, is at once apparent.

According to Guthe, the writers of the Old Testament chose family histories and genealogies as a means for expressing ethnology and the history of peoples, tribes, and places. Volck denies this unconditionally, and energetically defends the traditional view, i. e., that the characters named in the Old Testament were real men and not peoples or tribes. Guthe classifies the legends of the patriarchs among the materials appropriated and adapted from Canaanitish sources. Israel simply took up along with the civilization of the country, characters that had been known in Canaan from the earliest times, and so enveloped them with their own recollections and experiences that they became theirs. Accordingly, Israel owes Canaan not only their primitive history, as we were taught during the *Babel-Bibel* controversy, but also the remaining portion of Genesis.

Of course, according to Guthe, the Israelites transformed these characters, and made them the bearers of divine gifts and virtues. But, Volck comments, suppose that such were the facts, how strange it is that even the picture of an Abraham, who has become the ideal of Christian piety, shows, according to Genesis, great faults. And the history of Jacob and his house, with which, according to biblical accounts, the family of Abraham begins to be a people, is full of sin and shame; in fact the only great thing that we find there is the faith of Jacob, which clings fast to the promise. And if we inquire further of Guthe as to what these patriarchs really were before their transformation and adoption by Israel, we are informed that our means do not suffice to answer the question. However, it looks as if they stand in close relation to the worship of ancestors, of which we find remnants among the Canaanites.

Many portions of like character could be cited. Of course Volck rejects all such positions, and adds that such a rearrangement of history was to be expected from one who handles the sources according to the principles laid down in Kuenen's *Critical Method*.

"I have given the above from Guthe's book in order, first, to show an example of the way in which he handles the sources, and, secondly, to show that his presentation moves wholly in the direction pointed out by Wellhausen. This can be noticed especially in his declarations concerning the beginnings of the Israelitish religion, which agree with that which we read in Wellhausen's works. According to the latter, the decalogue is from the time of Manasseh; according to Guthe, in its present form, it is a work of a deuteronomic period." Guthe also agrees with Wellhausen in teaching that the prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries laid the foundation for a higher "conception of God, in so far as they placed the moral and spiritual content of the idea of God higher than all His other attributes, which was contrary to the opinion generally held."

By the death of Prof. Volck Germany lost a strong and aggressive advocate of a conservative higher criticism. He is generally classed with Koenig of Bonn and Hommel of Muenchen, though he differs from them on many points.

Zahn of Erlangen has again placed the theological world and the Christian Church in general under obligations to him by the publication of his commentary on Matthew. (*Kommentar zum Neuen Testament*, herausgegeben von Prof. D. Theodor Zahn. Band I. Leipzig, 1904. A. Deichert. M. 14.50). It is part of a New Testament commentary edited by Zahn, for which he plans to write the volumes on Matthew, the Johannine books, Romans and Hebrews. Probably profiting by the examples of his predecessors in Erlangen, Olshausen and von Hofmann, who died in the midst of the preparation of their great commentaries, he assigned the other volumes to students or friends of his. The purpose of his commentary is quite different from that of Olshausen and also from that of Von Hofmann, from whom he learned so much. Olshausen wished to present archæological and grammatical material for the student of the New Testament. Von Hofmann undertook an investigation of the entire Bible, examining from all sides the hidden meaning, in the hope that such an investigation would scientifically prove it to be the Holy Scriptures. Zahn simply gives an exhaustive explanation of the text.

The theological conditions of Norway are, as a rule, unknown outside of Scandinavian countries. Here in America we read a great many items of church news from that far away Lutheran country of the North, probably because the practical rather than the scientific interests of the Church are discussed. However, changes of great importance are about to take place, in fact are now taking place, which have been discussed at length in foreign journals, from which we condense the following:

The Church of Norway, until very recently, has been entirely free from the so-called "modern theology." This conservatism is, to a great extent, the result of an intelligent rejection of the new and an intelligent adaptation of the old to new conditions; but there are many Norwegian pastors—some writers claim that the majority are of this class—whose conservatism is secured only in their ignorance of present day theological thought, which conservatism is the most dangerous

and discreditable that can exist; dangerous because it is incapable of self-defence; discreditable, because it is generally the result of intellectual indifference or bigotry, or perhaps of both. And yet it must be acknowledged that the Lutheran Church in America has considerable of this sort of conservatism.

A brief historical retrospect is necessary if we would understand present theological conditions in Norway. At the beginning of the last century Rationalism reigned in the Norwegian Church as elsewhere. Then later, as in Germany, a confessional tendency made itself felt, in which the pietistic spirit of the great lay-revivalist, Hauge, exerted great influence. Then came the revival which swept over the country about the middle of the century under the leadership of the conservative Prof. Johnssen, who exerted great influence over the students of theology for almost half a century. Caspari exerted a like influence, and the same can also be said of Profs. Bugge (later bishop of Christiania,) Petersen and Bishop Heuch. The result of the life work of such men was the building up and the strengthening of a very pronounced type of orthodoxy in the Norwegian Church. Petersen was probably the most liberal of these leaders and Heuch was the most conservative. Petersen saw a time of crisis coming, when the Norwegian Church would have to reckon with the modern thought, and tried to prepare his students for meeting it. Heuch would have nothing at all to do with the results of modern investigation and even hesitated to approve Petersen's course, whom he regarded as a good Lutheran, but his teaching might lead to rationalism.

Under such conditions it was unavoidable that a transition of some importance should take place. A certain feeling of unrest began to be noticed here and there. Ritschlianism and Old Testament Criticism began to modify the views of many. There was a general feeling that the Church was confronted by grave difficulties. This change was most marked in the old doctrine of inspiration. Perhaps the first noticeable tendency toward a division of the Church into two parties appeared about 1895, when Heuch severely criticized a thesis, submitted by Pastor Brockman for attaining the doctor's degree. The

thesis was rejected, and many believed that its rejection hinged wholly on its supposed rationalistic tendency. Brockman's error was that he made righteousness depend on sanctification. There were many who defended at least the liberty of its author, but the devout laity agreed with Heuch and saw in it a threatening tendency. However, Brockman and all those who disagreed with Heuch held firmly to the divinity of Christ and the reconciling power of his death, and all of them subscribed to the Lutheran confessions. But the first stage in the defining of two theological tendencies in the Norwegian Church had been reached.

The first real cause for division came in the Fall of 1901, when Harnack's "*What is Christianity?*" was reviewed and discussed. One would have expected it to find no sympathetic readers in this land of severe orthodoxy and conservative liberalism, for Norwegian liberalism was by no means liberal in the sense in which German liberalism is liberal. But there were some who, because of its apologetic spirit, thought they saw in it a means of overcoming for the Church the anti-Christian materialism of the times. But it was different with Pastor Klaverness. For some time he had advocated the teaching of the results of modern criticism to the young, so that later they might not find themselves estranged from that which they had learned and thereby be led to doubt everything. In a word, his slogan was, Christianity must adapt itself to the culture of today. Accordingly, the theme of his address at the Lutheran conference in Lund was: *The Increasing Religious Indifference among the Cultured, and how the Church is to remedy it*. This became then the motive of his preaching in Christiania. Later he published a volume of sermons under the title, *The Gospel Preached to the New Age*. He charged the clergy with using obsolete forms of expression, and urged them to seek their *terminus a quo* in religious and moral truths that are found among men of culture, e. g., belief in a merciful God the Father in heaven, the dictates of conscience, etc. Such truths should serve as a starting point from which the clergy might lead them on. Then for more than a year, from the Fall of 1901 to the Spring of 1903, there was a controversy as to what is meant

by "the Gospel," in which Klaveness's foes charged him with having chosen another center for the Gospel than the person and work of Christ.

At a large conference in Christiania, in the Fall of 1901, Tanberg read a paper on, *Is Our Church Threatened by a New Rationalism at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century?* which he answered in the affirmative. Then about a year later the aged Heuch took up the same question in a pamphlet, which bore the suggestive title, *Against the Stream*, in which he condemned almost every leader of consciously or unconsciously fostering rationalistic tendencies. Then the storm broke. For a long time there were earnest discussions in both the secular and the religious press. And after the smoke of the battle had cleared away there were two well-defined theological camps where there had been but one before; the one, extremely and uncompromisingly conservative; the other with various shades of more liberal tendencies, some conservatively liberal, others, radically so. The laity, with very few exceptions, agreed with Heuch.

Just at present the interest centers in the appointment of a professor for the only chair of Systematic Theology in the only university of Norway. Dr. Ording had successfully passed the competitive examination, but was found to be Reformed in his doctrine of the sacraments. The discussion has disturbed the whole Church, and such great pressure has been brought to bear upon those who have been entrusted with the duty of appointment that a new examination has been ordered, to which competitors from Sweden and Norway have been invited. The other members of the faculty, with the sole exception of Odland, are indignant, and ask what has become of academic liberty; but Prof. Odland threatens to resign from the faculty if Dr. Ording is appointed. And since Prof. Odland is active in all practical work of the Church, and consequently is widely and favorably known among the very conservative laity, his threat has back of it a power that will probably prove irresistible for the appointing authorities, who, in a land that is democratic rather than autocratic in spirit, will probably yield to the voice of the people. All of which means that the very conservative party is still on the throne in the Church of Norway.

ARTICLE X.

REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, NEW YORK.

Union Seminary Addresses. By Thomas S. Hastings. 12mo. Pp. viii and 266. Price \$1.50 net.

These addresses were published by Dr. Hastings upon the written request of his colleagues of the Faculty of the Union Theological Seminary in New York. The first address is Dr. Hastings' Inaugural, delivered, September 22, 1881, and is entitled, *The Minister and his Work*. The real theme, however, is: *Self—Its Meanings, and its Relations to the Work of the Christian Minister*.

The author insists that personal Christian character is the basis of power, influence and success in the Christian ministry. The minister must be a student, a preacher, a pastor. As a student the minister must seek knowledge in books, in men, in things, but primarily in Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Truth. He must be saturated with the spirit of God's Word. This will enable him to forget himself and to think only of God and of his hearers in preaching. The minister must so cultivate his manner of preaching, his voice and gesture, that people will forget the preacher in listening to what he says. "Fine speaking is the broadest and finest of the fine arts; it is architecture, music, statuary and painting, all in one." It is *summa ars artem superare*. The minister must be also a pastor. Here the author utters strong words against place-seekers and self-seekers. The honest self-sacrificing worker will find doors open for him. "A stone that is fit for the wall will not be left in the road-way."

There is a short address on Luther as a Preacher. Here Luther's physical, intellectual and spiritual qualifications as a preacher are considered. In all these respects Luther excelled. Surely no follower of Luther could have said more or better things of Luther as a preacher than Dr. Hastings has said in these few pages. He has undoubtedly studied the great Wittenberg master.

The third address seeks to answer the query: *How does God call his Ministers?* The call comes through various instrumentalities, and is variously made known according to the differences in men. But behind all and in all is the Holy Spirit. But when God calls man must recognize the call. Moses and Isaiah at first excused themselves, but the Lord said to the one "Go," and when the seraph had touched the lips of the other with a live coal from off the altar, he said: "Here am I, send me." Paul conferred not with flesh and blood, which the author thinks implies that he conferred with the Lord.

Another address of special excellence is entitled, *Man in the Image of God*. This image of God appears in all of man's faculties; and it is because man is the image of God, that the divine revelation and personal communion with God, and the incarnation of the Son of God, are made possible. In Dr. Hastings' estimation man is a creature of grand endowments and of lofty possibilities. Even in his ruin he is great.

The book also contains numerous addresses to the graduating classes of the Seminary, and numerous prayer-meeting talks. All these are models of their kind—tender, wise, spiritual, evangelical. Every theological student ought to read this book, and we should think that every student who graduated from the Union Seminary during Dr. Hastings' incumbency would procure a copy of it. The book possesses rare literary charm. The illustrations are gathered from an extensive course of reading, and the whole is enriched by the choicest flowers of poetry. We have read the book with profit, and have read paragraphs of it before our own classes, for the purpose of illustrating important points in ministerial culture.

J. W. RICHARD.

A Dictionary of the Bible dealing with its language, literature and contents including the Biblical Theology. Edited by James Hastings, M. A., D. D. With the assistance of John A. Selbie, M. A., D. D. *Extra Volume* containing Articles, Indexes and Maps. Pp. 936. Price \$6.00.

This is the *crowning* volume of the great Hastings Bible Dictionary. We use the word "crowning" advisedly, for the reason that this volume supplements, completes and crowns the entire work; and a magnificent work it is, consisting now of five huge double-column quarto volumes, each volume equivalent in the amount of its matter to ten or more ordinary duodecimo volumes, the whole constituting the most comprehensive and learned work on the Bible, in existence. This comprehensiveness is shown by the fact that it embraces almost every subject contained in or in any way connected with the Bible. The learning that it exhibits is not that of any one man, but that of all the great biblical specialists in the world, both Jewish and Christian. No less than one hundred and ninety-four names are found in the *Index of Authors*. We doubt if so many names of equal significance for any other science can be brought together as contributors to the composition of a dictionary, or of an encyclopedia, of the science to be named, and no doubt the reason for this is found in the closely associated facts that the Bible is the King of Books and that Theology is the Queen of Sciences.

This work is also up-to-date. It exhibits the very latest conclusions in regard to the Bible—for some things in regard to the Bible are definitely settled—and presents the newest theories about subjects contained in and connected with the Bible—for some biblical subjects are

yet under strife awaiting evidence that may lead to conclusions. The articles connected with the Old Testament are all constructed from some standpoint of the so-called Higher Criticism. But this is exactly what was to be expected in a biblical work of so comprehensive a character as the one before us, for, whether we will or will not, we have to accept the fact that there is probably not a single first-class O. T. scholar in the world who does not stand somewhere on the line of the Higher Criticism—who has not accepted some of the conclusions and theories of the so-called Higher Critics. The sciolists and scholars in O. T. criticism have before them a nobler duty than that of complaint. Let them enter the arena and with that weapon which is proverbially mightier than the sword, let them strive for a victory which, when won, will make the field more glorious in the annals of Christian warfare than Marathon and Waterloo are in the annals of carnal strife. It is not the office of dignified scholarship, conscious of its strength, to complain and to philosophize. This is the age of the pick and shovel, and of hard digging among dry roots. Falsehood must be overthrown by truth, fiction by fact. If the traditional views of the O. T. are to be restored—and we hope they will be—let the O. T. traditionalists make it plain to scientific apprehension and to intelligent faith that the six days of creation enumerated in Gen. I, are six literal days of twenty-four hours each, that the Pentateuch is an absolutely original composition of Moses, that the book known as Isaiah is, in all of its sixty-six chapters, the prophecy of one man, and that every Psalm that in our English Bible is designated *A Psalm of David*, was actually composed by the great Shepherd King of Israel. The minds of Christian people which have been unsettled by the work of the Higher Critics will be glad to find rest again in the traditional views, provided the facts marshalled in support of these views are stronger and clearer than those advanced by the Critics. The Christian mind and faith, long since emancipated from the thralldom of mediaeval scholasticism will not receive religious instruction merely on authority. There must be good and sufficient reasons for it. A sound Protestantism emphasizes the objective as well as the subjective factor in the Christian religion. The *credo ut intelligam* and the *intelligo ut credam* must be reconciled. Bernard triumphed at Sens, but Luther triumphed at Worms: "Unless I be refuted by scriptural testimonies, or by clear arguments," etc. Popes and councils have erred. Clear arguments have their place in the Christian religion.

But what has all this to do with the Hastings Bible Dictionary? Much in every way. The most comprehensive and learned biblical work in Christendom has thrown down a challenge on the line of the so-called Higher Criticism. This library of biblical and theological information and discussion has gone into the hands of tens of thousands of ministers and theological students. Its influence reflected in

sermons, in Sunday School teaching, and in discussions, will be felt in every part of the English speaking Church. Until its fundamental tendency is refuted, or until it is supplanted by another similar work of equal comprehensiveness and learning, but of opposing tendency, it will be accepted as a standard. Vast numbers of teachers in the Church will gauge their understanding of the Bible, and regulate their teaching more or less, according to its *dicta*. It will avail nothing that objectors hump up the back and shrug the shoulders and pout out the lips. The so-called Conservative Scholarship must either refute the fundamental tendency of this work, or it must accept it, and must adjust itself to the new situation. Which will it do? *Sit lux*. It will avail nothing to say that the ark of God has fallen into the hands of the Philistines, for these men also inquire at the ark of God. It does not follow necessarily that Uzza must put forth his hand to hold the ark because the oxen have stumbled. The Christian world will accept the fundamental tendency of this work unless the refutation be forthcoming. *Grammatici certant, et adhuc sub judice lis est*.

And now to this *Extra Volume*. 1. *The Articles*. Of these there are only thirty-seven, some of which do not belong directly to the contents of the Bible, but all of which are in place in such a work as this Dictionary claims to be. The first is the *Sermon on the Mount*, forty-four pages, by C. W. Votaw. It is simply exhaustive. The *Religion of Greece and Asia Minor*, pp. 109-156, by W. M. Ramsay, has interest for the classical as well as for the biblical scholar. There can be no doubt that the Hellenistic Religion and Worship helped to prepare the world for the final and perfect religion and for the reception of the only proper object of worship. Dr. Ramsay is at his best in this article. The *Religion of Egypt*, twenty pages, by A. Wiedemann, has both religious and secular value. *Textual Criticism* (of N. T.) pp. 208-236, by J. O. F. Murray, is written from a very comprehensive and thorough knowledge of the subject. The author belongs to the "critical school," and ably defends the position of that school—Tischendorf, Tregelles, Westcott and Hort, Nestle *et al* as over against the position of the "traditional school"—Burton, Miller *et al*—though the article is didactic rather than polemical. It is written for scholars, and not for beginners in the science of N. T. Textual Criticism. It is admirably done.

Another article of great value in the study of comparative religious history, pp. 531-584, by Morris Jastrow, Jr., is that entitled *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*. The author thinks that the Babylo-Assyrian religion "represents on its best side the high-water mark of ancient thought," and says that "the general thesis may be maintained, that an understanding of the Hebrew religion is impossible without a constant consideration of the religion and culture that were developed in the Euphrates Valley," p. 581.

The *Code of Hammurabi*, pp. 585-612, is comprehensively discussed.

by C. H. W. Johns. Two hundred and eighty-two statutes of that Code are given. The parallelism between this remarkable piece of legislation and the early Hebrew is sketched. The article closes with these words: "The presumption that Babylonia had a prominent influence on Palestine long before Israelite codes were drawn up, is one that grows stronger as time goes on."

Professor E. Kautzsch, of Halle, writes on *Religion in Israel*, pp. 612-734. In extent of matter this article is quite equivalent to an ordinary book of from five hundred to six hundred pages. It is in all probability the most important treatise on the subject in the English language. We are not prepared to give either an outline or an analysis of this article. We prefer to characterize it as learned, comprehensive, reverent. It is a pleasure to note that the author has written "that this religion called for supplement and completion—a completion which came in the fullness of time through Christ, who is the end of the law." The article is sure to evoke dissent as well as consent. 2. *Indexes*. I. *Index of Authors*—their residences, titles, official positions, and the articles written by them for this work—eight pages. II. *Index of Subjects*—pp. 735-890. III. *Index of Scripture Texts and other References*, pp. 890-919. IV. *Index of Hebrew and Greek Terms*, pp. 919-933. V. *Index of Illustrations*, pp. 933-936. VI. *List of Maps*, thirteen in number.

By means of these Indexes every part of the great work becomes easily available. "And now the work of this Dictionary of the Bible is at an end." It has been a pleasure to the present reviewer of this Dictionary to give some account of each volume as it appeared. Though compelled to express dissent from some views contained in this work, we nevertheless set a high value upon it. It is truly worthy of a place in every public library and in the library of every student of the Bible. We wish for it a wide circulation and hope to see it give place to something greater and better. Excelsior!

J. W. RICHARD.

The Theology of the Old Testament. By the late A. B. Davidson, D.D., LL.D., Litt.D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis, New College, Edinburgh. Edited from the author's manuscripts by S. D. F. Salmond, D.D., F.E.I.S., Principal of the United Free Church College, Aberdeen. 12mo., pp. 553.

Dr. Davidson was recognized as a master in Hebrew, and in Old Testament Theology. It is deeply to be regretted that he did not live to apply the finishing hand to this book, though the editor says: "I have not thought it right to take liberties with my departed friend's work. I have given it substantially as he left it, adding only an occasional note where that seemed appropriate or needful." We thus have Dr. Davidson's work in its material content, though cast in its present form by Dr. Salmond. We file no objection against the form, and we

are delighted with the material content of this book. It is thorough, on many subjects fairly exhaustive, sound and orthodox from a moderately Calvinistic standpoint, and a standpoint, a fundamental principle, every book must have in order to have character. The author may be said to occupy the position in regard to the authorship, date of composition, etc., of the Old Testament books, known as that of the so-called "conservative Higher Criticism." He regards Old Testament Theology as a historical science, and as having a development. He divides the subject into three heads: Theology, Anthropology, Soteriology. His general soundness is vouched for by his adoption and expansion of the Augustinian motto that the New Testament is concealed in the Old, and the Old is revealed in the New. He says: "There is perhaps no truth in the New Testament which does not lie in germ in the Old Testament, and conversely, there is perhaps no truth in the Old Testament which has not been expanded and had new meaning put into it in the New. The Old Testament contains the same truths as the New Testament, but in a less developed form, and we must avoid two errors which are rather common. The one is the mistake of separating the Old Testament from the New in such a way as leaves us with no authoritative truth in the Old. The other is to confuse the New and the Old so that we shall find the Old equally advanced with the New. The difference between the New and the Old is not that the same truths are not found in both, but that in the one the truths are found in a less degree of development than in the other. The Old Testament is as good authority for a truth as the New; only we must not go beyond the degree which the truth has yet reached in the Old Testament," p. 10.

The different names of God are carefully distinguished. "The pronunciation *Jehovah* has no pretence to right. It was not introduced into currency till the time of the Reformation, about 1520." "Various reasons conspire together in favor of the pronunciation now current, *Yahwe*' (variously spelled *Jahve*, *Yahveh*, *Yahweh*, etc.)." The personality and the spirituality of God are clearly vindicated.

The book is very comprehensive in its discussion of Anthropology. The author favors the view that the Old Testament teaches Dichotomy. Sin, both in the individual and in the race, is ably discussed. "Sin has reference to God the Person, not to His will or His law as formulated externally." This seems to be one-sided. Does not sin have reference to God the Person and to the will of God as that will is expressed in His law? We agree with the author that the Old Testament favors *Traducianism*, and this view of man is certainly sustained both by psychological and physiological science. We are especially pleased with the following: "All institutions were an expression of religion. The Sabbath expressed a *religious* idea—the acknowledgement that *time* was Jehovah's as well as all things. The day was *sanctified*, that is,

dedicated to God." The *Doctrine of Redemption*, the *Messianic Idea*, *Immortality*, receive ample discussion.

A quality of this book that especially pleases us is its cautiousness, or better, the cautiousness of its author, who seems disposed to interpret the Old Testament as it is, and to draw authoritative conclusion only where the Book has spoken definitely. He finds no place for speculation. His attitude toward the so-called Higher Criticism may be inferred from the following: "I cannot help thinking that this kind of criticism has gone to extremes in recent times, and has had the effect of discrediting the criticism which is legitimate," p. 30.

We commend the book as containing a wise and intelligent handling of the subject of Old Testament Theology.

J. W. RICHARD.

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY.

Balance the Fundamental Verity. By Orlando J. Smith. Houghton, Mifflin and Company. The Riverside Press, Cambridge, 1904.

We have here a very original and interesting effort to solve the problem and show the harmony of science and religion. The solution is sought and alleged to be found in the scientific reality of cause and effect or the absolute equivalence between action and reaction. Nature is formally viewed as evolutionary movement, matter and force as indestructible and persistent. Effects follow causes in unbroken sequence and equipoise, and so the conclusion is reached that "*balance* is the fundamental verity, and rules the world." "It is supreme in the small as well as in the great processes of nature—every physical transformation includes exact equivalence and compensation."

In a sphere of physical nature the author has traced the supremacy of this truth of balance or equivalent consequences as a law of advance, with skill and great force. When, however, he comes to the domain of moral life he is obliged to concede that the law of balance is not found in full dominion, but largely disappears in irregularity and confusion, in uncompensated virtue and unpunished wrong. He says: "At the end of our reasoning concerning the fundamental questions of life we must choose between two alternates—either (1) all things are in process of being righted, or (2) the world-order is hopelessly wrong." The former alternative is taken: "The processes of compensation in human affairs involve a cycle of beginning, development and conclusion—as seed-time, growth, and harvest—for completion." The belief in a future life is, therefore, accepted as a part of nature's truth. "The only basis for the belief that justice will be completely established in human affairs is the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. This conclusion sheds much light upon the universality, persistence and rational meaning of religion."

The author makes much of "man's feeling of accountability," found to be inherent in both the moral and religious life. "The belief that the

soul survives the body, is the recognition that accountability does not end with the death of the body; that the wrongs which are not righted here must be righted elsewhere; that the good which is not rewarded here must be rewarded hereafter; that there can be no break in the processes of accountability. As science assumes that cause and effect, action and reaction, motion and transformation, are ceaseless in the physical world, so religion assumes that cause and effect, action and consequences, are ceaseless in the soul of the individual. The religious doctrine of ceaseless moral accountability is identical with the scientific doctrine of ceaseless cause and effect."

The interpretation is carried further. The necessary corollary of the two preceding beliefs is declared to be "*belief in a supreme power that rights things*"—or, put more briefly: "*right rules the world*," this latter form of statement being put as a particular embraced under the generic universal verity "balance." "Balance *includes* order, right and justice. Balance is an active, governing principle, supreme, central, automatic." "Balance is single and supreme, without a mate or rival."

The book throughout gives evidence of Mr. Smith's ability and learning, and is an interesting and suggestive contribution to the current discussion of the world-problem. Its value will be found to consist in its emphatic maintenance of the truth that both moral law and religious obligation have legitimate and necessary peace and reality in the world-system and human life. We cannot feel, however, that he has satisfactorily proved the proposition presented in the title of the book. "The fundamental verity" seems to be a synonym for the ground of the entire world-system, its full explanation. The abstraction "balance," which at best designates only a mode or feature of cosmic movement, is put as a real causal entity, "The Regulator," "Supreme," automatic. The efficient source of this fact or law of balance, marking the ongoings of nature, are neither sought nor found. That cause must lie back of the phenomenon. Though the words Theism and God are a few times used, a personal God is not recognized. So the logic of the discussion necessarily falls back upon the monistic (pantheistic) idea, of impersonal deity, in self-evolution. But monism, offering only an impersonal Supreme Power "that rights things," even though this be capitalized, is as far from furnishing a scientific solution of the world as it is from explaining its moral and religious problems. A similar use of the term "right" as "ruling the world," carries on the illusive, illogical method, putting a mere concept to do the work of a moral ruler, which involves personality. But this failure of the author to establish his distinct thesis does not destroy the value of the work. Its worth, which is large, is in its clear and logical support of the fundamental moral and religious verities, and as an original and interesting presentation of the cosmic problem, for which speculative science is striving after a new solution.

An *Appendix* containing critical reviews by scientific and religious

writers and a *Reply* by the Author to his Critics, adds to the value of the volume.

M. VALENTINE.

Rich as the December number of the *Atlantic Monthly* was, the January number is equally attractive. It would seem as though with its clean, new type it has taken a new lease of life. A long list of literary favorites are among the contributors of this number. As an introduction to Thoreau's Journal the initial installment of which appears in this number, Bradford Torrey contributes a paper on Thoreau as a Diarist. T. W. Higginson writes of the American Audience; Charles M. Huger, of The Country Store; Andrew D. White, of the Warfare of Humanity, and Marguerite Merington, of Ethics of the Street. Elizabeth Robins Penwell begins The Leland Papers. A beautiful story by Lafcadio Hearn will be read with pathetic interest. Two Stories, Thurston and The Enamel Bug in Black Canon are quite up to the *Atlantic's* high grade of fiction. The fifth installment of Isidro is of the same character as the strong chapters that have preceded it. These other fine papers, choice poems, appreciative and discriminating book-reviews complete one of the best number's of the always acceptable *Atlantic*.

CONCORDIA PUBLISHING HOUSE, ST. LOUIS, MO.

Gospel Sermons. By Henry Sieck, Pastor of Mt. Olivet Lutheran Church, Milwaukee, Wis. Part II. Pp. 187.

The volume before us is Part II of a series of sermons on the gospels of the church year. Part I, containing the sermons from Advent to Trinity Sunday, was published several years ago, and was noticed in this place. The present volume containing the sermons for the Trinity cycle together with a sermon for St. Michael's day, a Reformation day sermon and one for Thanksgiving day.

These sermons, thirty in all, are hardly fair subjects for criticism on the score of homilistical or literary merit, but they are good specimens of plain, simple, earnest addresses, conveying the glorious gospel message. They present the truths of the gospel from the standpoint of the Lutheran confession, and are well calculated to build up the believer in his most holy faith.

Pastor Sieck has a clear insight into the plan of salvation, and of the leading and abiding principles of the Christian life. Whilst true to the doctrines of God's Word these sermons are not barren theological abstractions, but they represent religion as a thing of life and power, the one thing needful to man. It is to be regretted that the author's style is catchy and abrupt. The sermons read as if they had been originally written in German, and then had been translated into English by an unpractical hand. But for all that, these sermons, full of the gospel, are

vastly superior to a great many of the empty, flashy, meteoric things published in these days under the name of sermons, and they will accomplish vastly more good.

R. H. CLARE.

Manual of Physical Exercises for School and Home. Arranged by F. Rechlin. Pp. 145.

The physical exercises in this Manual are based on the acknowledged necessity of intermitting the unavoidable tedium of school hours, by such bodily movements as will infuse into the pupils, fresh spirit and physical vigor. The time which the manual suggests should be devoted each day to physical exercises, is but ten minutes, five in the middle of the forenoon and five in the middle of the afternoon. The amount, although small, is yet sufficient for stimulating and healthful relaxation. The exercises directed are presented from a practical rather than from a scientific standpoint, and can easily be handled by teachers who are interested in this kind of work, and who may yet have no experience in technical physical culture.

The work is arranged for primary, intermediate and grammar grades, and consists of varied exercises, composite drills, marching and songs with calisthenics. Flag drills and games are also included.

The directions are clearly given, and all the exercises seem well adapted to meet the laudable purpose in view.

G. D. STAHLEY.

PERRY MASON COMPANY, BOSTON, MASS.

The Youth's Companion still holds its enviable place as prince among the secular periodicals for the young. It leads in so many particulars that it well deserves to lead also in circulation.

To summarize in this space the many and varied attractions announced for this year would be impossible. With more than two hundred men and women enlisted to write for it, the *Companion* represents the largest variety of talents and callings.

A series of articles planned to interest especially the forty-five millions of Americans who look directly to the soil for their subsistence will treat of "New Fields for Young Farmers," "The Sanitation of the Farm," "The Future of American Cotton," "How Women Make Money on the Farm," etc.

Seven serial stories and two hundred and fifty short stories by the most talented and popular American writers of fiction will form part of the contents of the new volume for 1905.

The *Companion* is an excellent help in cultivating a taste in young persons for wholesome literature. We heartily commend it. Its address is 144 Berkeley Street, Boston, Mass., and its price \$1.75 per annum.

LUTHERAN PUBLICATION SOCIETY, PHILADELPHIA.

History of the Pittsburg Synod of the General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. 1748-1845-1904. By Rev. Ellis B. Burgess. Pp. 448.

The poet is born. The historian is made. To write history well, to make an entertaining and profitable record of the deeds of men of former years, the historian must collect all existing materials, must sift the same with impartiality, must enter into the spirit and conceptions of the past and must draw his picture with lively imagination tempered by good judgment and sound sense. In all these respects the author of the book before us has succeeded admirably. He has given us a narrative of struggles, contentions, alienations, toils and triumphs, that, taken together, exhibit a philosophy of Christianity that teaches by example. We believe, however, that his history would be more instructive, had he included a larger portion of the shadows that beclouded the horizon after the separation in 1867. Posterity has a right to know everything. The past can yield its full and proper lesson only when all of its events, good and bad, have been made known. The mistakes of good men serve as warnings to others. Our historian has probably erred on the side of *Irenic*. But enough is given, both of light and of shadow, to furnish a most excellent and instructive book. It ought to have a wide circulation, both within and without the bounds of the Pittsburg Synod, and ought to stimulate other synods to have similar histories written. The Lutheran Church in America is still in its formative period. Correct local histories will prepare the way and furnish much of the material for that general philosophical history of the American Lutheran Church which awaits the coming of the man of broad vision and of impartial spirit, who can create one picture by skillful combination of many local studies.

J. W. RICHARD.

GERMAN LITERARY BOARD, BURLINGTON, IOWA.

At the Deathbed of Darwinism. By E. Dennert, Ph.D. Translated by E. V. O'Hara and John H. Peschges. Pp. 146, 75 cents.

Those people whose opinions on the theory of Descent, or organic Evolution, were made some 30 or 40 years ago, and who have not taken the trouble to follow the subsequent discussions, or revise their opinions as then formed, will get a wrong idea from the title of this book. Darwin was such a dominant figure in evolutionary thinking, that his explanation of the theory of Descent by "natural selection" and the "survival of the fittest," was accepted with very great unanimity, and hence "Darwinism," (meaning Darwin's explanation) was, for a time, synonymous with Evolution itself. But many biological students, during the past 15 or 20 years, are disposed to discredit Darwin's ex-

planations, and hence "Darwinism" is losing ground, although the theory of evolution is still maintained as a working hypothesis. Instead, however, of attaching primary importance to Darwin's explanations, other laws are being discussed and recognized.

The book furnishes very interesting reading and is deserving of a wide circulation. In view of existing opinions, the term "deathbed" is rather a strong word to use, and yet it may eventually be the appropriate one. With the exception of an occasional exhibition of undue anxiety in proving positions taken, the arguments and judgments given, are, in the main, fair and convincing.

The author acknowledges that "it is easier to criticise than to do constructive work." He objects to the law of "natural selection" and the "survival of the fittest," as advocated by Darwin, because in such a scheme "chance reigns supreme," no Creator is recognized and no purpose can be detected in the process. Man, both as to his body and mind, is only a highly developed animal.

He very properly insists that all evolution proceeds by definite plans to definite ends; that there are law-controlled factors and no chance; that coöperation among organisms is more important than contending struggle, and that the soul of man is an independent substance.

Christian evolutionists, and there are multitudes of them, can heartily endorse these views. Evolution is certainly "not a purely mechanical process," and the more recent views on the subject indicate that much weight must be given to "internal forces of development."

G. D. STALEY.

HINDS AND NOBLE, NEW YORK.

Songs of All the Colleges. No expense of effort has been spared to gather into this collection many of the old and all of the new College Songs. No alumnus is too far removed from the scenes of his college life to be insensible to the ringing cheer of the songs of old college days and this collection will be very welcome to the student. It includes the popular Yale Boole Song. Next to familiar hymns college songs are the greatest favorites with young and old, and to those now in Colleges and Universities as well as to the men who have long quit the college life this very complete collection will be well received.